A reappraisal of transport aircraft needs 1985 - 2000:  Perceptions of airline management in a changing economic, regulatory, and technological environment by Spencer, F. A.
NASA Contractor Report 165887 
/V1;'5ft-· ~f{-. /Cj~' 3-o'l 
NASA-CR-165887 
19830010430 
A Reappraisal of Transport Aircraft Needs 1985-2000: 
Perceptions of Airline Management in a Changing Economic" 
Regulatory, and Technological Environment 
Frank A. Spencer 
NORTH~~ESTERN UNIVERSITY 
Transportation Center 
Evanston; Illinois 
Contract NAG 1-180 
March 1982 
NI\S/\ 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 23665 
r. If> '1 J\ r>V n nov 
\' . ." >..~ d ~ l." ~ 1 • •• L"t~li~ .. ' 11} - U 
SEP 2 1982. 
H\,.~Gl.t: f 1<~,~':'I;r~';d ",Eli 1 ~,~ 
LIt:;R[;HY, ::AS!\ 
'1,\'l'PT!3U1 \lm81!'\~ 
i /111111111111 ~ J'~~I~IJI~ 1111111111111 
I 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19830010430 2020-03-21T05:38:55+00:00Z
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
. . 
. . 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-. 
A Reappraisal of Transport Aircraft Needs 1985-2000: 
Perceptions of Airline Management in a Changing ~conomic, 
Regulatory, and Technological Environment 
by 
Frank A. 'Spencer· 
.Associate Professor 
Northwestern University 
Transportation Center 
Evanston, Illinois 
Pursuant to NASA Langley Research Center 
Grant NAG 1-180 
TC431 
;1%3- /~1(}/#· 

\ LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF CHARTS 
FOREWORD . . • 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. \. ) 
.. 
\, vi i 
.  
. viii 
ix 
xi 
Chapter 1 . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . • . .. . . . . . . .. 1 
1.1 The New Environment Facing Management -- Developments 
of the 70s 
1.2 Research Procedure . . . • . • . . . . . 
Chapter 2 HOW EIGHT MAJOR (FORf4ER TRUNK) AIRLINES PERCEIVE 
THEIR FUTURE ROLES 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
2.10 
Alternatives Available 
Questions to be Raised. 
American Airlines 
TWA . . . . . . . 
United Airlines 
Northwest Airlines. 
Delta Airl i nes . . . 
Eastern Airlines .. 
Western Airlines .. 
Continental Airlines .• 
Chapter 3 HOW THE TWO NEW MAJOR AIRLINES SEE THEIR 
FUTURE ROLE . . . • • . . . . . . . . . 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
USA i r . . . . . . . . . 
Republic Airlines 
Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter 4 THE' CHANGING ROLE OF SIX MEDIUM SIZE CARRIERS 
4.1 Frontier Airlines ....... . 
4.2 Piedmont Aviation ... . 
4.3 Air Wisconsin. . ... 
4.4 AirCal ..... . 
4.5 Air Florida .•. 
4.6 Air New England ..... 
Chapter 5 ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF THREE SPECIALIZED CARRIERS . 
5.1 Southwest Airlines. . . . . ... 
5.2 Pacific Southwest Airlines ......•... 
5.3 Midway-Airlines· •..••. 
iii 
3 
5 
9 
10 
11 
14 
17 
20 
24 
27 
30 
33 
37 
37 
40 
43 
47 
47 
51 
53 
56 
58 
61 
65 
66 
70 
73 
Chapter 6 . ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF A CARGO CARRIER AND A 
SMALL PACKAGE CARRIER 
6.1 The Flying Tiger Line. . ... 
6.2 Federal Express •..•. 
.... 
Chapter 7 ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF THREE COMMUTER AIRLINES 
7.1 Golden West ......•. 
7.2 Britt Airways ... 
7.3 Midstate .......•. 
7.4 Commuter Summary 
Chapter 8 FUTURE JET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT NEEDS: .AIRLINE 
MANAGEMENT VIEW . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 
77 
77 
79 
85 
88 
91 
92 
95 
99 
8.1 The Next New-Technology Series of Jets .. • . . . 99 
8.2 Management's Perceptions of the 150-passenger Jet. . 100 
8.3 Prospects for a 130-passenger Jet. . . . . . . ... .. 107 
8.4 Management and Re-engining the B-727 . . . . . . . 109 
Chapter 9 FUTURE FOR TURBOPROPS AND PROP-FAN TRANSPORTS: 
AIRLINE ~ANAGEMENT VIEW . . . . .. . . . ... . . . .. 113 
9.1 
9.2 
9.3 
9.4 
9.5 
9.6 
9.7 
Early U.S. Turboprop Experience -- Large Airlines 
Local Service Airlines Turboprop Experience .. . 
The Prop-Fan ................. . 
Larger Carriers' Views on the Turboprop and Prop-Fan 
Turboprops and Prop-Fans as Viewed by Medium 
Size Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 
The Commuters View of. Turboprops and Prop-Fans 
SUrTI11a r y . . . . .. ' . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 
Chapter 10 FOREIGN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT: MANAGEt~ENT 
113 
115 
. 117 
119 
127 
131 
134 
ASSESSMENT AND INTEREST .' ... '.' . 137 
. . 
10.1 Background ...... ; . . . . . . . . . . . .. 137 
10.2 The Changing "Foreign Aircraft" Picture •..•..... 138 
10.3 Major, National and Regional Airlines (Non-Commuters) .• 139 
10.4 Commuter Airl ines and Foreign Aircraft ......... 142 
Chapter 11 MANAGEMENT PERCEPTIONS OF FUTURE GROWTH . . .. . 147 
11.1 Backg~ound ... . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .. .• 147 
11.2 Forecasts of Individual Carrier and Industry Growth ... 147 
, Chapter 12 INTERFACE AMONG TYPES OF CARRIERS . . . . • . . 151· 
12.1 The Majors: AA, TW, UA, N~I, OAt EA, wA, CO, 
USAir and Republic .....•...•.••...... 151 
12.2 Nationals and Regionals: Frontier, Pi~dmont, AirCa1, 
Air Florida, SWA, PSA, Midway, Flying Tigers, 
Federal Express . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • i52 
12.3 Commuters: Air Wisconsin, Air New England, Golden 
West, Midstate • . . . • . • . . . . . 155 
12.4 Summary ......... 0. • • • • • • • . • • •• • 156 
iv 
Chapter 
13.1 
13.2 
13.3 
13.4 
13.5 
13.6 
13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . • . . . . • 
Future Rol e (Chapters 2-7) . . . . .• . • . . . . • 
Type of Aircraft Needed 1985-2000 (Chapters 8 and 9) 
The Purchase of Foreign Transport Aircraft • . 
Managements Growth Forecasts (Chapter 11) . 
Interfacing with Other Carriers (Chapter 12) 
·Concl usions .... 
Appendix A 
Appendix B 
v 
157 
160 
162 
165 
166 
167 
168 
173 
174 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
< 
-'. 
r ' 
. . 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2-1 
2-2 
2-3 
2-4 
2-5 
2-6 
2-7 
2-8 
3-1 
3-2 
LIST OF TABLES 
American Airlines Fleet, August 1981 .... . 
TWA Aircraft Fleet, October 1981 ... t ••• 
United Airlines Aircraft Fleet, October 1981 
Northwest Airlines Fleet~ March 1981 
Delta Fleet~ April 1981 .......• 
Eastern Airlines Fleet, July 1981 
Western Airlines Fleet, July 1981 
Continental Airlines Fleet, July 1981· 
USAir Fleet, October 1981 
Republic Fleet, June 1981 
4-1 Frontier Fleet, July 1981 .••. 
4-2 Piedmont Aviation Fleet, July 1981 
4-3 Air Wisconsin Fleet, August 1981 . 
4-4 AirCal Fleet, July 1981 .... ' .. 
4-5 Air Florida Fleet, October 1981 .. 
4-6 Air New England Fleet, October 1981 
5-1 
5-2 
5-3 
Southwest Airlines 1981 Fleet and Aircraft on Order 
PSA Fleet, October 1981 ~ .. 
Midway Airlines Fleet, .October 1981 
6-1 Flying Tigers Fleet, July 1981 
6-2 Federal Express Fleet, October 1981 
7-1 
7-2 
7-3 
8-1 
8-2 
Golden West Aircraft Fleet, October 1981 ..... 
Britt Airways Fleet, October 1981 •.•. 
Midstate Airlines Fleet, October 1981 
Proposals for ISO-Seat Aircraft, Spring 1981 
Distribution of Stage Lengths (Delta/United) 
9-1 Turboprops of the 60s .. . • . . . . 
12 
15 
18 
20 
25 
28 
31 
34 
38 
42 
48 
52 
54 
57 
59 
62 
67 
71 
73 
78 
80 
88 
91 
93 
102 
102 
115 
10-1 Commuter Aircraft of 15 Seats or More, 1981 ...•.•. 143 
10-2 New Commuter Aircraft Offered for Sale November, 1981 143 
11-1 Annual Growth as Forecast by Carrier for 1985-2000 . • 148 
vi i 
LIST OF CHARTS 
1-1 Influence of Fuel Price ...... . 
1-2 Progress in Noise Reduction Technology 
7-1 Analysis of Commuter Aircraft Fleet 1980 
vi ii. 
1 
4 
87 
FOREWORD 
This study which deals with the future equipment needs of the air-
lines is the third in a series of research projects conducted by the 
Transportation Center of Northwestern University for the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA). The first, pUblished in 1979, 
Factors Affectin the Retirement of Commercial Trans ort Aircraft 
NASA CR-152308 , indicated that retirements in the current era have not 
been caused by equipment aging and physical fatigue but rather by tech-
nological obsolescence resulting from dramatically rising fuel prices 
which pointed to the need to focus technology on fuel efficiency, and 
from increasingly successful pressures by environmentalists toward mini-
mizing or even eliminating the use of certain types of transport aircraft 
because of their noise characteristics. Fortunately, the development of 
high-bypass engines, first adopted on long-range wide-body aircraft, 
represented substantial improvement in both fuel efficiency and noise 
emissions. The study closed by pointing to the advisability of acceler-
ated research to hasten the application of this technology to smaller 
capacity and shorter range aircraft. 
Indications that air traffic in Europe and in the Pacific Basin was 
subject to increasing constraints because of aircraft noise regulations 
led NASA to commission the second study, a two-volume report entitled 
Transport Jet Aircraft Noise Abatement in Foreign Countries: Growth, 
Structure, 1m act, Vol. I: Euro e and Vol. II: Pacific Basin. This 
report NASA CR-152,356 and 152,357 , published in 1980, focused on the 
existing noise regulations as well as the future outlook. It concluded 
that noise regulations were becoming more pervasive and more onerous in 
a number of European and Pacific Basin states than in the U.S. Foreign 
carriers and their governments evidenced some dissatisfaction with the 
progress made by U.S. aircraft manufacturers in addressing the need for 
replacing medium to small transport aircraft with quiet, fuel-efficient 
planes. . 
This third study complements the other two and adds the factors of 
deregulation, inflation, and new technology to' the calculus of decisions 
dealing with equipment needs for 1985-2000. Focus is on the perceptions 
of the executives who will be making the equipment decisions. 
A note of explanation is necessary concerning the apparent lack of 
standardization in terminology in categorizing the airlines into types 
of carriers. On January 1, 1981, the CAB discontinued the terminology 
of trunks, local service, and commuters -- a terminology based upon the 
type of service rendered -- in favor of categories based upon gross reve-
nues received. Under the new classification there are majors (revenues 
of $1 billion or more), nationals ($75 million to $1 billion), large 
regionals ($10 million to $75 million), and small regionals (revenues 
less th~n $10 million). 
ix 
Financial analysts and the airlines themselves are not too happy 
with the new terminology; a few cling to the former classification, some 
have adopted the new, and still others use a mixture of both. This re-
port employs whichever term is appropriate in the context. Thus, the 
h~storical material employs the classifications of trunks, local service, 
and commuters -- terms in common usage at the time. 
Evanston, Illinois 
January, 1982 
Frank A. Spencer 
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Chapter 1 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
Dramatic changes in the economic, political, regulatory and tech-
nological environment in which the airlines operate have taken place in 
the 1970s and are continuing. 1 Rapid escalation of fuel costs relative 
to other costs (graphically depicted on Chart 1-1), fluctuating concerns 
over fuel availability, more stringent environmental regulations stemming 
from complaints about noise and particulate emissions, and a changed 
economic environment resulting' from inflation and deregulation have 
required airline managements to re-examine carefully their needs for air-
craft in the years ahead. 
Chart 1-1 
Influence of Fuel Price 
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Prior to 1973, when fuel was 11 cents a gallon, airframe engineers 
and powerplant designers were not concerned with fuel consumption; nor 
were they as concerned with jet aircraft noise emissions as the 
1 The controllers' strike beginning in August 1981 is the most recent 
example of a change which might have long run effects. 
1 
environmentalists have now forced them to be. Similarly the airlines, 
then under a regulatory system which provided a measure of protection 
against entry by other carriers, found it necessary to compete in fre-
quency of service and to provide more and more costly amenities. 
In the 1960s, high growth rates of traffic stemming from a post-war 
population which was experiencing increases in disposable income and 
leisure tim~ caused aircraft designers to build larger and longer range air-
craft, including the 8-747, which were deployed over route segments as short 
as 32 minutes flying time and as long as 13 hours irrespective of the 
efficiency involved. In the rush to increase capacity some airlines even 
purchased aircraft without having identified the routes on which they 
waul d be flown. It was the common bel i ef of management that if too 
large an aircraft was purchased the carrier would either grow into it 
or easily sell it. 
In the middle 1960s, with traffic .increasing at the robust rate of 
over 15 percent per year and with certain overwater distances too great 
for nonstop operation, aircraft manufact!Jrers concentrated on developing 
a new generation of wide-body high-capacity aircraft (8-747, DC-10, 
L-1011 and Airbus). The peak efficiencies of these planes were in the 
longer ranges. Introduction of these wide-bodies in the early 1970s 
began in a recession and continued in the subsequent inflationary period 
during which fuel costs increased by 900 percent. 
Infl uenced by the hi storical record of traffic growth and the "big-
ger is better and cheaper per seat mile" syndrome,aircraft manufacturers 
have been slow to develop medium- to short-haul aircraft of moderate 
capacities. Until recently aircraft manufacturers were not being pushed 
2 
hard toward new-technology planes of more modest size and by small-
medium-sized airlines because their managements had visions of growth 
which would enable them to emulate the trunks. However, new elements 
have now developed to change the environment in which airline managements 
must operate so that management of an airline is "a whole new ball game." 
1.1 The New Environment Facing Management -- Developments of the 70s 
Six important developments of the 1970s now face management: 
(1) a 900 percent increase in fuel price which renders many airline 
aircraft either economically obsolete or requires fares sufficiently 
high to curtail demand; 
(2) a general rate of inflation which results in less disposable income 
being available for travel, thus reducing future growth expecta-
tions. Inflation has also raised ownership costs of new aircraft 
to the extent that the economies of the new technology are offset; 
(3) a growing trend toward a more competitive industry -- formalized 
into law by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and characterized 
by significant changes in airline route structure; . 
(4) legal and social pressures for the replacement of existing aircraft 
by quieter aircraft which are now available (chart 1-2); 
(5) public rejection of large wide-body service when it competes with 
higher frequency, lower-capacity, standard-body planes; and 
(6) the possibility of a technological advance which would make a prop-
fan with its significant fuel savings viable, poses complications 
on long-term equipment decisions. 
These elements combine to force managements to reassess their : 
strategy not only as to routes and types of business, but particularly 
as to the type and size of aircraft employed. Under the previous regu-
lated environment in which there were varying degrees of protection from 
entry by competing carriers so that routes had a franchise value, the 
CAB set rates on the basis of industry costs. Thus, fares had to be 
high enough to protect the inefficient carriers. This is no longer the 
3 
Chart 1-2 
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case. Efficient lo~-cost carriers, like Delta and Northwest, as well as 
. . 
new ~pecialized carriers, like SWA, PSA, Ne~ York Air, and People, have 
the capability of establishing rates which will not be profita~e for-
high~cost competing carriers. Th~s~ it may prove impossible for a car-
rier with a three-engine. three~m~n cockpit cre~ plane of the wrong size 
operating over non-optimal stage lengths to survive against a new~ 
technology, t~in-engine, two-pilot,properly.,.sized aircraft. 
Immediately prior to the introduction of jet ~ircraft. when energy 
costs were not a signifi.cant factor in air~raft equi.pmel'\t d.ec.ision 
making, a limited number of Lockheed ElectrQ turboprop aircraft were 
introduced. An unfortunate design defect leet to accidents an,d the air-
craft's eventual phase out. Moreo~er, ~he p~blic's rapid acceptance of 
jets doomed extensive use of this turboprQP. When jet~ were iptroduced, 
airl ines were happy to avo.id the c;om~le~ities ~nd PrObl,ems wit" the turbo.-
prop propell er and its dri.ve and gear~x mechal'\i,sms. Recel1tly. however ~ 
hi gh energy costs pl us the fact that NA$A $tudi~s i.ndicate very 
" 
substantial fuel savings and the ability to fly at speeds close to jet 
Mach numbers for advanced technology turboprops, now called "prop-fans," 
suggest that there may be substantial economies for short- and mid-range 
turboprop aircraft over pure jets, providing the public and the airlines 
are willing to accept them. Thus, the present attitude toward turbo-
props or prop-fans by those who would have to commit for them is a sub-
ject worthy of examination. 
The proper size for future air transports is critical to profita-
bility. Is the age of empire building with larger aircraft and larger 
airline networks over? Or, will additional competition, coupled with a 
behavior pattern of the public showing preference for frequency of ser-
vice with fewer amenities over large aircraft with low frequencies, 
result in a demand for aircraft no larger than the present planes? This 
study presents the current thinking of those charged with making equip-
ment purchase decisions or with making the recommendations to those who 
do make the decisions. 
1.2 Research Procedure 
The purchase of aircraft can be the most important capital expense 
made by a company and should involve long-range planning including top 
officials of a co~pany. It is perhaps-significant that the more suc-
cessful airlines turned out to be those most attentive to strategic 
planning. In general, long-range planning for aircraft has not been the 
strong suit of airline management. 
Because aircraft equipment decisions have historically been made by 
the top executive or a few top executives, albeit purportedly by the 
board of directors, the research alternatives of a survey of the 
5 
literature dealing with equipment choice processes or an analysis of 
responses to questionnaires was discarded in favor of personal inter-
views with either the chief executive or his designated representatives. 
Each company executive to be interviewed was suppl ied in 'advance with 
;questions whi.ch would serve as the basis for further discussion. The 
basic question list is found in Appendix A. A representative list of 
persons interviewed is found inAppendixB. In the case of several large 
carriers, the chairman of the board and CEO were the major participants 
, ' in the interview. 
One 'to six individua'ls of each of the following 24 airlines were 
interviewed at comp~ny headquarters. Individual interviews averaged one 
hour 'and twenty mi nutes. 
1. AirCal 13. Golden West 
2. Air Florida 14. Midstate Airlines 
3. Air New England 15. Midway A ir'l i nes 
4. Air Wisconsin ,16. Northwest,Airlines 
5. American Airlines 17. Piedmont Aviation 
6. Britt Airways 18. PSA 
7. Continental Airlines 19. Republ ic Airl ines 
8. Delta Airlines 20. Southwest Airlines 
9. Eastern Airlines 21. TWA 
10. Federal Express 22. United Airlines 
11. Flying Tigers 23. USAir 
12. Frontier Airlines 24. Western Airlines 
Because of the extensive management restructuring underway at 
Braniff and Pan American -- a restructuring whtch wfl1 undoubtedly change 
future plans of ~he companies, these companies were not inc1uded. 
Ozark's president suggested fiis carrier be omitted since the company was 
still recovering from a strike and had'nolyet formulated a game plan 
for the future. Originally this study was lobe limited 'to trunk and 
regional carriers, thus omitting the smallercertiricated and commuter 
6 
airlines. later NASA asked that some coverage be given to these cate-
gories. As a result, AirCal, Air New England, Golden West, Air Wisconsin, 
Midstate and Britt were added. 
7 

Chapter 2 
HOW EIGHT MAJOR (FOR~1ER TRUNK) AIRLINES 
PERCEIVE THEIR FUTURE ROLES 
2.1 Alternatives Available 
Faced with deregulation, inflation, rising fuel costs, noise prob-
lems and financial constraints, various alternatives are open to airline 
managements. A carrier's equipment needs for 1985-2000 are dependent 
upon the role it sees for itself in the transportation system. A car-
rier may attempt to follow the course of history in which almost every 
carrier worked toward expanding its operations to become a coast-to-
coast or even an international carrier. Commuters may strive to expand 
into local service or national carriers, and nationals to transconti-
nental majors. A large airline may structure itself to be, in effect, all 
three types of airlines, with its smaller operations feeding into the 
large. In an attempt to protect traffic on its linear routes, a carrier 
may choose to expand the hub-and-spoke concept. Additionally, a large 
carrier, after reviewing what it can do most profitably, may discontinue 
its quest for size and decrease its fleet to concentrate on the routes 
best suited to its present equipment, or it may adopt a new strategic 
plan and restructure its route network to take advantage of the economics 
of a new type of plane not yet in its hangers. 
Since deregulation, the former local service airlines have generally 
been more profitable than the former trunks. Options of the local ser-
vice lines include: (a) maintaining the status quo and concentrating on 
fine-tuning their operations; or (b) attempting to attack the weaker 
major airlines in the hope that the superior efficiency of their operations 
9 
will cause the major airlines to withdraw and the local service lines 
will then become majors. 
Options for the commuters are more limited -- they must remain rela-
tively small or attempt to break out of the commuter mold to progress to 
larger certificated operations. As the remainder of the chapter shows, 
when the question of future role was asked of the officials interviewed, 
there were a wide range of responses covering all these options. How-
ever, if a generalization can be made, it is that there is greater 
recognition (than in the past) that competition may force inefficient 
airlines out of business and that there is, therefore, a high priority 
on a "lean" company structure and great attention on redeploying assets 
where operations are not meetJng a desired standard of profitability. 
Finally, the cost of aircraft -- present and potential aircraft -- are 
b~ing scrutinized as never before. Capital costs, financing costs, 
costs per seat mile, per revenue passenger mile, per aircraft mile, per 
aircraft hour, seat mil~s per gallon, and maintenance costs per revenue 
hour, are all closely examined to determine which aircraft is best for 
the strategic plan. 
2.2 Questions to be Raised 
American, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, Republic, TWA, 
United, and USAirare the nine major airlines intervie~ed. Each carrier 
was asked: 
10 
"Given the changes of the 1970s and 1980s how does your airl ine 
see its future role in the air transport system?" 
a. "What is the size and type of aircraft this role 'requires?1I 
b. "What stage 1 engths wi 11 be i nvo 1 ved?" 
c. IIWill it be necessary to readjust the a ir1 ine' s route network 
to fit the economics of the current f1eet?1I 
d. 1I0r is it planned to obtain a completely new plane optimal for 
the airline's new or existing strategic p1an?1I 
2.3 American Airlines 
This major transcontinental carrier, with a past history of a low 
return on total assets, stated that financial constraints dictated some 
of its answers. Additionally, it pointed out that deregulation has per-
mitted and encouraged new II instant" or "upstart" low-cost operators to 
enter some point-to-point markets. Aside from the advantage of low 
startup costs by buying or leasing low-cost used airplanes and operating 
them with low-cost, non-union, low-seniority personnel, these carriers 
offer spartan service without interlining. The net effect will be to 
drive American and other "full service" carriers from some of these 
markets. American has already dropped several such markets -- markets 
in which the carrier for a long time has had a major presence. 
The company foresees its role as a medium- to long-haul carrier fed 
through an expanding hub-and-spoke concept. It believes that other air-
lines facing a similar situation will adopt the same strategy. Point-to-
point operations will survive where they feed the longer routes. 
What type of aircraft does the company need for future operations 
with this scenario? For its long-haul domestic passenger and possible 
new passenger interationa1 operations, it needs and has B-747-l00s of 
about 400-passenger capacity and DC-lO-lOs with about 296 seats. Thus, 
except for the possible need for used DC-lO-30s for a projected route 
too long for the DC-lO-lO, the long-haul stage lengths are covered. 
Given American's financial situation, it has no plans for replacing or 
11 
re-engining these aircraft before they. are 18-20 years old and consider-
ation is being given to extending their life further. 
Owned 
55 
55 
29 
1 
6 
5 
28 
Tab1 e 2-1 
American Airlines F1eet,Au9ust 1981 
On 
leased Order ~ Seats 
1 B-727-100 108 
70 B-727-200 144 
B-707-300* 
7 B-747-100 396 
B-747F 
15 B-757 190 
30 B-767 204 
CV-440 44 
6 Dc-10-10 296 
Cargo Aircraft 
Payload 
215,0001bs. 
* All are now permanently grounded and being sold. 
Table 2-1 lists American's fleet in August 1981. Noise regulations 
would have forced the grounding of the B~707s in several years, but the 
escalating fuel prices made their use uneconomical in 1981 thus forcing 
the company to take them all out of service. For similar reasons 
American is phasing out as quickly as possible the 8-727-100s and some 
of the older B-727-200s. Obsolescence of these planes and the present 
absence of suitable replacement~ set in motion the company's. search for 
new-technology aircraft or for a major modification to its newer B-727-
200 series in order to be competitive in the 1985-2000 period. 
With the new 204- and 190-passenger B-767 and 8-757 aircraft on 
orde~ for use up to the year: 2000, the carrier's equipment concern is 
how to meet the short- to medium-haul ma~ket given its hub-and-spoke 
strategy. It cannot be competitive for long with its B-727-100s and 
B-727-200s. Options available are: (a) feed the hub out and back with 
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\ 
an efficient two-man crew B-737-200 fleet which it. does not have; 
(b) employ one piece of equipment which would be less efficient on the 
short-haul but would have long-haul capability. For example, assuming 
the B-727-200, there would be a ten passenger advantage per trip. 
At present the main concern of American for the 1985-2000 period is 
which aircraft can efficiently handle its shorter hauls and still provide 
frequency of service -- a factor deemed to be of great importance. Also 
of concern is how this purchase can be financed. Current analysis leads 
the company to believe that much as it needs a quiet, fuel-efficient, 
new-technology, twin-engine aircraft of about ISO-passenger capacity, 
there is no way such an aircraft, which has not yet been designed, could 
presently be financed. Further, there is the conviction that with the 
exception of highly profitable Delta, no other airline could handle the 
financing of a new-technology aircraft. Therefore, American reasons 
that unless a major modification of most of its three-engine B-727-200 
series2 into ~ fuel-efficient twin-engine aircraft at a price less than 
one-third of that of a new-technology aircraft can be effected, the com-
pany must decrease in size and number of aircraft operated. 3 
To be more specific in answering the question on its future role, 
American sees a smaller but.more profitable role for itself than it has 
had in the past. It will fight to preserve its long-haul routes and 
withdraw from point-to-point routes which do not provide profitable feed. 
With system stage lengths now averaging 900 miles in 1980 and 850 in 1981, 
and with stage lengths of its short- to medium-range obsolescent fleet 
2 Because of some construction differences, none of the B-727-100s and 
B-727-200s produced before 1974 can be re-engined. 
3 By October 1981 the company already had reduced its fleet by 35 aircraft. 
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averaging 600 miles, the company feels that because of the effect of its 
hub-and-spoke program it will experience a further decrease in stage 
lengths. The net result of the foregoing dictates an emphasis on the 
purchase of smaller planes than in the past. Recent additions of seating 
in-the B-727-200-series to 144 with consideration being given to a fur-
ther addition have, in effect, made it a 150-passenger plane. Thus, if 
the plane's economics can be improved to approach those of new-technology 
aircraft at one-third the price, this is the way the company feels it 
will be forced to go. 
In recent months both United and Delta announced forwarding to 
manufacturers specifications for a twin-engine 150-passenger plane. 
American was asked which of these two proposals it favored. In answering 
"neither," it explained that Delta's II specs'" focused on a specialized air-
craft optimized aro~nd a 400 mile_ stage length with a rang~ of 1400 
miles -- both figures being below those desired by American. Addition-
ally, since the plane would require a completely new engine which had 
not yet been designed, the plane was, perhaps, a 1988 to 1990 airplane 
much too late for American's needs. While the United proposal was more 
to its liking, American concluded that it just could not afford to look 
at new air~raft beyond the B-767s and B-757s ordered. 
To compete' with the "upstart" or "instant" airl ines over such routes 
as American wishes to protect,the company is adding still more seats in 
a single-class service to its three-engined planes. 
2.4 TWA 
TWA, an old established major line with both international and 
domestic operations, has not fared well financially over the past decade. 
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As in the case.of American, TWA's IIdruthers li are offset ~y capital con-
straints. In 1980, although it still lost money, the company reacted 
m~re quickly and successfully to recessionary influences than did some 
other carriers. As a result, in 1981 its financial fortu"nes began to 
improve. In looking to the 1985-2000 period, TWA does not see a change 
from its present role which tends to emphasize its international opera-
tions. The company thinks its present fleet is well suited to its 
route structure so that there is no need to change either the equipment 
or routes. Of course, its economically obsolete B-707 fleet is a drain 
on its competitive ability, as is its B-727-100 fleet. TWA's October 
1981 fleet is presented in Table 2-2 below. 
Tabl e 2-2 
TWA Aircraft Fleet, October 1981 
On 
Number Order ~ Seats 
34 B-727-100 101/116 
56 B-727-200 135/144 
61* B-707 141/151 (184 single 
class) 
30 5 L-I011 274 
18 B-747 380 
10 B-767 200 
* Including 12 grounded. 
Approximately seventy-five to eighty percent of the carrier's oper-
ation is in three types of service: (1) transatlantic; (2) transconti-
nental; and (3) hub-and-spoke. These are the operations which dictate 
the carrier's equipment needs. TWA has little short-haul, high-density 
service. Since one-half of the business is very long-haul i.e., between 
2,500 and 5,000 miles, the company has a fleet of wide-body, twin-aisle 
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B-747s and L-I0lls which it feels are well suited to the purpose. For 
, 
the future, TWA is investigating the possibility of re-engining the L~1011 
with more efficient Rolls Royce or GE engines for use as early as 1984 
(GE) or 1985 (Rolls). As was the case with American, no plans are in 
progress for r.eplacing or re-engining the B-747s. However, some are 
being modified to comply with noise regulations. 
The balance of TWAls operations utilize about 90 B-727s, two-thirds 
of which are the 200-series, and about 56 active B-707s. An additional 
19 B~707$ are permanently grounded. Since the B-707s are uneconomic 
and are running afoul of the noise regulations, they are a burden and 
will be phased oyt by 1984 or sooner. Thus, the company needs replace-
ments fqr this type of plane. It has on order some 200-passenger B-767s 
Which are considerably too large to replace the Bo:-727s. Indeed, finan-
cial pressures may delay delivery of the B-767. 
Becaus~ of the cost~ of opera~ing the three-engine, three-man cock-
pit crew B-727, TWA expressed the desir.e f()r a twin-engine, two-man crew 
airplane carrying 150 passergers ~t Mac:h .75 to .~O. It was expressly 
stated that the 175- to 189-passenger B-757 was too large to be con-
sidered. The mission requirement for the 150-pa~~~nger plan~ is a 
multiple one involving stage lengths ranging from 250 to 1!800 miles, 
with optimization around 900 miles. 
Unlike the Delta requirementt which foc:yse~ qn a short st~ge length 
for optimization, TWA desires a mor.e flexi~le aircraft, which ~~y start 
off on short stage lengths and th~n c~rry ~hese pas~engers to feed the 
longer 1500-mile segment. The carri~rl~ co~t qbjectiye is to meet the 
B-757 1 s seat mile costs but with a 20 percent lower ~irplane mile cost. 
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Although the United proposal was favored over Delta's, TWA felt that its 
capital constraints would prevent it purchasing the craft even if the 
plane were designed and offered for sale. 
In discussing the merits and likelihood of re-engining the B-727-
200, TWA expressed negative views. Although the re-engining cost might 
be only one-third that of a new-technology plane, the $14 million per 
aircraft estimated price was considered a lot to pay for modifying a 
ten-year old plane which would still embody much old technology. Also, 
and particularly if the balance problem4 should make it necessary to add 
a "p1 ug" with more passenger capacity, the resu1 ti ng modificat ion woul d 
bring the plane into competition in size and price with Boeing's new 757. 
The foregoing factors suggested to TWA that even if a number of carriers 
preferred the re-engining, Boeing probably would not go ahead. 
One of the TWA officials expressed a view not voiced elsewhere that, 
given the financing prabl ems, the industry could well get along for some 
years with evolutionary incremental engine and airframe modifications to 
the B-727-200 to increase its efficiency so that a new-technology plane 
coul d be put off. 
2.5 United Airlines 
United, with a fleet of over 300 transports consisting of about ten 
aircraft types from two major manufactu'rers, is one of the largest car-
riers in the world and has e'stab1ished dominance or significant presence 
in many choice markets. In the past its routes have involved a variety 
of stage lengths from very short to very long. As a result of deregulation, 
4 The weight of the new heavy PW2037 engines so far to the rear is said 
to require a counterbalance weight of "nonproductive" lead in the nose. 
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increased competition has adversely affected profitability on many of 
its routes. Some such routes, particularly those of 150 miles or less 
(uneconomical for its jets) have been dropped. While United officials 
were more reluctant than those of some other airlines to describe in 
detail the carrier's future role, its equipment plans, its route restruc-
turing, and its public utterances suggest the company's direction. 
Table 2-3 
United Airlines Aircraft Fleet, October 1981 
Number On 
Owned Leased Order ~ Passengers 
9 9 8-747 374-413* 
20 16 1 DC-I0-I0 254 
24 6 DC-8-61 190-238** 
14 0 DC-8-F . 0 
60 16 B-727.-200A 132-141*** 
25 3 B-727-200 126-132t 
48 13 B-727-100 96 
49 0 B-737 103-125tt 
39 B-767 197 
* All. are being converted to 413 passengers 
** 238 is toach class 
*** All being converted to 141 passengers 
t All being converted to 132 passengers 
tt All being converted to 125 passengers 
Maximum 
Cargo 
93,000 1 bs. 
Long in favor of deregulation because it permits a company to re-
structure its routes with changing competitive conditions and changing 
aircraft technology, United sees itself not only maintaining a preemi-
nent position in 10ng- and medium-haul markets but eventually succe~sful1y 
competing with what ~re now the new-entry, low-cost, short-haul carriers. 
Thus, United will be competitive over almost all stage lengths. To 
accomplish this result the company realizes that the long-sought goal of 
standardization on one, two, or even three separate aircraft types will 
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be modified. This is not to say that an aircraft type will have a very 
limited stage length mission; in fact the company's idea for its short-
to medium-haul aircraft replacement involves stage lengths from 300 to 
1850 miles with an average of about 800. However, a given fleet type 
may contain subf1eets, such as a number of planes with high-density 
single-class seating and no galleys, others with limited galleys, and 
still others with a full mixed class. 
The main thrust of United's equipment program is economy of opera-
tion -- in crew complement, in fuel efficiency, and in maintenance cost. 
While it is well situated with efficient wide-bodies for its long-haul, 
dense-traffic routes, and has ordered 20D-passenger B-767s for the medium-
to long-haul less heavily traveled routes, the company needs by 1985 to 
1988 a highly efficient replacement for its lower capacity aircraft in-
volved in shorter and thinner routes, i.e., the B-727 and B-737 whose 
current capacities are reaching 145 in the B-727 and 125 in the B-737. 
After looking at theB-737-3DD, at the proposed re-engining of the B-727, 
and at the DC-9-80, the company decided that for the long term it was 
best to reject them in favor of a "c1 ean sheet" new-technology p1 ane 
carrying 150 passengers. As a result, general specifications for this 
aircraft were sent to aircraft manufacturers. 
While other companies would like to program seat capacities in rela-
tively even increments, such as 25, United has announced it sees no place 
in its strategy for a 175-passenger plane. It sees long life ahead for 
its B-737s configured to 125 seats. 
There are some who would question whether a 150-passenger plane is 
the smallest new-technology plane an airline which plans to compete on 
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thin, short routes should have. However, unlike many carriers, United 
is showing strong interest in turboprop and prop-fan developments. It 
is this type of propulsion which shows signs of being a significant 
advance in the short-haul field. 
Summary: United sees itself using its considerable financial re-
sources to continue expanding in all phases of its operation. This will 
involve short, medium, and long stage lengths. It has been necessary to 
readjust the carrier's route rietwork to fit the economics of United's 
current fleet. As some planes become uneconomic, the routes over which 
they flew are abandoned. To effectuate the company's strategic plan for 
the 1985-2000 period, management has determined not to purchase a 175-
passenger new-technology plane but, instead, to press for a high-
technology 150-passenger transport with considerable flexibility in 
mission capability. 
2.6 Northwest Airlines 
Table 2-4 
Northwest Airlines Flee~March 1981 
Number ~ 
14 8-727-100 
52 8-727-200 
22 OC-10-40 
24 8-747 
5 8-747F 
Passengers 
93-100 
128 
236 
363 
·0 
Maximum 
Cargo 
261,000 1 bs. 
This transcontinental airline with international operations has 
been markedly different from other major carriers in its equipment poli-
cies, financial policies, marketing policies and the degree of labor 
strife. Northwest's attention to low operatirig cost on an available 
seat mile basis is legendary. As a result, it has been able to operate 
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profitably at lower load factors than other carriers and develop an 
enviabl e debt/equity ratio. In the past, its pol icy of replacing compo-
nents in the fleet rather than repairing them has resulted in such well 
maintained aircraft that they have brought premium pr~ces in the used 
aircraft market. The funds so accrued have been used to buy more up-to-
date equipment or upgrade existing equipment. 
The company sees itself as well poised for the future to continue 
in its past role but with further expansion of international operations. 
Northwest has three ki nds of routes: (1) long- and very long-haul i nter-
national routes; the very long are served by 8-7475 or by DC-10-40s 
which the company required as a condition of purchase to have the same 
engine as the 8-7475. The extra power of the engines and their. common-
ality with the 8-747 is efficient and economical. (2) There are also 
long-haul domestic transcontinental routes, easily handled by the 
DC-10-40s; and (3) there are domestic short-haul routes for which the 
company has a fleet of 8-727-200s and a small number of 8-727-100s. 
Since the company believes it has a reasonably up-to-date fleet 
which can be operated profitably at lower load factors than many of its 
competitors, it thinks its future role requires the same size and type 
of aircraft. The stage lengths will be about the same. Deregulation 
has enabled the company to drop some short, uneconomic routes which 
freed aircraft for more profitable deployment. It was pointed out that 
whereas many companies are approaching the limits of providing for growth 
by adding more seats instead of aircraft and consequently are faced with 
tremendous capital costs to add capacity through aircraft increments, 
Northwest can in some instances "just sit" and let the load factors build 
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in planes which already are attractive because they have greater seat 
pitch than that of their competition. For other aircraft, seating is 
being increased (from 128 to 142 in the case of the B-727-200) -- a very 
modest expense compared with adding aircraft at 20 to 40 million dollars 
each. 
Given the high cost of money and the earnings records of most of 
the major airlines, Northwest was not optimistic about the early arrival 
of new-technology aircraft. Inflation has increased the price of commer-
cial aircraft so that it is difficult for new technology to payoff the 
investment. For example, the company estimates a B-757 delivered in the 
first quarter of 1985 would cost $46.6 million, or $282,000 per seat. 
Yearly depreciation (15 year depreciation and 10 percent residual) would 
be $2.8 million or $1,000 per hour. Compare this with the current 
delivery price on a B-727-200 of $15 million, or abo.ut $110,000 per seat 
in mixed class. A OC-9-80 at $19 million is still only $137,000 per seat. 
Engine fuel efficiency has been co.unted on as the main financial 
offset provided by new technology, with noise control a welcome addition. 
However, mQ.ny of the rosy pictures of a financial payoff were based upon 
assumptions of much more rapid escalation of fuel prices than has been 
the case. A 30 percent saving at $1.00 a gallon is 30 cents a gallon, 
but a 30 percent savings at $4.00 a gallon ~- and some predictions did" 
reach that figure -- is $1.20, a much bigger payoff. 
As Northwest pointed out, past financial difficulties have left all 
but two majors with insufficient internal resources; thus, reliance on 
the capital market must be resorted to for equipment replacemeht or 
growth. High interest rates add to. costs and therefore to economies that 
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new technology must furnish. In the past some offset came for the value 
of current in service planes which brought not only much more than their 
book value when sold, but often more than their original cost. Now, 
however, the very planes most in need of replacement are falling in 
value, and in some cases are worth little more than scrap. 
As a result of the foregoing factors, Northwest expects to see more 
companies "s1 ipping their orders" for the new-technology aircraft now in 
production and moving still further in the future any thoughts of pur-
chasing new-technology aircraft to replace the 8-727 and some DC-9 series. 
Northwest thinks it has been 'the realization that financing of 
another new-technology aircraft is out of the question which has gener-
ated interested by some airlines in the,727RE (re-engine). An expendi-
ture of $14 million (current estimated re-engining cost) on a $5 to $10 
million airplane to give it at least 10 or more years of life might be 
financially possible for certain air1 ines, whereas $30 to $40 mill ion 
expenditure per plane would not be. 
Summary: Northwest sees no substantial change in its role in the 
industry. While it recognizes the de~irabi1ity of eventually replacing 
its 8-727 fleet with a more efficient twin-engine craft, it is currently 
attacking the unit cost problem by converting its 128-passenger 8-727s 
to 142-passenger planes. Competitors already have 144 in mixed class 
and are talking 149. Thus, Northwest feels that its fleet of 8-727s 
is pretty well insulated from economic obsolescence until the 19905. 
Since many of its 8-727s are written down to a low value it can use them 
to fend off attacks by the new II instant a i r1 ines. II 
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2.7 Delta Airlines 
For many years Delta consistently has been the most profitable of 
the major airlines. Reams have been written to explain Delta's success 
and the entire litany need not be repeated. However, one should briefly 
note the company's location in the growing southeast; its unusually suc-
cessful prosecution of route applications before the CAB when other lines 
were unsuccessful; its paternalistic management under the legendary 
C.E. Wollman whose treatment of employees inspired loyalty and dedication 
and avoided the prohibitions against cross-utilization of personnel which 
so often accom~any unionism; its dedication to long range planning which 
early dlscovered the merits of the hub-and spoke system; and its adop-
tion of equipment acquisition policies directed toward keeping its fleet 
efficient, young, and closely matched to the mission to be performed. 
In any event, plans being made" by a company which has experienced such 
consistent success as Delta are worthy"of note. 5 
Delta's future role appears to be that of using its massive financial 
resources to obtain the most modern and efficient fleet in order to be 
the lowest cost full-service operator. Such a fleet will enable the 
company to makethe most of opportunities provided by deregulation. 
To reach this goal Delta has become convinced that a fundamental 
change be made in its equipment acquisition phii6sophy from one of com-
monality and simplicity to one of specialization involving multiple 
types. As late as 1972, after the merger with Northeast Airlines, Delta 
5 Further details on its aircraft equipment policies are found in Julian 
May, "Aircraft Eval uation and Sel ection" ATRIF, Atlantic City, May 27, 
1981 and Mr. May's address of August 11, 1981, AIAA, Dayton OH, 
bearing the title "Design of the 80s." 
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had 12 different equipment types. Believing that the economics of com-
monality more than offset the over-design and off-optimum operation, 
Delta consciously sought to reduce to three equipment types. However, 
by the time the fleet was reduced to four types, the dramatic rise in 
fuel prices plus the anticipated future increases put the first priority 
on fuel efficiency. Delta also noted large gaps between the capacities 
of its various aircraft. This situation sometimes compromised Delta's 
ability to shift to a larger aircraft and maintain desired frequency 
without adversely affecting load factors and profitability. The cur-
rent fleet-mix is tabulated in Table 2-5. 
Tabl e 2-5 
Delta Fleet,April 1981 
Average Capacity Difference 
Number 
, 35 
128 
13 
35 
~ 
DC-9-32 
B-727-200 
DC-8-61 
L-1011 
Capacity 
88 
137 
198 
293 
Stage length From Next Lower 
343 
520 49 
525 61 
989 95 
Note: In October 1981, in order to increase the seat miles per gal-
lon and to decrease the cost per seat mile, Delta initiated 
a program of adding seats: 9 in each L-1011, 14 in each 
DC-8-61, and 11 in each B-727. 
Actually Delta had planned (for capacity, noise, and fuel economy 
reasons) in the early 1970s to purchase a new 200-seat aircraft. How-
ever, inflation and fuel price controls made it uneconomic to produce 
such an aircraft. Accordingly, to take care of its expanding needs 
Delta felt it necessary to purchase more than 100 B-727s, even though 
they had been designed in the early 1960s. By 1978 fuel prices, manufac-
turing costs, and technology combined to permit the ordering of 42 Boeing 
202-seat B-767 aircraft to cover lo~g-haul domestic routes not justifying 
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the use of the 293-passenger L-IOll. The financial obligation was $1.6 
bill ion. In 1979, by contracting for the re-engining with CHI-56 engines 
of its 195-passenger DC-8-61 which was running afoul first of noise 
rules and second with fuel expense pro~ems, Delta extended the life of 
the aircraft at a fraction of the cost of new aircraft. 
In 1980, the company continued to pursue its quest for a smaller 
new-technology aircraft with lower airp)ane mile costs. Because of its 
interest in fuel economy, Delta was willing to wait a year for the cer-
tification of the PW2037 high-bypass engine with still greater fuel 
savings. Thus, the $1.5 billion November 1980 order for 60 Boeing 757 
aircraft of 187-passenger capacity. Although carrying only 15 passen-
gers less than the B-767, the B-757 was aimed at a shorter mission. 
Ever si nce 1976 Delta has been 1 ooki ng for repl acements for its 
150 medium- to short-range narrow-body aircraft but could not interest 
the manufacturers in designing such aircraft. Now, however, with a 
large fleet of narrow-bodies deteriorating in profitability, and with 
two-thirds of its trips being 450 miles.or less in length, Delta sees a 
chance for a tremendous improvement in profita bil ity if it can secure a 
new-technology plane optimized around these shorter trip lengths. As 
C.J. May, Delta's vice president of engineering put it, "We can no longer 
enjoy the luxury of using an aircraft designed with transcontinental 
range for trips of less than one hour. We must optimize the aircraft 
for the operation, even if it means a lar.ge variety.of aircraft in the 
stable." The perceptions of competjtors on the merits of thjs view are 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Summary: Delta's plans for the future appear to contemplate con-
tinuing its policy of steadily developing its hub-and-spoke system so as 
to become th~ dominant and most profitable (in terms of gross profits) 
carrier in the industry. One factor in the implementation of the plan is 
an aggressive equipment pol icy of acquiring and maintaining a young, 
efficient fleet of various types -- all tailored to specific missions. 
With 42 Boeing 757s and 60 Boeing 757s on order supplementing its L-lOll 
wide-bodies and re-engined DC-8-62s, the company is well on its way to 
its goal. However, two-thirds of its trips are in stage lengths of 
450 miles or less and are being covered by early 1960 technology Douglas 
DC-9s and the Boeing B-727s which are marginal under noise regulations 
and fuel-inefficient relative to new-technology aircraft. To close 
this technology and capacity gap, Delta has issued specifications to 
manufacturers for a new l50-passenger aircraft with performance optimized 
for sho~t-haul operations. As later sections will show,because of 
financial constraints on both the manufacturers and other airlines and 
because other airlines at present tend to favor the longer-haul stage 
lengths in the United Airlines specifications, the likelihood that Delta 
will be successful in having its specifications fulfilled in a timely 
fashion has been seriously questioned. 
2.8 Eastern Airlines 
Eastern Airlines, a major competitor of Delta, is the last of the 
major transcontinental carriers to be discussed. Lack of earnings over 
a period of years has placed the carrier in a weak financial posture. 
Nevertheless, Eastern has striven to modernize its· fleet, and with the 
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help of imaginative financing by the banks, th~ airframe, and the engine 
manufacturers, two sizes of wide-bodies (A300 and L-1011) now appear in 
its fleet. Additionally, some Boeing 757s are on order. 
Eastern sees its future role as being one of the surviving major 
carriers when competition has run its course under deregulation. To 
accomplish this feat the company sees the need to remain competitive, 
particularly with Delta, by replacing or re-engining its less efficient 
planes. 
Tabl e 2-6 
Eastern Airlines Fleet, July 1981 
On Hand 
~ 
DC-9-30 
DC-9-50 
8-727-100 
8-727-200 
A300 
L-1011 
Seating 
97 
129 
118 
149 
240 
293 
On Order 
. Type 
8-757 
Seating 
185 
Table 2-6 indicates a conscious policy of acquiring differently 
sized aircraft with seating varying by increments of approximately 20 
percent. Eastern's 8-757 purchase was to fill the void between the 
149-passenger 8-727-200 and the 240-passenger A300. Since Eastern plans 
to continue its present type of network, the size and types of equipment 
will remain the same. Stage lengths now vary from 100 miles to trans-
continental. Other than fine tuning, the airline sees no need to re-
adjust its structure to fit the economics of its fleet. 
Although Eastern recognizes the need for replacing or modifying its 
8-727 and DC-9 fleet, the fact that it has exhausted its borrowing capa-
city drastically limits its new equipment plans. While the airline 
examines with interest the United and Delta proposals for a new 150-
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passenger plane, realistically it knows there is currently no finan~ing 
possibility. Some in the company question whether a 150-passenger plane 
(the "magic number" now so frequently mentioned) is too big to be the 
smallest plane in the fleets of major carriers. They see the need for 
a 90- to 100-passenger transport for their company and for various 
smaller carriers. One executive argues that to maintain frequency of 
service -- and frequency is now considered lithe name of the game" --
that the next new plane should be designed for 130 passengers because: 
(1) deregulation increases the number of competing carriers thereby 
reducing the size of aircraft required; (2) traffic growth has presently 
stopped and is unlikely to return to levels justifying larger aircraft; 
and (3) since history indicates that airplanes always increase in capa-
city during the design stage, a design for 130 would very likely reach 
150 by the time the production began. 
Since fi.nancing a new airplane is out of the question, some in 
Eastern lean to a re-engined 8-727 lIif the numbers on fuel consumption 
and capi~al cost come out right." Most of its 8-727-200 planes fall into 
the re-enginable category, and they already carry 149 passengers. 
Summary: Eastern seeks to retain its role as one of the large sur-
viving major carriers with short-haul, medium-haul, and long-haul routes 
across the U.S. and into some foreign destinations. Despite inheriting 
an unsatisfactory financial condition, the current management, by 
imaginative and innovative financing, now has some large efficient air-
craft on its roster. Also some 8-757s have been ordered. Eastern 
recognizes a growing need to replace its smaller capacity DC-9 and 8-727 
fleets which now seat 97 and 149 passengers respectively. 
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Since Eastern felt the Delta proposal involved a completely new 
engine which, because of its specialized nature would not be built, the 
cnmpany did not fear that Delta's superior financial resources could be 
used to acquire a specialized very efficient aircraft which Eastern would 
be in no position to purchase. However,Eastern's own financial posi-
tion also precluded real current interest in the 8-727 re-engine project. 
It knows future equipment purchases must await' a period of improved 
profit margin~ and lower interest rates before the financial community 
will consider it a worthy credit risk. Given,the financial position of 
the aircraft manufacturers, who have participated in what little air-
craft financing has been done, manufacturers I financing is not available 
on a large scale. 
2.9 Western Airlines 
Western, one of the oldest airlines in the United States, serves 
primarily leisure markets and thus it is vulnerable to changes in econ-
omic conditions. Originally confined to the West Coast with relatively 
short hauls, over the past two decades it has expanded to include the 
destinations of Hawaii, Alaska, Mexico, and more recently, London. 
Deregulation subjected Western to extensive competition forcing it to 
eliminate or reduce service in some markets. Efforts to merge with 
Continental, a merger previously denied under earlier legislation, were 
on the road to success until February 1981 when Texas International began 
its takeover attempts of Continental. The Western-Continental merger 
then fa i1 ed. 
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Western1s equipment picture improved as it disposed of its fuel-
inefficient 80eing 727s and 707s and some of its 8-737s which at the time 
were required to carry an extra pilot as a result of a "me too" labor 
agreement tied to United. Although its long-haul routes were in reason-
able shape with ten DC-10-10s (the longer range of some of the new routes 
tend to exceed the economical range of the aircraft with a heavy pay-
load so that the DC-10-30 would .be more economical) -- and one DC-10-30, 
its key problems are the 47 8-727-200s, currently configured with 133 
seats (160 when all coach), and the 12 8-737-200s, configured with 113 
seats. Western1s July 1981 fleet and aircraft on order are shown in 
Tabl e 2-7. 
Table 2-7 
Western Airlines Flee~ J~ly 1981 
Number ~ Seats On Order 
12 8-737-200 113 6 8-767 for 1983-1984 
44 8-727-200 133 del ivery 
1 DC-10-30 ·260 
10 DC-10-10 270 
3 8-727-200 160 (coach) 
In a move contrary to the industry trend of increasing aircraft 
seating to achieve lower seat mile costs, Western, late in 1981 began 
reconfiguring its 8-727s from 133 seats to 124, and its 8-737s from 
113 to 103. 8y advertising a roomier airplane, the company hoped to 
differentiate its product as being superior in comfort to that of its 
competitors. Whether other carriers with excess capacity will follow 
suit and thus nullify Western1s advantage will depend upon the public1s 
reaction to Western1s revised seating. 
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Western sees its future role as being strong in a North-South direc-
tion from Anchorage to Mexico featuring major connecting complexes at 
Salt Lake City, San Francisco~ Los Angeles and Denver. Its long-haul 
continental routes will be aided by the arrival (1984)of B-767s 
assuming del iveri es are not postponed or orders cancell ed for financial 
reasons. However, a look at Western's stage lengths indicates that over 
one-half of them are 500 miles or less, and the heavily traveled Las 
Vegas shuttle is but 235 miles in length. Accordingly, to handle its 
future short- to medium-hauls Western desires a twin-engine, two-pilot, 
ISO-passenger plane with high fuel efficiency and with noise emissions 
equal to or lower than tho~e on any other transport. Also prominent in 
the specifications is a flexibility requirement which would enable the 
aircraft to handle econ6mically stage lengths from 250 to 1500 miles. 
Fortunately for Western, the new~technology ISO-passenger plane is 
not yet available. For one thing, given the impact of deregulation and 
the recession, a ISO-passenger plane would be too large. The recent 
addition of B-727-200s as replacements for the B-737 is causing the 
dropping of some routes because they cannot support the larger B-727. 
Secondly, the carrier would be una~e to finance the purchase. It is 
these factors which have caused Western to feel it wise to become active-
1y interested in the viability of the B-727 re-engining program. A 
$12-14 million expenditure per aircraft, particularly with such a young 
fleet as the carrier has;6 presently seems more realistic of accomplish-
ment than $40 to $50 million per aircraft five to seven years hence for 
a completely new aircraft. 
6 According" to Western's annual report, the average age in September 1980 
was 6.35 years, said to be the youngest of any U.S. trunk line. 
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Summary: Western's future needs center around replacing its 8-727 
and 8-737 fleet. Because of additional competition and the deteriorating 
economics of the aforementioned planes, the airline has already had to 
do some readjusting of its route network to fit the economics of the 
current fleet. According to Western, the ideal solution to its long run 
needs would be a ISO-passenger, fuel-efficient, quiet aircraft whose 
economics would be good for stage lengths from 250-1500 miles. 
Western noted that one of ,the adverse effects of deregulation was 
that the additional competition made it very difficult to fill wide-
bodies such as the DC-lO. Hopefully the lower-capacity 8-767 will alle-
viate that pro~em. Nor is it easy to fill the smaller l33-seat 8-727. 
At one point the idea was expressed that really nothing bigger than the 
current 8-727 was needed for the future short- to mediu~-haul plane. 
'2.10 Continental Airlines 
Continental is the last of the 'old line trunk airlines to be dis-
cussed. In an earlier expansionist era, Continental added extensively 
to a route structure primarily linear in nature and emphasizing Denver 
and Denver-West. After years of efforts the company was successful in 
acquiring transpacific routes to Hawaii, New Zealand, 'Australia, Fiji, 
Samoa and Tokyo by way of some small Pacific islands. American Airlines 
had previously dropped the South Pacific routes for reasons of unprofit-
ability. A look at the company's route map shows routes radiating from 
Denver to both coasts, Alaska, and to a number of points in Mexico. 
To service this extensive route system the company operates a fleet 
of DC-lOs and 8-727s, with the current complement listed in Table 2-8. 
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Number 
2 
11 
45 
15 
73 
Tabl e 2-8 
Continental Airlines Fleet, July 1981 
~ 
DC-10-30 
DC-10-10 
8-727-200 
8-727-100 
Seats 
247 (mixed class) 
247 (mixed class) 
137 
102 
The years since deregulation have not been kind to Continental. Losses 
were sustained in 1979 and 1980. 8ecause of competition the company has 
not been able to raise fares to offset the increase in fuel costs. Con-
tinental 's fleet is similar in size and composition to that of Western 
and has some of the same problems. Continental's DC-lOs have proven to 
be too large. The company's 8-727 aircraft are becoming increasingly 
fuel-inefficient and mayeventuallf be at a competitive,.if not legal, 
di sadvantage by reason of their noi se emi ss ions. 7 
Early in 1980, A.L. Feldman, who had been president of the very suc-
cessful Frontier, and some of his staff were brought in to turn around 
the company's fortunes. Western saw a new role for itself, namely, 
strengthening its domestic system by increasing the traffic feed 
through Denver, Houston and El Paso. This was to be accomplished by con-
centrating on a hub-and-spoke system. President Feldman was suddenly 
met with a takeover attempt by Texas International. His sudden death in 
1981 resulted in another president being brought in, Mr. George Warde, 
7 Although under the Reagan administration noise regulations are not being 
pushed at the federal level with the vigor of the former administration, 
the pressure has merely been transferred to other forums: state, muni-
cipal, and airport authorities and the courts. Some airports are being 
accused of formulating their regulations so as to force the purchase of 
Douglas DC-9-Super 80s or other quiet craft at the expense of older 
Douglas and 80eing Aircraft. California airports such as Orange County 
and San Diego are currently i~ the news in this regard. 
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~ 
who had former airline experience as president of American Airlines. 
What changes will take place in Continental's future strategy now that 
Texas International's stock purchase has been approved is not clear. 
At the time of the interviews, Continental planned to continue the 
broadening of its hub-and-spoke operations. For the near term its fleet 
is not ideal but options are few. A number of the DC-lOs are larger than 
optimum for the traffic on the routes to which they are assigned. Ef-
forts to dispose of DC-lOs have found only a soft market. Even the 8-727 
fleet leaves something to be desired. Continental's domestic stage 
length categories are: one-third between 600 and BOO miles; one-third 
between BOO and 1200 miles; and the final third between 1200 and lBOO 
miles. In the 8-727-200 fleet only the nine aircraft equipped with 
JTBD-15 engines will handle the critical mission of Denve~-East Coast on 
a hot day. The JT8D-17 engine is really needed, but the twin-engine, 
two-pilot 8-737 with JT8D-17A engines is said to be economically prefer-
able. As with most of the carriers referred to, Continental's ability 
to readjust its fleet is limited by financial circumstances. 
Although currently faced with excess seating capacity, Continental 
believes that by the 1985-2000 period traffic growth will not only sup-
port its existing fleet but will justify replacement of the 8-727s (now 
102 or 137 seats) with a ISO-passenger, twin-engine, fuel-efficient, 
quiet airplane. While it is expected that examination of the hub-and-
spoke system will lead to an increase in the number of less than 500 mile 
trip segments and thus a decrease in the average stage length, Continen-
tal prefers a plane with a wide range of mission capability to an opti-
mized short-haul aircraft. 
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Given the possibility that financial constraints of the manufac-
turers or airlines might preclude the arrival of a new-technology plane 
in the time frame needed, Continental, like other financially con-
strained airlines, was receptive to the concept of re-engining the 8-727. 
However, it favored adding a "plug" to increase the seating over "car-
rying around several thousand pounds of lead in the nose for balance." 
In any event, one prime requiremen~ according to the company, is perfor-
mance out of Denver combined with range to the East Coast. 
Summary: Continental'.s future role is to remain a major trunk line 
covering very long-haul international routes plus an extensive domestic 
network featuring feed by a hub-and-spoke system. Two to three types 
of equipment will be needed. Since it already has fuel-efficient wide-
bodies, Continental sees as its greatesf need replacements for its 8-727s 
which have three engines and a three-pilot crew while competitors may 
have two-engine, two-pilot crews. Stage lengths are expected to decrease 
somewhat. Continental has found it necessary to readjust some of its 
route network because of the economics of the current fleet. While the 
current 8-727 capacity is adequate for several years, future air travel 
growth will, Continental bel ieves, justify concentrating on a new 150-
passenger plane for the 1985-2000 period. 
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Chapter 3 
HOW THE TWO NEW MAJOR AIRLINES SEE THEIR FUTURE ROLE 
The ability of local service airlines (now called regionals) to 
grow at a greater rate than the trunks arose first, from ·their success 
in persuading the CAB that additional segments were needed "for route 
strengthening purposei," secondly, from taking advantage of opportunities 
afforded under deregulation to enter routes of their choice and, finally, 
from a greater ability than the trunks to merge with other airlines 
relatively free from rejection on antitrust grounds. Two of these car-
riers, currently known as USAir and Republic, have by various expansion 
tactics now passed the $1 billion revenue mark and are "majors" under 
the present CAB classification system. 
3.1 USAi r 
USAi r began operati ons in 1937 as All Ameri can Avi ati on, a very 
small carrier engaged in experimental air mail pickup operations. By 
merger, two other local service carriers, namely Lake Central in 1968 
and Mohawk in 1972, were acquired. By this time the name had been 
changed to Allegheny. In 1979, further geographic expansion and the 
company's major airline status was reflected by the name change to USAir. 
By 1981 its route network radiated out of Pittsburgh to various points 
on the East coast, as far west as Phoenix and Tucson, into Texas and 
Florida, and across U.S. borders into the Canadian points of Montreal 
and Toronto. In the main, the route segments are of the short- to 
medium-haul type averaging less than 500 miles in length. 
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Table 3-1 
USAir Fleet, October 1981 
Number ~ Seating 
55 
11 
5 
27 
DC-9-30 
8-727-100 
8-727-200 
8AC-1-11 
110 single class 
122 single class 
142 - 14 first class/128 coach 
79 single class 
The company's operating fleet is listed in Table 3-1. Additionally, on 
order are 15 8-737-200s seating 120 and 10 8-737-300s seating 138, both 
single class. The latter will not be delivered until 1983 and 1984. 
USAir's role, Which in large measure determines its aircraft acqui-
sition policies, is based upon conscious decisions made about the time 
of deregulation to concentrate on routes or markets of less than 1500 
miles utilizing twin-engine, two-crew aircraft of less than 150-
passenger capacity and feature frequency of service. These decisions 
reflect the fact that in the United States two-thirds of air travel is 
less than 1,000 miles from origin to destination (O&D). Since most of 
the stage lengths in this thousand miles or less ca.tegory are skewed to 
less than 500 miles, the company's equipment plans will focus on acquir-
ing planes which are very efficient over this length. On the other hand, 
not wishing to put all its eggs in the short-haul basket, USAir hedged 
its bets for some longer-haul services by purchasing 11 three-engine 
8-727-100s and five 8-727-200s. These will take care of its operation 
up to nearly 2,000 miles. Although the company would prefer newer-
technology two-man crew, twin-engine aircraft for this purpose, it does 
not expect them to be available until after 1985. Thus, the role of the 
8-727-200s, and particularly the 100s, is an interim one. USAir manage-
ment strongly wishes to resist temptation of purchasing larger aircraft 
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such as the B-757, attractive because of its low seat mile costs, for 
fear of losing the advantage of frequency of service. 
USAir's unusual success in the last few years -- with a 1980 net 
income of over $60'mil1ion, its rate of return on investment exceeded 
that of all certificated carriers except Southwest Airlines -~ indicated 
a need for additional twin-engine, quiet, short-haul, fuel-efficient 
aircraft with seating capacities in the 110- to 135-passenger range in 
order to maintain its role. Specifications for such aircraft were 
announced by Edwin I. Co10dny, chairman and president, at the L10yd ' s of 
London Press International Civil Aviation Conference No.2, in April 1980. 
Lack of a quick favorable response from aircraft manufacturers combined 
with significant fuel and noise lmprovements to current models of air-
craft caused the company to re-evaluate derivatives for use 'well into 
the late 80s and early 90s. The result was an order for 120-passenger 
B-737-200s and 138-passenger B-737-300s. Delivery of the latter does 
not begin until 1984. 
Perhaps the most telling way of highlighting USAir's role in the 
1985-2000 period and of indicating how it intends to maintain that role 
is to quote and paraphrase from Mr. Co10dny ' s well-publicized "Ten 
Commandments" speech given before the Third International Civil Aviation 
Conference in Paris, June 4, 1981: 
I. THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE NAME OF DEREGULATION IN VAIN 
By the above he means: Do not overdo the opportunity to 
expand. USAir's credo is "controlled growth." 
II. THOU SHALT PLAN BASED ON CONSERVATIVE PROJECTIONS OF 
TRAVEL GROWTH 
Beware of ten-year geometric progressions. 
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III. THOU SHALT KEEP AN EFFICIENT FLEET 
Plane mile costs are as important as seat mile costs. 
Frequency is more important than wide-body comfort. 
IV. THOU SHALT NOT COVET OTHER AIRLINES 
Under deregulation there is little need for mergers. Mergers 
bring problems; one of 'the most significant is integration 
of the labor forces. 
V. HONOR THY INVESTOR AND THY LENDER 
Without capital the industry cannot flourish. This means an 
essential need for profit, a reasonable debt/equity ratio 
without over]everaging and willingness to raise capital when 
the market "window" is open. 
Summary: USAiris future role is in the short- to medium-haul market 
requiring efficient equipment for trips of less than 500 miles, as well 
as some aircraft for a limited number of long-haul routes out of hubs. 
USAir believes its network is well tailored ,to fit the economics of the 
current fleet. Recognizing that portions of this fleet are fuel-
inefficient and noisy, USAir sees a requirement for aircraft in the 150-
passenger and less class, preferably down in the 110- to 130-passenger 
category. The preference for smaller sized aircraft stems from their convic-
tion that the frequency of service necessary to attract passengers cannot 
be maintained under deregulation if large aircraft with their higher 
plane mile costs are used. 
3.2 Republic Airlines 
The very rapid expansion of Republic Airlines, its philosophy, and 
its use of the merger technique proscribed in Edwin Colodny1s command-
ments stand in contrast to USAir ideas and actions. Some of Republic1s 
1980 loss of $25 million can be attributed to merger problems. 
A few years ago Republic was a small one-state airline and recently 
it has grown to be the number seven airline in passengers carried. 
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Beginning as Wisconsin Central Airlines in 1948, the company grew as a 
subsidized local service carrier to become North Central Airlines in 
1952. It prospered under the Ilroute strengthening" philosophy of the 
CAB as well as from substituting high-frequency service with smaller 
planes for the low frequency service provided by some larger lines. 
When deregulation came, North Central quickly and aggressively ex-
panded, particularly via the merger mechanism. In 1979, when the com-
pany merged with Southern Airways -- a 14-state local service carrier 
which had begun operations in 1979 -- the name Republic Airlines was 
adopted. A year later, 1980, Hughes Airwest -- a western based local 
service airline with 47 planes was acquired, again via merger. As a 
result, Republic now serves 200 cities and has a route network which 
stretches along both coasts,across the U.S., and from Canada to the 
Caribbean. This extensive expansion partially explains a tripling of 
revenues in 15 months. The losses. incurred while digesting the change 
of the carrier's role from a regional to a transcontinental major con-
strain its ability to finance new-technology aircraft with their very 
high capital costs. 
With the caveat that fleets are rarely static -- particularly when 
airlines are in transition because of changing economic, technological, 
or regulatory conditions -- Republic's 1981 fleet is distributed as 
shown in Table 3-2. 
Prior to deregulation Republic saw itself as a regional carrier 
concentrating on bringing people from small cities to large hubs 'where 
major carriers took them to further destinations (essentially a feeder 
operation). With the ~nset of deregulation, Republic decided to change 
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Number 
28 
59 
37 
16 
15 
2 
Table 3-2 
Republic Fleet, June 1981 
I~ 
DC-9-50 
DC-9-30 
DC-9-10 
CV-580 
B-727-200 
DC-9-80 
Seats 
130 
96/102/107 
80/85 
48 
141/145 
147 (12 yet to be delivered) 
its role so as to become a large, major airline. The quickest way to do 
this was to acquire via mergers IIgoing concerns ll which already had facil-
ities and personnel in place at desirable hub points. Given the new 
ease of entry, it then would be easy to establish. routes between the 
hubs and carry the traffic it formerly gave away. Another purpose of 
its new role was to attract passengers away from the major airlines by 
using satellite airports such as, San Jose and Ontario. Accordingly, 
Republic believes it will obtain long-haul traffic. 
To fulfill its plan for an extensive service over short- to medium-
haul and long-haul routes the company will need (1) planes carrying from 
100 to not more than 150 passengers for the short haul; and (2) a limited 
number of 200- to 250-passenger planes to compete on the long haul. 
Among the short- to medium-haul planes the low-capacity, fuel-hungry, 
DC-9-10 will be the first to be replaced because they cost as much to 
operate as other DC-9s but have fewer seats. For its short- to medium-
haul aircraft the stage lengths will be from 200 to 1,000 miles but will 
average between 400 and 500 miles. 
Now Republic is well satisfied with its route network and does not 
plan to alter it to fit the fleet. In fact, management thinks the cur-
rent fleet is a IIgood fit. II Although it has some aspirations in the 
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long-haul market, Republic s~s it does not in any way intend to abandon 
short-haul operations for a concentration on long-haul. 
There are two main reasons why Republic does not plan to acquire 
a new-technology plane optimized around its strategic plan. First, the 
ISO-passenger plane so often talked about is 150 in mixed-class con-
figuration. Republic is primarily a one-class operator, so that for it 
the ISO-passenger plane would become a 180- or 190-passenger craft --
far too large for thin routes. Second, at an estimated $40 million each, 
the price for the plane would be far above the company's financial 
ability. 
For the future, Republic s~es its best approach to be the acquisi-
tion of derivative aircraft, which it believes will be almost as desir-
able as new-technology planes but at a much more attractive cost. 
Accordingly, the first step was the purchase, for delivery beginning in 
1981, of 14 of the fuel-efficient, quiet, DC-9-80s, configured to 147-
passenger capacity. It is interesting to note that when USAir and 
Republic evaluated the DC-9-80 and the B-737-300, each came up with a 
different answer. Republic chose the DC-9-80 because it contained a new 
engine and an improved wing .. Additionally Republic already had a large 
fleet of Douglas planes with which it was well satisfied. Finally there 
was a reluctance to wait until 1984 for the Boeing aircraft when deliv-
eries of the Douglas plane could begin in 1981. 
3.3 Summary and Conclusion 
Two carriers, USAir and Republic, both with a history as short-
haul local and regional carriers, have by quite different means -- and 
with different philosophies -- grown into the category of major airlines. 
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One, USAir, has taken a more conservative approach and sees itself 
primarily as an operator of a hub-and-spoke system for routes character-
ized as short- or medium-haul,with 500 miles and less being predominant. 
Nevertheless, it has not been completely able to resist the temptation 
to enter some long-haul vacation markets such as Phoenix and Tucson and 
to acquire some three-engine, three-man crew B-727s to service them. 
It has a firmer long-term preference for new-technology aircraft than 
Republic and was willing to wait several years for delivery of the 
8-737-300 -- a plane which, according to USAir's engineering and mar-
keting staff, was better for its operation than the DC-9-80. Thus far 
USAir's "controlled expansion" has been profitable and the company is not 
tightly constrained for capital should new equipment appear. 
After deregulation Republic Airlines very quickly discarded its 
one-region role for the development, largely via the merger mechanism, of 
an extremely large network enveloping both coasts, the interior of the 
U.S., and international neighbors to the north and south. 8ecause of 
the economic downturn and the PATCO strike, the company's operations have 
recently been unprofitable. If Republic is unable to digest the mergers, 
its ability to finance equipment will be compromised. 
80th companies are well satisfied with their route structure and 
the fleets they now have. Also, when it comes to aircraft needs in the 
next generation of aircraft, the companies' philosophies are quite simi-
lar. Both emphasize the need for frequency of service to attract pas-
sengers and both believe that competition arising from deregulation 
dictates caution on sizing air~raft. For the major portion of their 
operations they indicate a ISO-passenger plane would be the maximum size 
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considered, but as a matter of preference they want new planes in the 
100- (for thin routes), 130-, and 150-passenger capacity. Each carrier 
repeated several times the importance of low airplane mile costs. 
Finally, both airlines thought it would be some time before they would 
have enough power, at least individually, to influence significantly 
specifications for the next generation of short- to medium-haul 
aircraft. 
i1.~ 

Chapter 4 
THE CHANGING ROLE OF 
SIX MEDIUM SIZE CARRIERS 
As has been suggested previously, deregulation has introduced 
instability into the classification of airlines so that in some cases 
distinctions have been blurred and in other cases airlines are rapidly 
moving from one category to another. Chapters 2 and 3 dealt with the 
old line trunks, plus USAir and Republic which have recently passed into 
the trunk or "major" category. This chapter includes results of inter-
views with the managements of six medium size airlines, all but one of 
which -- Air Florida -- have more modest goals than those of the major 
airlines. Generally these are medium sized, single-class service air-
lines who engage in short- to medium-haul operations .. Although origin-
ally organized as feeder airlines, in recent years they have engaged 
increasingly in point-to-point service and have encouraged commuter air-
lines to act as feeders for them. Four of the six airlines emphasize 
twin-engine aircraft with high-density seating and, by being able to 
charge higher rates per mile than the majors, these four airlines have 
been financially successful during periods in which most majors have 
been having difficulty. The six carriers treated are: 
4:1 Frontier Airlines 
Fronti er 
Piedmont 
Air Wisconsin 
AirCal 
Air Florida 
Air New England 
Frontier began in 1950 as the outgrowth of a merger of three small 
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feeder lines: Monarch Airlines, Challenger Airlines, and Arizona 
Airways. The carrier is characterized as a hub-and-spoke system. Its 
main hub is Denver from which routes radiate in all directions, in some 
cases as far west as the west coast and as far east as Detroit and 
Atlanta. Its current fleet is listed in Table 4-1. 
Number 
49 
16 
Table 4-1 
Frontier Fleet, July 1981 
3 (on order) 
~" 
B-737 -200 
CV-580 
DC-9-80 
Seating 
106 
50 
147 
Notwithstanding the short-haul nature of its operations -- 44 per-
cent of its stage lengths are less than 300 miles, another 37 percent 
in the 300-600 mile bracket -- and notwithstanding that most of its 
routes are classified as thin-density routes, Frontier in 1980 ranked 
third in profitability behind USAir and Southwest Airlines. The carrier 
was an early supporter of deregulation because of the control it gave 
management over the company's own destiny, including the ability to dis-
pose of subsidy routes. As airplane economics change, Frontier adjusts 
its route network. Since deregulation the carrier has added 25 desir-
able cities while disposing of 27 "loser" cities. 
For the future, management intends to build on its present hub-and-
spoke system and perhaps" add one or two more hubs. Also it will (and is) 
moving gradually into some longer-haul operations -~ a move which has 
equipment implications. Hot-day, long-haul operations with full loads 
out of its high altitude Denver hub require high-performance airplanes. 
Fortunately, the B-737-200 with the new higher thrust JT8D-17A engines 
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satisfy this need. The expansion will be the controlled-type, keeping 
in mind a quotation often repeated by the companyls President G.l. 
Ryland, II Remember, IBeing big didnlt save the dinosaur. III Expansion 
will be aimed at the nationls prime growth regions. Some lengthening 
of the current average stage length of 373 miles is anticipated. 
In looking at the equipment picture, the CV-580 fleet, because of 
age and high operating costs, will soon be retired or replaced. Since 
the company finds no suitable replacements for this 50-place airplane, 
some of the cities it serves are being deleted. If a better 75-seat 
plane were available, Frontier would stay in those markets. Thus, to a 
certain extent, Frontier is restructuring its routes to fit its fleet. 
For most of the route structure .the B-737-200, with its low cost per 
aircraft mile and with its modest size, is ideal for the near term. By 
1985 the company would like to be selecting two or three types of air-
craft carrying 75-100, 100-130, and 150 passengers, of course with low 
airplane mile costs and lower cost per ASM than current equipment. 
Since the tendency will continue to be to add routes in the longer 
ranges, Frontier wants a portion of its future planes to have 1,500-
1,600 nautical mile capacity as well as performance out of Denver on a 
hot day. Presently ten of the companyls B-737-200s have the more power-
ful JT8D-17A engines which just about meet this future requirement. In 
choosing between Deltals and Unitedls proposed new-technology aircraft, 
Frontier leans toward the United-type transport. 
Ever since the jet era began, environmentalists have promoted with 
increasing success noise regulations covering aircraft emissions as well 
as curfews and daily schedule limitations. The latter might themselves 
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be tailored to aircraft noise emissions. One of the most restrictive 
airports is Orange County, California -- an airport which Frontier 
wishes to serve. Early in 1981 Frontier placed an order for three of 
the 147-passenger DC-9-80s primarily for their low noise emissions (they 
meet stage 3). Reference to Table 4-1 shows that until the DC-9-80 
order the carrier's active fan-jet fleet was limited to small 106- -
passenger planes from Boeing. Thus, a secondary reason for the DC-9 
purchase- was to increase capacity for use on more heavily traveled 
routes. The change in vendor was not a question of a company leaving a 
supplier for reasons of dissatisfaction, but because of non-availability 
of the desired type of plane from the traditional source. Frontier 
could not follow its strategic plan if it waited until 1984 for delivery 
of the Boeing product, the B-737-300. 
Although the current B-737-200, because of its small size and low 
plane mile costs, has the advantage of being able to enter a market 
sooner and build up frequency of service quicker than a larger plane, 
Frontier feels it must monitor carefully each new-technology aircraft so 
that it does not get caught with obsolescent aircraft in the 1985-2000 
period. 
Summary: Currently, Frontier has a fuel-efficient, low~operating­
cost fleet of 106-passenger B-737-200 aircraft which is a good fit for 
a route system featuring stage lengths of 400 miles. The airline's suc-
cess in managing its business, as well as its future plans, suggest that 
growth will be accompanied by new, longer routes $0 that its re-
equipment plans will require as many as three types of planes. One, a 
75- to 100-seat plane for short-haul and thin routes; two, a 100- to 
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130-seat aircraft for the major portion of its medium-haul routes; and 
three, a ISO-seat plane with the flexibility necessary to serve routes 
a~ long as 1,600 nautical miles. New-technology aircraft will be 
closely examined for the II bottom 1 ine" as well as for the prime el ements 
of fuel economy and low.noise emissions. 
4.2 Piedmont Aviation 
Piedmont, located at Winston-Salem, North Carolina, is a somewhat 
smaller carrier than Frontier, but has some similarities with the latter. 
It has successfully concentrated on single-class twin-engine service 
with B-737-200s using a two-pilot crew, but has begun to find them short 
on capacity for its web of short-haul routes in the southeast. In 1980, 
a recessionary period, its profits reached an all time high, following 
Frontier in the list of profitable airlines. 
Piedmont, like Frontier, has been a staunch supporter of deregula-
tion, attributing part of its success to using the opportunities afforded 
by deregulation to aQd and subtract routes as needed, to adjust fares 
more freely, and to its "bypass strategy. II The latter saves passengers 
time by bypassing major hubs for direct point-to-point flights. Based 
on two and a half years of successful growth under deregulation, Piedmont 
plans on a 20 percent annual growth factor over the next few years. 
Such a growth factor implies significant equipment changes in the 1985-
2000 period. Piedmontis fleet in July 1981 is shown in Table 4-2. 
Piedmont views itself as a feeder system feeding itself and others. 
In looking at its future needs, Piedmont believes it cannot continue the 
luxury and simplicity of a single plane fleet. Historically, its 
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Table 4-2 
Piedmont Aviation Fleet, Jul~ 1981 
Number ~ Engine Seats 
40 B-737-200 dash 9 112 
6 B-727-100 117 
2 B-727-200 150 
6 B-727-200 150 (on order) 
20 B-737-200 dash 15 112 (on order) 
short-haul characteristic resulted in 200-300 mile stage lengths. But 
longer lengths are now showing up. As late as the annual report of 1980, 
dated February 1981, Piedmont planned a complete two-engine, two-pilot 
B-737 fleet by 1983. Yet by spring, additional ISO-seat, three-engi.ne, 
three-pilot B-727-200s were ordered. The company found that the combi-
nation of the added seating capacity and the higher yield of its single-
class service, resulted in profitable operations. Plane mile costs were 
IIterrible but with the loads carried the seat mile costs were good. II 
Further growth has given birth to consideration of placing 160 seats in 
the B-727-200s. 
Currently the YS-ll stage lengths average only 115 and they will 
be completely phased out by the start of 1982. Stage lengths on some 
8-727s are now 800 miles. A large portion of B-737 trips are in the 300 
mile stage length category. The company, therefore, hopes for a plane 
with excellent economics at 800 miles and with good economics at 300 
miles. 
Although the present fleet is operating profitably, the aircraft 
employed are reaching the limit of their capacities, and hence produc-
tivity. Piedmont's planners, based on growth projections, believe that 
in the 1985-2000 period the airline will require two types of planes 
which it does not now operate. One will be a l50-passenger, twin-engine, 
52 
two-pH ot, qui et, fuel-effiei ent transport for its shorter operations, 
the second, a 150- to 180-passenger aircraft similarly configured but 
with a flexible range. 
Summary: High yielding single-class fares combined with high load 
factors and the economies of a twin~engine, two-pilot crew airplane have 
been profitable for Piedmont. Unanticipated growth and longer haul 
operations have forced Piedmont to purchase three-pilot, three-engine 
airplanes ~s an interim measure until the next generation of new-
technology aircraft arrives. The company, like others of the regional 
group, does not feel it has the expertise to design replacement air-
craft nor the clout to influence design, but hopes that those that do 
will provide two sizes, namely, a 130-passengerand one 20 to 40 pas-
'sengers larger, which will enable Piedmont to upgrade its fle~t in the 
1985-2000 period. From a prel iminary perusal of the Delta and United' 
specifications, Piedmont favors United's because of its focus on economy 
of operation at the 800 mile range. 
4.3 Air Wisconsin 
Thus far' this report has involved airlines established in the 1930s 
undei the restrictive CAB interpretations as to entry and exit.' We now 
shift to some of the newer carriers. Their small sizes give them the 
,feel ing that they have 1 ittle input in equipment matters but must "take 
what is on the shelf. II They hope, however, that collectively there are 
enough of them to interest manufacturers in their specific needs. 
Air Wisconsin, whose headquarters is in Appleton Wisconsin, was 
established in 1965 to serve the paper industry people with business in 
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Chicago. Blessed with astute management, the company expanded and pros-
pered. Deregulation was a boon to the company because its small planes 
w~re able to fill in and ir.crease frequency where major carriers dropped 
out. Curiously, although it carries the name Air Wisconsin, Appleton is 
the only Wisconsin city it serves. Only 12 other cities: one in Minne-
sota, one in Illinois, four in Indiana, two in Michigan, three in Ohio, 
and one in Pennsylvania are on its routes. Air Wisconsin's fleet at 
present and on order is shown in Table 4-3. 
Tabl e 4-3 
Air Wiscons'in Fleet, August 1981 
Number .~ Seats 
13 SW Metro 16 
6' DH-.7 50 (4 additional by April 
.1982)' . 
3 .BAe-146· 100 (first deliveri 198j) 
Using this 19-plane fl~et, in which 46 percentof.the available 
seat mil es were flown with the DH-7, the company earned a net profit of 
$4.2 mill ion on revenues of $35.7 mill ion, a 12 percent margin. By way 
of compari son, a number of the majors have been hoping for a 5 percent 
margin. 
Air Wisconsin's equipment need~ in.the 1985-2000 period reflect its 
. conviction that its role is high frequenc'y serv.ice in short-haul opera-
tions -- operations in which it has been successful and in which it 
intends to stay. Basically its success has been partially due to its 
policy of avoiding competition where possible which enables it to charge 
high fares. While trunk line fares yield carriers about 12 cents a 
mile, Air Wisconsin's fares yield about 38 cents a mile, three times the 
yield of major airlines. 
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The company sees for itself a bigger role in the future than it now 
has. Since deregulation large carriers have been abandoning their un-
profitable routes which have usually been served by planes too large 
for the traffic. Air Wisconsin's success in replacing United's low-
frequency service in short-haul markets in Michigan and Indiana suggest 
that the process will be repeated in the future. Already the 16-
passenger Metros are becoming too s~all and are being phased out. 
For its expanded role in the 1985-2000 period, Air Wisconsin sees 
the need for two or three' types of pl anes .Si nce the ~urrent average 
stage length is but 133 ~tatute miles, and the future maximum stage 
length is conceiv~d to be 2~0 miles, focus must be on efficient short-
haul aircraft., The company sees a clear ne'ed, for a 36-passenger, a 50-
passenger, and a 100~pas~enger plane. '~hile there are some 36-s~atai~~ 
craft being offered for sale, none of them is con,sidered completely 
satisfactory so Air Wisconsin' is continuing to look. Options which it 
has on the 36-passenger DH-8 may not be exercised. 
Its experience with the DH-71eads Air Wisconsin to b~lieve that 
the aircraft will be a workhorse for the company for a number of years. 
The company's recent order for the four-engine, 100-passenger BAe146, 
though surprising to those who cannot believe that there is economy in 
four engines over two, was made only after a long evaluation of the 
product. Air Wisconsin is convinced that this aircraft will be economi-
cal down to a 150 mile stage length. The carrier believes that by 
obtaining new aircraft, though capital-expensive, it can fend-off the 
"instant" airlines who believe they can compete by using cheap cast-off 
aircraft. 
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Finally, the arrival of the lOO-pii'ssenger BAe-146 .. will cause the 
airline to readjust its route network to enter more large cities and 
eligage in longer haul operations. Since the carrier calculates the 
break even load factor to be in the thirti~s, it does not fear entering 
these markets. 
Summary: Air Wisconsin intends to stay in the short-haul market 
and continue,. where possible, to avoid competition in order to maintain 
high yields. Unless a 36-passenger plane can be found," phasing out the 
Metros means that future markets will be limited to those which will 
support the 50-passenge~ DH-7 or 100-pa~senger ~Ae-146. 
4.4 AirCaT 
AirC~l is anotherrelatively"new carrier.· It began o~erations as 
Air California in 1967 with two Lockheed Electrasto serve the Orange 
County-San francisco market. Orange County is the compa~y'sheadquarters 
and major base. This intrastate operation avoided the necessity of ob-
taining a certificate from the CAB. Until deregulation, howeve~, AirCal 
was rather tightly regulated by the State of California Public Util i~y 
Commission. Since deregu1ation, AirCal has used the Opportunities af-
forded under the law to branch out into nearby states. This well-
managed company earned $10 mil11on. on op~rating revenues ~f $159 million 
in IgaO, a recessionary period. Its July 1981 fleet is tabulated in 
Table 4-4. 
AirCal has a clearly defined role for itself in the future. It is 
to continue to be a single-class, full service, no frill airline to pro-
vide for the basic transportation needs of selected cities in California, 
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,. 
Number 
14 
2 
2 
AirCal 
~-
8-737-200 
8-737-100 
OC-9-80 
Tabl e 4-4 
Fleet, July 1981 
Seats 
119 
119 
160 (2 more for October 1981 
delivery and 5 beginning 
in 1982) 
Utah, Nevada, Washington, Arizona, and Oregon. Frequent but simple (no 
meals, except an occasional snack-pack), on time, quality service on 
segments of one to one and one-half hours flying time will continue to 
be its selling point. Relatively high-density seatin~ and higher than 
average yields (currently 15 cents a mile compared with about 12 for the 
trunks) is expected to keep the company profitable and ease equipment 
acquisition problems. 
The aircraft which AirCal wants to implement this role are 120 and 
150 seats in capacity, with two engines, two pilots and fuel-efficient 
powerplants. Finally, the aircraft must be extremely quiet to comply 
with environmental regulations which are most strict at Orange County. 
AirCal's continuing acquisition of OC-9-80s with their quiet, fuel-
efficient JT80-209 and -217 engines fulfill part of this requirement 
almost to the year 2000 .. The 8-737-100 and -200 series, however, are 
another story. While currently the 8-737s are satisfactory, they were 
acquired used from PSA, and are older technology, and are high in 
cycles -- some have 60,000 landings and takeoffs. 
AirCal feels that its first replacement task will be that of the 
8-737 fleet with 120- to 130-seat new aircraft. Currently the price of 
the 8-737-300 has not looked attractive when carried down to bottom 
line after deducting interest charges and depreciation. The new 8Ae-146 
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at 100 passengers is considered too small, and the B-757 at over 220 
passengers in single-class is too large. As long as fuel prices do not 
increase faster than inflation, interest rates remain high, and as long 
as used aircraft meeting the company's immediate needs sell for about 
$5 mill ion in compari son with a price of over $20 mi 11 ion for a new air-
craft, AirCa1 does not feel pressed to buy new. Environmental pressures 
could possibly speed up its timetable. 
Summary: AirCa1 plans to continue its role of serving a limited 
western region area with frequent, single-class, quality service. Short-
haul service -- 300-400 miles in one-to-one and one-half hours -- will 
be its mode of operation. By taking del ivery on a fleet of 160-seat 
DC-9-80s it has solved for a number of years its environmental, fuel 
efficiency, and high capacity problem. While management recognizes that 
it 'faces replacing B-737 aircraft unless they go through a major modifi-
cation program which is highly unlikely, it sees nothing very attractive 
on the market. AirCal emphasized that under current conditions financing 
could cost more than technological advances could save. Thus only some 
special circumstance, such as environmental rules, could dictate a 
purchase. 
4.5 Air Florida 
Prior to 1978 Air Florida was an intrastate airline initially util-
izing B-7.07s and Lockheed E1 ectras. The company began its rapid growth 
and route expansion with the onset of deregulation and now flied to 
Houston, Dallas-Ft.Worth, Washington, D.C., New York, Toledo, Chicago, 
as well as international operations to Central American, the Caribbean, 
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and several points in Europe. Any plot of where the company flies and 
the content of its fleet is subject to quick change. Its October 1981 
fleet is listed in Table 4-5. 
Tabl e 4-5 
Air Florida Fleet, October 1981 
Number ~ Seats 
5 B-727-200 170 
2 DC-9-15 85 
3 B-737-100 107 
23 B-737-200 125-128 
3 DC-10-3D 380 single class 
41/288 in.mixed class 
. Notwithstanding extremely rapid expansion -- revenue growth from 
$8 million in the year before deregulatiqn to $161 million in 1980 --
Air.Florida has been profitable and in 1980 earned $5.7 millio~; It 
attributes some of its suc~ess to cost c6ntrol -- its offices are among 
the most spartan in the industry -- the ability because of 'its small 
size to react quickly and to its focus on low fares ma.de possi ble by 
high-density sirigle-c'lass seating. A policy of going into a market with 
charters the first year, expanding by schedul ed service with bul k con-
tracts the second year, and then full schedul es the third year has been 
successful. 
Although the company is opportunistic and pragmatic, it does see a 
specific role for itself and has some definite ideas about its equipment 
needs. In the short term the company's needs vary with aircraft price. 
Although the B-727-100s are considered obsolete, Air Florida conceived 
of circumstances -- such as low cost coupled \lith favorable contr~ct 
provisions for future aircraft from Boeing -- which would make them an 
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interesting possibility .. Indeed,.to the surprise of some, Air Florida 
did purchase new from 80eing five three-engine, three-pilot 8-727-200s 
under arrangements it considered to be· profitable. 
To fulfill its future role, Air Florida thinks it ne.eds three types 
of planes. First, for its Miami to Europe routes it requires a 300-
to 400-passenger wide-body, with 10 to 11 hours or 5,500 to 6,000 mile 
range. The second type is a 100- to 130-passenger ,two-pil ot, twin-
engine aircraft with arang~ of 1,800-2,000 miles and short and rough 
field capability. This requirement for some years c1m be·satisfied 
with the high gross' weight version of the 8-737 with dash 17 engines. 
Ultimately, a plane of the same size and· range· but better economics is 
desired. According to the company· s computations ,the price of fuel 
would have to es·calate considerably to',justHy purcha'sing the 6-737-300 
series. 
The third type desired· isa plane sl ightly small er than the 8-757 
which would carry about 190-200 passengers in an all coach configuration . 
. However, because of the small probabil ity that such a plane would be 
built, Air Florida took 'advantage of a package deal with80eing to order . 
three 8-757s for delivery several years in the future. Air Florida also 
indicated an interest in the 8-727RE Hif the pric~ is ri.ght.", 
Summary: For the 1985~2000 period~, Air.Florida sees itself reason-
ably well suited for two of its three types Of operation. For the third 
type it sees the need f6r a new-technology plane .. carrying 190-200 pas-
sengers in dense seating coach configuration with a range of up to 1,800 
or 2,000 miles. Air Florida considers itself a gnat in the equipment 
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picture and therefore feels it will be purchasing off the ~helf or used 
rather than participating in the determination of any design parameters. 
4.6 Air New England 
Air New England, a Boston based carrier; was difficult to classify. 
It had outgrown the commuter stage but Was hardly lar~e enough to fit 
into another classification. The company's recent financial difficul-
ties were such that its name will soon be only a memory. This is a far 
cry from its early promise. ' Air New England was organized in 1970 and 
quickly became one of the largest and most successful of 200 commuter 
airlines. In 1972 the carrier filled a void in New England when Delta 
took over Northwest Airl i nes and then was a bl e to drop serv ice to many 
New England towns because of the size of their airports in relation to 
the size of Delta's planes. At the time of the, interview, routes ex-
tended west to Al bany, Rochester, and Cl evel and and from there to 
Baltimore. 
By 1974 Air New England alr~ady serv~dNew York, Boston, New Bed-
ford, Hyannis, Nantucket, Martha's Vineyar~ Lebanon, Lewistown, Portland, 
etc. When it applied for certification as a scheduled interstate car-
rier under the Civil Aeronautics Act, it made a serious misjudgment on 
the additional costs involved. Subsequently~ instead of operating at a 
profit without government aid, the company found it necessary to ask the 
CAB for larger and larger subsidies. Although not all routes were sub-
sidized, subsidy payments have risen every year up to 1980. 
Under deregulation one type of subsidy, i.e., section 406, is to be 
phased out. Recession, competition by new, low-cost carriers under 
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deregulation, and instability of management have placed the company in 
a precarious financial position. Its fleet in October 1981 is shown in 
Tabl e 4-6. 
Tabl e 4-6 
Air New England Fleet, October 1981 
Number ~ 
4 FH-227 
10 DH-6 
4 CV-580 
Seats 
44-48 
19 
50 
Use 
Subsidized routes 
Subsidized routes 
Non-subsidized routes 
Given its route structure and the traffic generated, Air New 
England was not satisfied with its fleet composition shown in the above 
table. There is over a 100 percent spread between the seating capacity 
of the DH-6 and either the CV-580 or the FH~227.· Air· New England felt 
it woul d be much better off wi th a 30- to 36-passenger pI ane, such as 
the CASA or Embraer Brasil ia, but without funds nothing could be done. 
During the interview it became clear that Air New England was un-
certain whether it had a future at all. Because of the loss of subsidy 
under deregulation, and because of additi~nal competition from "upstart" 
airl ines with artificially low costs, Air New England haa to restructure 
some of its routes to fit the economics of its existing fleet. This 
coul d' not be done success full y and a t the end of October 1981 the 
company ceased operations. 
Sur.nnary: Air Net'l England, after an auspicious. beginning, under-
estimated the cost of operating as a certificated !irline in the con-
gested short-haul, high-cost New England area. Conipounding its problems 
were a reduction of subsidy; additional competitiOn from new carriers 
started with in~xpensive airplanes and staffed by entry l'evel, low cost 
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personnel; poor economic conditions; and the PATCO strike (Boston is one 
of the 22 restricted airports). Air New England was privately held and 
w!thout a large infusion of capital it was doomed. Therefore, any dis-
cussion of needs for the 1985-2000 period is moot. 
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Chapter 5 
ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF THREE SPECIALIZED CARRIERS 
Previous chapters have dealt first with the future role seen for 
themselves by the former large trunk lines and by two new additions 
whi ch are now 1 umped into the trunk or "major" category; and second, 
with the role seen for themselves by six medium-sized carriers. In 
general, it was found that the medium-size carriers were more limited in 
their objectives; had almost all their operations in single-class, short-
to medium-haul service; were able to maintain higher yields per revenue 
passenger mile; and emphasized the importance of low aircraft mile costs . 
. in their equipment plans.' Despite a desire to retain the economies of 
a two-pilot, tWin-engine aircraft, several airl ines, because of,l ack ,of 
range or adequate se~ting capacity in their twin-engine craft, were 
forced to introduce three~engine, three-man crew B-727s on some of their 
routes. This occurred after management had calculated ,that with the 
denser seating and higher yield, aircraft which were unprofitable for 
oiher carriers became profitable for them. 
This chapter outlines roles seen by two·airlin'es which began as 
intrastate' operators to evade the obstacles of CAB certifications but 
now under deregulation have expanded into interstate operations --
Southwest Airlines (SWA), and Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) -- and 
by one of the new high-density, low fare, single-class airlines made 
possible by the free entry system under deregulation, i.e., r~idway 
Airlines. 
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5.1 Southwest Airlines 
The genesis of Dallas-based Southwest Airlines (SWA) in 1967 was 
the idea that the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of obtaining 
a certificate of convenience and necessity under the CAB could be avoided 
by forming an intrastate airl ine· in Texas as Pacific Southwest Airl ines 
had done in California. Despite the limited service provided by the 
two existing CAB competitors -- .Braniff and Texas International -- these 
competitors raised numerous legal objections in the state court~ the 
processing of which almost bankrupted·SWA. Southwest, however" ulti-
mately won these legal battles .. Braniff and Texas International, never-
theless, kept up the attack only to be sued ~nd eventually found guilty' 
and fined for trying to stop Southwesfin.an ill egal.fashion. 
Operations of SWA literally ilgot off the. ground"in 1971 with.three 
new B-737 airplanes obtained from Boeing at· the bargain pri~e of $4 mjl-
lion each. Colorful lamar Muse, a man with pre~ious airline experience. 
became president. Muse sought out high-quality~ experienced airline 
talent available because of thereces~ionary period -- to ~onduct the 
operat ion ina hi ghl y effi ci ent man~er. Through the yea rs the·company 
has been successfu~ to the point that its mar~in ~f profit is often a 
multiple of that earned by·any of the trunk carriers,incTuding Delta 
and Northwest. Aside· from its ·excell ent cho ice of suita bl e. equipmerit, 
part of SWA's success has been due to operating from airports close to 
the city in HoustOn and Dallas. After many legal battles t Southwest 
Airlines was permitted to operate out of love Field in Dallas while com-
petitors were required to operate from the more distant Dalla~~Ft~ Worth 
Airport (DFW). SWA had never signed an agreement as had all others to 
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move to DF~; in fact, it had not been organized when the other carriers 
signed. 
Southwestls operations are based on a mass transit concept of 
short-haul, high-frequency service, featuring low fares at peak times, 
and still lower fares at off-peak times. Since deregulation, a limited 
number of interstate points have been added. Until recentl y, stewardes-
ses dressed in IIhot pants II as well as slogans bu ilt around the word 
. . 8 
1I1 0ve ll were .hallmarks of SWA. Among other features, not common on other 
airlines are: ten-minute stops, quick ticketing at cash registers, no 
interlining, and no meals. Generally speaking, the employees are not 
unionized and are cross utilized. Southwest actually attempts to com-
pete with the automobile. IIKeep it simple ll is a motto often repeated 
by company executives. In line with the IIkeep it simple ll concept, and 
because of the excell ent fit of 8-737s to the SWA route net'tlork, the 
company decided early on the use of a one-type fleet of twin-engine, 
two-pilot B-737s. 
Tabl e 5-1 ' 
Southwest Airlines 1981 Fleet and Aircraft, on Order 
Number Type Seats 1981 
(Dec) 
1982 1983 1984 1'985 
Oct 181 
25 8-737-200 118 
o 8-737-300 142 
27 
o 
6 
o 
3* 
o 
*Plus Options for 3 8-737-200s and 30 8-737-300s 
4 
2 8* 
In viewing the future -- 1985-2000 -- SWA believes it i~ well pre-
pared for continued success. Table 5-1 lists planes on order and on 
8 Stewardesses now have the option of wrap-around skirts. Recently a 
court ordered Southwest to grant application of qualified males to 
become flight attendants. 
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option in October 1981 but it does not reflect the fluidity of the situ-
ation. Increases in the number of 8-737-300s on order to 40 are cur-
rcntly under consideration as well as fUrther acquisitions of the 200 
series. Part of the company·s strategy is to keep its transports young 
and efficient -- currently the average age is 28 months -- so that they 
will command a good price as used aircraft. According to Southwest, the 
advent of deregulation made the utilization of efficient iircraft a 
requirement for survival. 
, ' 
Company officials were very clear about the carriers futUre role' 
which is to continue its present role ofpro~iding )n~~cost,high-fre~ 
quency, short-haul, mass transportation which ,may compete with the ~uto­
mobile. This role requires the same type aircraft but possiblY'a littl.e 
~arger than th~t used in the 70s.·Southwesthas no aspi~a~i6ns to 
. beconie a trunk 1 ine or to engage in loi,g~haul. operations. 9· Nanagement 
v iewed with skept ici sm proposals for a new ISO-passenger mi xed~cl ass 
aircraft, pointing out, as did Air Florida and other single-class car-
riers, that ISO-passenger mixed-class aircraft are.equivalent to 180~ 
passenger planes in single-class service. This .. latter ~ize represents 
too large a capacity jump to accorilmodate traffic' and still provide fre-
quency of service. 
Building another model' of the B~757 but 'reduced in siz~, or reducing 
the size of some other plane, \',Qul d not be appropriate because~ according 
9 In a surpnslng move early in November 19Si, the president of South-
west, Howard Putnam, left to become president of Bfaniff: His succes-
sor, Herbert Kelleher, who was and continues to be chairman of thE! 
board has announced plans for expansion ihto other states than con.;; 
templ ated by the former president. However,.it is riot beli eved that 
these plans presage a move to a major change in the type of operations; 
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to SWA, much unneeded weight stays with the airplane in the reduction 
process. Additionally, large planes are designed for longer stage 
lengths than the 276 mile stage length average now characteristic of 
Southwest's routes. Finally, the company-pointed out that since noise 
was one of the reasons for developing the Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport and 
moving airlines from Love Field, it is imperative for SWA to purchase 
the quietest new-technology planes possible. One of the appeals -- be-
sides its fuel economy -- of the recently ordered B-737-300 was the 
assurance that it would shrink the Ldn 65 noise contours to ,an area 70 
percent less than that of the B-737-200, and 50 percent 1 ess than that 
of the quiet DC-9-80. 
Summiry: Southwest Airlines has a very clear idea,of its future' 
role in the industry. It ~lans to contiriue'to operate -- as it has so 
successfully in the' past -- a mass transit, auto-competitive, short-haul 
service, employing twin-engine, two-pilot aircraft with high-density 
seating and attractive flight attendants. Furth~r, the op~ration will 
, -
be characterized by low-fare, high-frequency service, involving such 
"keep it simple" features as quick ticketing, no interlining, no meals, 
and simple "no gimmick" fares. 
The company has no desire to expand to a full-service airline so 
that its equipment needs for the years 1985-2000 are substantially the 
same as today except for a more intense emphas is on low cost (both per 
'seat mile and per aircraft mile), extended seat miles per gallon, and a 
vast improvement in noise emissions. Growth will require slightly larger 
aircraft than the present 118-seat B-737-200. 
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Management sees the B-737-300 as meeting future fuel economy and 
noise requirements. By 1990 most of the B-737~200s are expected to be 
replaced by the 1 arger, more efficient B.,.7~7-300s. Unl ike the case with 
most other carriers, financing is not expected to be a problem; As the 
company president put it, "If you make money, you have no trouble raising 
money. II He also saw no reason for readj~sting Southwest'.s route network 
to fit its current fleet or planned acquisition·s. Although the B-737':'300 
is the closest to a new-technology plan~ SWA will. need, the company did 
emphasize that it does now, and will in the futl,lre, clos'ely monitor new 
~ircraft .offeringsto ~ee if anything better is de${gned~ 
In short, Southwest feels it has its eql,lipment .needs well covered 
qntil the year 2000. 
5.2 Pacific Southwest Airlines 
Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA),with headquarters in San Diego, 
is anot~er airlin~whichentered the business as a single-class, high-
frequency~ low-cost, intrastate carrier to avoid rejection by the CAB . 
of ~n interstate application. Although the compan.ywas successful for·. 
c:, whi1~, regulation by the Cal if9rnia State Publ icUtn ity Gommission 
later proved as onerous as that oftheCA~. Thus PSA became ~ staunch 
advocate of ·deregulation which later ena~1ed H ~9 e;<panq 1;9 Arizona? 
Nevada, cities within Califgrnia, and int9 Mexi<;o·~ W~R~ ~himp; chair:-
man of PSA, recently stated, "I douot t~pt PSA would n.aye survived with-
out deregulation. II The company's r9LJtes ilre still pre9Qmina'1tly oetwE!el'! 
cities of western Cal Hornia with a heav.y q)nCE!ntriltiqn qf traffic ~1on~ 
the high-density Los Angeles-San Franci?C9 <;9rrig9r~ Its reYE!nue? grE! 
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running about $400 million a year. Passenger yield in 1980 was 13.6¢ 
and average stage length was 348 miles. 
PSA's 1981' aircraft fleet, listed in Table 5-2, has already been 
heavily influenced by deregulation, fuel prices, and noise regulations. 
Tabl e 5-2 
PSA Fleet, October 1981 
Number ~ Seats On Order 
15 8:"727-200 165* 
3 8-727-100 128 
6 DC .. 9-80 153 20 
* Being converted to 175 
Fuel prices, in particular, have forced changes in the route s:tructure 
and PSAfeels its future ,role will involve longer stage lengths than its 
current 50 minute average. Stage lengths,'such ,as San Diego-Los Angeles, 
are inefficient for its present fl ee't and are bei ng dropped .. These 
segments are bei ng repl aced by expansion into the Paci fic Northwest wi th 
Seattle being an objective. 
As previously indicated, Cal ifornia 'residents have been increas-
ingly successful in obtaining compensation for unwanted noise and in 
restricting the operation of noisy aircraft. Thus, one of:the major 
reasons for purchasing the DC-9-80 was that. it reduced the noise foot-
, '10 ' print of the 8~727-200 by 80 percent. For the next few years, the 
153-seat DC-9-80 is considered to be the ideal' size.' While most of the 
8-727s will be disposed of as soon as market conditions will permit, a 
few will be retained where there is a special need. 
10 PSA Annual Report, 1980, p. 7. 
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Since PSA already has 153- and 175-passenger planes, ideal for the 
present, it believes that by 1985-1990 a slightly larger plane (200-215 
p~ssengers) containing more new technology will be needed. At the 
present time the Boeing 757, configured to 214 pasSengers in single-
class service, is favored by the company. -The $1 billion investment 
required for 26 OC-9-80s and 14 B-757s is two and a half times the total 
. . 
assets and four times the value,of the current fl ight equipment shown 
on the company's 1980 balance sheet. 
Summary: . PSA has' found that deregulation,: hig'her.·fuel prices, 'and 
. noisereguliltions have had a dramatic effect on fleet compoSition and 
. '. 
qn the compi;lny' s rol e in the future transport system. To offset in-,' 
creasing fuel .costs, additiona'l seats are being a~ded,to the le~s fuel-
,efficient, B-727'::200s.' . Noise regulations at ,Orange County and San ,Oiego, 
~lus noise~sensitivity els~where; ~ere predominant fact6rs~~n the pur-
'. . ..... . 
chase ofa 1 arge fl eet of' OC'-9-80s .. The improved fuel' efficie,~cy of: the 
aircraft was also a significant factor .. 
PSA envisages a larger departu~e from its· initial trarisport role 
than doe'S, Southwest whiCh is satisfied with its "keep .itsimple," one 
type of aircraft approach; . PSA has found it necessary to make more 
adj ustments to' its routes .than has SWA in order t~ counter changed 
economic and compet"itive conditions. For-the future 1985,..2000 period, 
PSA sees the need for a more economical plane' in the 200- to 215-
passenger single-class category, and has publicly indicated that the 
8-757 meets its anticipated requirements. Because of the adverse ef_ 
fects of (a) their pilots' strike in 1980; (b) the particularly liscft" 
travel market in 1981; and (c) problems associated with the PATCO strike, 
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the financial position of the company will not warrant for some time a 
firm commitment to such a major future obligation. 
5.3 Midway Airlines 
Midway Airlines (MDW) is one of the new (often called "instant") 
airlines which are a direct product of the deregulation movement. The 
company, based at Chicago's Midway Airport, flew its first flight on 
November 1, 1979. With Chicago as a hub, its spokes go to Onaha, Kansas 
City, St. Louis, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and Minneapolis. 
In essence, it attempts to use in the Midwest. the principles so well 
employed in Texas by Southwest Airlines. Successful in its first year, 
Midway features short- to medium-haul, high-frequency service, using 
two-tier, unrestricted low fares' to attract traffic. To make these low 
fares possible, MOW has established simplified service consisting of 
single-class service, no meals, high speed .ticketing and reservations 
procedures .in one type of airplane -- the OC:-9. 
Table 5-3 
Midwa,l Airlines Fleet, October 1981 
Number Type Seats . Unit Misc . 
Cost (mil.) 
9 OC-9-15 86 $3.25 Exempt from noise 
regulations 
8 DC-9-31 115 $5.4 ex seats 
As was the case at Southwest Airlines, the airline began operations 
under the leadership of experienced executives from oiher airlines who 
were interested in the challenge of starting a new airline. To hold 
costs down, Midway Airlines planned to purchase' used twin-engine, two-
pilot crew aircraft .. This meant a small model which had the advantage 
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service, over a hub-and-spoke system on routes of less than 1,000 miles 
in length. It believes this role can be filled best by a twin-engine, 
two-pilot, l50-passenger, 5ingle-class, fuel-efficient airplane. Envi-
ronmental rules, as well as more modern aircraft, will render the com-
pany's early aircraft obsolete. Sometime during the 1985-2000 period 
Midway expects to reach a peak of 30 to 40 aircraft -- all in the 150-
passenger category. Because of its relative small size and specialized 
type of operation, Midway Airlines feels that it will have little or no 
input into the aircraft design process, but rather will be a purchaser 
of "off the shelf" airplanes. It would prefer, however, to buy low-cost 
used aircraft if they become available. 
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·Chapter 6 
ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF A CARGO CARRIER 
AND A SMALL PACKAGE CARRIER 
In previous chapters the report has dealt with old, established 
major trunk lines, si~ medium sized carriers (including newer carriers), 
and three specialized one-class service airlines. This chapter con-
siders two cargo carriers one of which limits its service to small 
packages weighing 70 pounds or less. 
6.1 The Flying Tiger Line 
The predecessor of the Flying Tiger L fne ("Flying Tigers") was 
organized in 1945 by World War II pilots, hence the name. The present 
Flying Tigers company, a subsidiary of Tiger International, ~s a certi~ 
fied carrier primarily engaged in common carriage of cargo over a route 
system serving cities in the United States, Asia, and Europe .. The 
scope of its operations was considerably broadened by its. merger in 
. October, 1980, with Seaboard Worl d Airl ines, another cargo carri er. As 
a result of this merger, the Flying Tiger compahyis the largest air 
.. '
cargo carrier in the free \>wOrld as measured by revenue cargo ton miles. 
In addition to its cargo operations~ it conducts passenger op~rations 
for the military under a MAC ~ontract. Limited charter and scheduled 
passenger service with B-747-200s and DC-8s are perjormed through its 
Metro International subsidiary~ Currently it suffers from overcapacity 
and for this reason is parking several DC-8s in the desert. 
Before examining the Flying Tigers' future role, let us look at 
its present fleet listed in Table 6-1. 
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Number 
7 
19 
2 
4 
14 
Tabl e 6-1 
Fl yi n9 Tig~~s Fl eet. Ju] Y 
~ Cargo Capacity 
OC-8-61 90,0001bs; 
OC-8-63 
OC-8-63 
8-747-100 
8-747-200 
105 ,000 1 bs. 
252 passengers 
215;000 1 bs.' 
240,0001bs. 
1981 
Comments 
Leased, not being 
re.;,engined 
14 b~ing re-engined 
John E. Flynn, executive vice president, indicated 'that cargo traf-
, ' , 
fic should continue to gro~ and Tigers' decision to coordinate its air 
cargo operations with its rail ,and trucking interests will ensure a 
'h~althy future. He believed that th~ t~o markets~ dom~stiC' and inter-
national, have needs which require different capac'itYaircraft. For 
the 1 985-2000 period, international' operations ,wil j b~wel f served. by 
the 8-747, but 'a 1 imited . number of II stretch" versions ,may'. be, 'nee,ded . 
. Lighter traffic can be handled by re-engined DC;..8s when rio,t needed 
domestically., 
Tigers considers the 8-747 as too i argefor optimal service on its· 
domestic routes. The huge size and, he~vy wei~ht of th~ aircraft imposes 
frequency and airport limitations which' conitrain'or preient its uses in 
many markets the company would like to serve. For service to smaller, 
domestic m~tkets anew 40,000-50,000 pou~d' paylo~~ ~~rgoairplane 'with 
two engines. and a two-pilot crew'iS definitely needed. , In a departur:e' 
from the view of most of the carriers interviewed, Tigers was not padi-
,cularly ,interested in fuel efficiency in new aircraft for domesticoper-
ation. Pointing out that cargo aircraft h~d 1&w uffi{zation.domesti~ 
cally, the company calculated that if would be bettet to trade off fuel 
efficiency for lower capital cost. 
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Summary: The Flying Tigers line has concluded that in the 1985-
2000 period it will need cargo aircraft with three different payload 
capacities: first, for smaller markets a 40,000 to 50,000 pound pay-
load plane powered by two engines and flown by a two-man crew; second, 
a 100,000 pound payload plane; and third, a 200,000 pound payload cargo 
aircraft. The three planes shoul dhave logistics commonality. Given 
the fact that cargo planes have low utilization and that Tigers does 
not expect fuel prices to increase more than the rate of inflation, the 
company does not want to invest for fuel sav ings. The developmen't; of a 
50,000 pound payload domestic car~o aircraft will permit the expansion _ 
of air cargo ~erviceto points not now served as well as provide a good 
"feed" to the larger aircraft. Flying Tigers' engineers are now evalu-
ating the 8-727-200F recently ordered by Federal Express. 
8ecause no other aircraft th~ size of the,8~747 exist~, and since 
the cost of building a competitive unit would be 'staggering, Flying 
Tigers believes that a more efficient re-engined 8-747 will emerge at 
some point. 
,.6.2 Federal Express 
Federal Express represents a different type of cargo service from 
Flying Tigers. Federal specializes ,in transporting small packages, (70 
pounds or less) overnight via a hub-and-spoke system (Memphis being the 
hub) to a large number of points in the United States. In eight years 
it has grown from nothing to a half a billion dollar business. The 
story of its phenomenal growth, originally over the objections of the 
established airlines, has been told in various business publications and 
79 
need not be repeated. Several points, however, should be noted as back-
ground for its future plans. 
The idea for the service was conceived by the company's founder, 
Fred W. Smith, an affluent young man, 'in his master's thesis at Yale. 
Because of objections by the establ ished airl ines, his early. efforts to 
obtain certification in 1971 failed. In 1973 he was 'able to begin oper-
ations under an Air Taxi ~xemptioil of the law which permitted unl imited 
operations if small planes with a payload~of less than 7,500 pounds wer~ 
.' '. 
used. Business quickly exceeded ~he 6,200 pound payload capacity of the 
Oassault Falcons employed. Att~pts.tbsecure permissio~ to use a.fleet 
of OC-9s falled. In r~77~ however, jn,·conc.ert with others,' Federal's 
efforts for· cargo dereg~lat.iori, so th~t 'jt could expand unf~tteredby 
government p.olicies and legal .restrictions,bore fruit~ .. 
,As a result of its qlpid growth~ Federal's fleet composition changes 
often. Its October 1981 fleet ~nd planes 6no'rder arelisted·iri·. 
Table 6-2. 
Tabl e·.6-2 . 
'Federal ExpressFle~t, Octobe~ 1981 
Number Average . .' Wefght 
On Hand On Order ~. Stage 'Length Capacit,i: 
29 9 B-727:..100QG 5'00-600 ... 42.000 
32 . Fa lcon :020, 400-500 6,200 
4 .DC-I0~10 . 900 11 0,000 
o· 15 B-727.-20DF .. ' 57~000 
65 24 
Initially,.the company believed that economies lay in the purchase 
of used t\>,Q-engine, two-pilot airplanes .. It later purch'ased several new 
B-737s because of their effi~iency and pos~ibl~ use as .passenger planes 
in off-peak times.. However, "'/hen' Federal· Express changed its mind on 
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passenger operations and found the 8-737s too small, it disposed of them 
in favor of used three-engine, three-pilot 8-727-100-QCs whic~ were 
available at very favorable prices because airlines had found that the 
"quick change" feature was time consuming and expensive with mo'st of 
the seats ending up at the wrong end of the route. More recently the 
company announced an additional move toward three-engine, three-crew 
member aircraft by ordering new 8-727-200s. configured for freight and 
bearing the designation 8-727-200F. 
Federal Express sees an expanding role for its services in the. 
ye~rs 1985-2000 and thui the acquisition of more aircraft. It foresees 
the need for three categories of aircraft: (1) a iO,000-15,000 pound· 
. . . 
payload aircraft to replace its 6,200 pound original Dassault Falcons; 
(2) a 50,000-60,000 pound capacftj aircraft to supplement and replace 
its 42,000 pound capacitY8-727.:.100-·QCs·;: and (3) a 100,000:-150,000 pound 
capacity aircraft for heavy load 10l')g hauls.· Since the·spring of 1981 
Federal Express has been studying the econoinics of and ha·s been negoti-
ating for the rights to op'erate supersonic Concordes between. the U.S. 
. . 
and Europe for high priority mail and ~xpress service. 8ecause·of the.· 
light weight, small bulk and high yield on letters, calcu1atioris show 
promi se of much hi gher . yi~l ds· per pound than for passengers. 
As was the c·ase with Flying Tigers, Federal Express emphasized that 
in its business "Frequency is not the name of the game," nor is high air-
craft utilization. As a result, fuel expense isa much lower percentage 
of operating costs than .on passenger airlines. Given the general pres-
sure for two-pilot crews. the continued purchases of aircraft requiring 
three men may be at first surprising. Federal, however, has found the 
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cost of the third man is a small. fraction of its expense and also that 
the third man serves an additional function as load master. Therefore, 
tile company is satisfied that for the 1985-2000 period its heavy. load 
requirements can be handled by adding more three-pilot DC-lO-lOs to its 
exi sting fl eet. Because the passenger carri ers' ardor for wide-bodi es 
h~s cooled under deregulation, Federal Expr~ss expects to purcha~eused' 
DC';lO-lOsfor its 100,000 pound' requ irement at· advantageous prices . 
. As p~eviously noted~ the company has oftehindicated a preference 
for used aircraft,over new a.i.r~raft b.ecalise of the: high capital cost 
and financing. of ¢h~rges for the latter~ ~heref6re~' it's recent 'annOunce-
mentof an ord(;!r for 15 new B-727.;,200s ~orifi gured to carry' cargo'wou1 d 
seem to be.a departure from its·previous practice irica~g6 pl~n~~~r~ 
chases~ ~t reasoned that there.weregoin~: to be. aninsuff.ici ~nt number' 
of us~d. B~7t7~~60-QC~ava~lahle to satiify Federal's expansion program 
and those tha."t would be ~vaila'ble would be. old'ahd not a's"reliable as 
new aircraft .. FU!'therthe 15,000 pound increase in payload.would be.a 
welconie boost in productivity. Accordingly, the company believes 'the 
. . ~ ..... .. '. '. . . . . . . 
purchase of the B-727-200F sa(isfies its wants'··th.rough· the.i990s for a . 
. ...,'  
50,:000 to 60 ,006 pound . payload ,pl aile. ,Howev·er,.sh~ul d an' efficient 
. '. . . '. ~ 
turbopro,pat the 'rightpriceappear, t~e':c~ri1pa'ny.Wourd be' interest~d~ 
. 'By the 1990s Federal Express' hOped a prop~fan coul, d be developed for 
longer haul operations:· 
With the, 100,000 and 50,000 pound capacity .a ircra.ft sel ection well 
in hand, Federal Express' next need is replacem~nt ,for its 32 Oassault 
Falcons with theii 6,200 pound ~apacities. Here the company is defi-
nitely looking for a turboprop. In testifying before the House COlTll1ittee 
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on Science and Technology in February 1981, Federal Express stated that 
for the short ranges and light loads it had been evaluating the turbo-
p.ops being offered to the commuter airlines, but none was satisfactory. 
Since the Falcons are all paid for and in good mechanical condition, the 
company believes it has several years remaining before it will be criti-
cal to ,purchase replacements. 
Summary: In only eight years from the date of its first flight, 
Federal Express has developed a half billion dollar small packag~ busi-
ness requiring the use of 75 aircraft of three distinct payload capa-
. .. . 
cities -- 6,200, 42,000, and 110,000 pounds. In the futu~e it sees a 
continuation of it~ aggressive expansion policies so that more of each 
category aircraft will be needed, as well as replacements- for its t\«) 
smaller categories of aircraft. The company sees some lengthening of 
stage ,lengths and entry into some markets not now served, including 
transatlantic.- The economics of its present fleet fit its routes well 
enough so that ,there is no plan to readjust the ro.ute network because 
of its fl eet. 
Although the company generally states that it \«)ul d take ten hours 
a day aircraft' utilization against its curr~nt five hour utilizati~n to 
justifY,the purchase of new aircraft because of their high capital cost 
. . . . 
and high interest rates, it recently ordered new B-727-200Fs to fill a 
need for a 50,000 pound payload aircraft. Presumably, the company feels 
that the end of model run 'price was a bargain compared with the cost of 
new-teChnology aircraft. Its n~xt replacement aircraft to be selected 
will be for the Dassault Falcons presently being used in short-haul 
operations. Here the company hopes that accelerated turboprop research 
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will result in a quiet, energy-efficient aircraft carrying from eight 
to ten thousand pounds of cargo. Contrar¥ to the views of passenger-
c~rrying airlines, Federal Express does nQ~ consider fuel a cost con-
st.raint. It even indicated that it might accept some degradation in 
fuel economy for more speed. Thi.s was par:'tic~l~r:'ly true in the case of 
the prop-fan if it took more fuel .to reach t:h~speed of M,ach . 76~. the 
mi.nimum. speed the company feels is necessary f()r prQfitabflity . 
.. 
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Chapter 7 
ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF THREE COMMUTER AIRLINES 
Changes in the laws governing commuter airlines and the consequent 
recent rapid growth of these airlines makes a precise and lasting defi-
nition of commuters difficult. Prior to 1972, air taxis and commuters 
were free from the limitations of certification providing the plane used 
did not weigh more than 12,500 pounds (equivalent to 19 passengers). 
This limit provided a barrier to the acquisition of larger more effi-
dent aircraft. In 1972 the 1 imit was raised to 30 passengers, or a 
7,500 pound payload. Under the Airline D~regulation Act of 1978 the 
figure was raised to 56 passengers and then to 60 passengers; for cargo 
the figure was 18,000 pounds. Although deregulatjon removed many re-
strictions from the large certificated carriers, the commuters are even 
less restricted in entry, exit, fares, and reporting requirements. 
Basically a commuter provides regular scheduled passenger or cargo 
service with aircraft seating 60 passengers or less. Recently several 
carriers have progressed to 75-passenger jets. However, the bulk of the 
airplanes are smaller turboprops flying between short-haul markets, 
often feeding the larger fan-jet carriers. More specifically, the 
average commuter stage length in 1980 was 120 miles with 87 percent of 
the flights being 250 miles or less. 11 One large commuter had a 67 mile 
stage length average. In the case of the certificated carrriers, only 
six percent of the flights were 250 miles or less. 
11 Commuter Airline Association of America, Commuter Airline Industry, 
1980 Annual Report, p. 6. 
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In November 1980, the Commuter Airl ine Association of America (CAAA) 
reported there were 237 commuter airlines flying 1339 aircraft. The 
C~ chart reproduced in Chart 7-1 shows the composition of the fleet in 
terms of percent of all aircraft, percent of hours flown, and percent of 
available seat miles. Turbine powered aircraft, while accounting for 
only one~third of the commuter fleet, now provides nearly 75 percent 
of all industry seat capacity. 
To some extent the choice of aircraft and its seating by a commuter 
was conditioned by crew number requirements. Since 20 passengers would 
necessitate adding a flight attendant, 19 passengers or less became a 
popular size. When 30 passengers became the limit, more aircraft in 
this category began to appear. Finally, the 60 passenger rule provided 
incentive to build 50 passenger aircraft. 
Changes resulting from deregul at ion accel erated the growth of com-
muters for five reasons. First, commuters were able to fill a void in 
the transport system when the larger airlines dropped the unprofitable, 
lightly-traveled routes under the easy exit provision of the Act. 
Second, the relaxation of seating capacity made it possible to purchase 
more productive equipment and service larger markets. Third, the com-
muters were eligible for federal loan guarantees to assist in financing 
their equipment. Fourth, subsidies were provided for commuters serving 
"essential service" communities. And fifth, the regular certificated 
carriers, in order to receive feed for their own longer routes, found 
it necessary to be very supportive of the commuters. 
Time and budget restrictions do not permit an extensive examination 
of perceptions of a large number of commuters for the 1985-2000 period. 
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Analysis of Commuter 
Aircraft Fleet 1980 
Aircraft Composition 
Chart 7:-1 
All Single Engine I ;·.1tM.t : 13.4 
Multl·Englne (Seating Capacity) 
1.91;~$W~ J 40.9 
10-19 I 30.6 
£' Piston Powered 
• Turbine Powered 
21·30 1_. 7.6 
31·50 I.. 7.5 
Percent 
Percent of All Aircraft 
Aircraft Hours Flown 
All Single Engine I~ 9.3 
Multl·Engine (Seating Capacity) 
1.91~;~.iif131.1 
10·19 I·': . 43.2 
21·30 I" 8.7 
31.50'. 7.7 
Percent 
Available Seat Capacity 
All SIngle Engine r 3.0 
Multl·Englne (Seltlng Capacity) 
1.9I'....,;:m .... 5,-i'!$-t ....... 115.2 
10-19 I 46.1 
21.301_ 15.3 
Source 1980CAA 31.
501_ 
(Passenger Use A A Annual Survey 19 4 orcra« Only) Percent . 
Percent of All 
Hours Flown 
Percent of All 
Available Seats 
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To many of them, anything beyond two years is extremely long-range. 
Nevertheless, we will attempt to obtain a flavor of their ideas by 
s~mpling three commuter airlines: (1) one of the larger established 
west coast commuters, Golden West; (2) a smaller Indiana-based commuter, 
Britt; and (3) a relatively new line headquartered in Wisconsin, 
Midstate. 
7.1 Golden West 
Golden West is currently the fourth largest commuter airline in the 
U.S. and is slightly smaller than Air Wisconsin. Headquartered at 
Newport Beach, California, the company through various predecessor com-
panies and acquisitions -- Avalon Air Transport, Cataline Air Lines, 
Aero Commuter, Cable Commuter, and Skymark -- has been operating since 
1953. The present company is privately owned by three persons and began 
operations in 1968. As late as 1970 the carrier indicated its future 
lay in 20-50 mile stage lengths, with a maximum of 100 miles. 
Gradually this very short-haul philosophy changed to longer haul as 
ground transportation improved, as the cost of very short-haul opera-
tions increased, and as"deregulation modified the environment in which 
Golden West could operate. The company's current fleet is listed in 
Table 7-1. 
88 
Table 7-1 
Golden West Aircraft Fleet~ October 1981 
Number 
11* 
5 
5 
21 
~ 
OH-6 (Twin Otter) 
So 330 (Shorts) 
OH-7 
*Only two are in scheduled service. 
Seats 
---
17 
30 
48 
Government rules which sanctioned the use of higher capacity planes 
as commuters permitted the company to acquire 48-seat, four-engined DH-7 
turboprops with a much longer range than its Twin Otters and Shorts' 330s. 
As a result of the factors mentioned previously, the company sees a 
significantly different role for itself in the 1985-2000 period. Pres-
ently Golden West is in transition and is establishing two types of hub-
and-spoke networks for the future: (1) a hub-and-spoke system involving 
segments 100 miles or less; and (2) a hub-and-spoke system centered 
around 200-mile segments. The latter system will utilize DH-7 aircraft 
which now number five, but within a year this fleet is expected to 
reach nine. 
Currently the company has 12 stations (San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
San Diego, Orange County, Ontario, Santa Barbara, Oxnard, Fresno, 
Bakersfield, Monterey, Lake Tahoe, Santa Maria) which are all in Cali-
fornia. As Golden West acquires more DH-7s, it expects to expand to 
Washington and Oregon, again emphasizing longer stage lengths. As the 
note on Table 7-1 suggests, the Twin Otters are being phased out. Nine 
have been taken out of service and the remaining two are expected to be 
gone by spring of 1982. But for the need for lift following the demise 
of competing Golden Gate and Swift Aire, they would already be gone. 
The difference in the two types of networks now being structured 
.is illustrated by the stage lengths employed. Stage lengths on the 
Dash 7s average 190 miles while those on the Shorts 330s average only 
65 miles. The Shorts 330s appear to have a questionable future at Golden 
West. They are limited to very short range operations and do not have 
the performance to be utilized profitably where temperatures are high. 
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Accordingly, the company seeks a more efficient 30- to 40-passenger re-
placement for the 50-330. Currently it has found none. 
In looking to the next airplane it will need five or more years 
hence for longer haul operations, Golden West anticipates a significant 
number of 400-mile stage lengths~ri~cessitating a 100-passenger, twin-
.. -
engine turboprop. 'While Golden West would prefer an aircraft. tailored 
to its operations, it recognizes that the company is too small to dic-
tate design. It therefore indicated an intention to modify its route 
structure to conform with the efficiency of future planes. 
Although blessed with about the same high yield (39¢) per passen-
ger mile as Air Wisconsin, the PATCO strike, extensive competition 
(prior to the closing down of Golden Gate and Swift Aire) and interest 
charges (tied to prime) on its DH-7 fleet, caused a financial loss to 
be expected for calendar year 1981. However, a pending sale and lease-
back of its DH-7s is expected to improve Golden West's financial 
position. 
Summary: Golden West, previously characterized as a very short-
haul commuter, has, because of deregulation, improvements in local trans-
portation, and the lack of efficiency of its short-haul aircraft, 
decided on a new future direction. Its new primary role will be that 
of a hub-and-spoke longer-haul -commuter in the 200 mile stage length 
category, on flights from 45 to 70 minutes in length. For this role it 
sees that its 48 passenger DH-7 will be ideal until traffic builds to 
warrant a 100-passenger twin-engine turboprop. 
For its secondary role, Golden West sees the need for a 30- to 40-
passenger short-haul commuter to replace its Short 330s for a short-haul 
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hub-and-spoke system. Although it has examined current offerings, com-
menting that it had to go to foreign manufacturers in the process, 
Golden West indicated that no satisfactory plane has been found. Since 
acquiring the DH-7 the company has been adjusting its route network to 
fit the economics of that plane. 
7.2 Britt Airways 
Britt Airways, privately owned by the Britt family, has headquarters 
in Terre Haute, Indiana, and serves 19 midwest stations. At the present 
time, most operations are in Indiana and Illinois but some touch 
Missouri (St. Louis), Ohio (Cincinnati) and Iowa (Burlington). In 1979 
it was tenth in number of commuter passengers carried. The company's 
current fleet is shown in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2 
Britt Airwa~s Fleet, October 1981 
Number ~- Seats 
--
3 FH-227 48 
8 Swearingen Metro lIs 17 
12 Beech 99 13 
William Britt began a fixed base operation as a crop duster in 
1950. In 1968, after acquiring a Beech 99, he became Allegheny Commuter. 
Britt Airways was formed in 1976 and Britt and Allegheny consolidated 
into one company in 1981. Its current average stage length is 140 miles. 
Although owned by a small family, the company has managed to ex-
pand and own its fleet. As it looks to the 1985-2000 period, Britt 
Airways sees a bigger role for itself. Expansion is planned to Detroit 
from South Bend, to Akron and Columbus from Indianapolis, and perhaps 
into another Illinois town. 
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None of the aircraft in the fleet are considered ideal for the 
future but neither does the company find suitable replacements. It 
hopes designs will be forthcoming from U.S. manufacturers.;., The FH-227s 
are considered the most suitable available and plans are being made 
to acquire more used FH-227s since they are no longer in production. 
Basically Britt Airways wants two new types: (1) a 30- to 40-passenger 
turboprop burning 100-120 gallons per hour and traveling 300 miles per 
hour; and (2) a 19-passenger turboprop -- essentially a DC-3 type 
replacement. 
Summary: Britt Airways envisages a modest expansion of its present 
operations. Basically the company sees a need for a 19-passenger as 
well as a 30- to 40-passenger turboprop, both with fuel economy and a 
300 mile per hour speed. It is not completely satisfied with any type 
in its fleet and expressed a strong.prefererice for U.S. designed and ) ) 
manufactured replacements. ~ 
7.3 Midstate 
In one form or another Midstate Airlines has been in business for 
17 years. Financial reverses almost caused bankruptcy two years ago, 
but the company was saved by a takeover by Sentry Insurance Co. of 
Stevens Point, Wisconsin. Sentry installed new management and provided 
an infusion of capital which enabled the company to purchase new 
Swearingen Metro lIs and later order more powerful Metro Ills to expand 
operations. With administrative headquarters at Stevens Point, Midstate 
serves four cities in Central Wisconsin, as well as Milwaukee, Chicago, 
Muskegon, Flint and Detroit. Its fleet is listed in Table 7-3. 
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Table 7-3 
Midstate Airlines Fleet, October 1981 
~ Seats Number 
2 
2 
Swearingen Metro II 
Swearingen Metro II 
16-18 depending on weight of load 
18-19 depending on weight of load 
Additionally, on order are six Metro Ills which are more powerful 
and will carry 19 passengers without load restriction. According to 
Midstate's president, the equipment modernization has been a success and 
the company with a high yield of 38 cents per passenger mile -- similar· 
to successful Air Wisconsin -- expects to be profitable. With the re-
sources of an insurance company behind it, Midstate feels it will not 
be short of capital when a need arises to purchase more flight 
equipment. 
The company defines its future role as that of a short-haul regional 
carrier, operating frequent flights in a well-defined midwest geograph-
ical area, over stage lengths less than 500 miles, at speeds guarantee-
ing a flight time of less than two hours. Further, its network will 
retain such hubs as Chicago, Milwaukee, and Detroit, plus some new ones. 
All flights are planned to be turboprop and will primarily be nonstop. 
According to management, this type of operation will eventually 
require several types of aircraft in the fleet whose capacities might 
well be 19, 30, 50, and .perhaps 80 passengers. Unlike some other car-
riers who strongly prefer equipment from only one manufacturer, Midstate 
is not concerned about this type of commonality, reasoning that the 
right equipment for the mission is more important that staying with one 
manufacturer. As for the distribution of stage lengths, management sees 
a spread from 100 to 500 miles with predominant clustering in the 200 
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7.4 Commuter Summary 
The story of Golden West, Britt, and Midstate is a microcosm of 
the commuter world, and in fact is quite similar to the history of many 
carriers who now are·large and have completely forsaken frequent short-
haul service. Many commuters began with the intention of using small 
aircraft and never exceeding the 19-passenger limit after which a flight 
attendant would be required. Golden West's predecessor at one time said 
its role was 20 to 50 mile flights. As the necessity of spreading costs 
over a greater volume of traffic became clear, pressure was successfully 
applied by commuters for authority to use larger capacity aircraft. 
As larger aircraft are acquired the shortest segments tend to be 
dropped, followed by the deletion of the. smaller airplanes themselves 
from the fleet. Voids in service often begin with the larger carriers 
dropping short-haul, light-density services when their new planes are 
too large for the routes. While a pilot for American Airlines, the 
writer used to fly a 21-passenger DC-3 from Milwaukee to Chicago, South 
Bend, Kalimazoo, Battle Creek, Jackson, Detroit, and Windsor. Later 
American abandoned some of the routes to Wisconsin Centrai (later to 
become Repu~ic). Subsequently these types of routes were transferred 
to smaller carriers, Air Wisconsin, for example. As Air Wisconsin grows 
it is dropping light-density routes to carriers like Midstate. In 
California, Golden West is picking up routes dropped by AirCal as the 
latter purchases bigger equipment and attempts to expand into other 
states. 
Despite the original intent in organizing a commuter, it seems 
universal for management, once the airline is established, to develop 
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broader and broader horizons and goals which inevitably lead it to ex-
pand to where it thinks in terms of lOO-passenger planes -- a size once 
r~served for major trunk lines -- and routes of 500 miles long, a 
length once considered in the medium- to long-haul category. Golden 
West, who not long ago was indicating average stage lengths of 20 to 50 
miles in small capacity planes, later progressed to 65 mile stage 
lengths using 48-passenger planes. Already the company is predicting 
200 mile stage lengths and the need for lOO-passenger planes. 
Britt, which still operates one l3-passenger Beech 99, has moved 
first to l8-passenger Swearingen Metro lIs and later to 48-passenger 
FH-227s. By placing primary emphasis on "DC-3 replacements" a secon-
dary emphasis on a 30- to 40-passenger turboprop, and lesser emphasis 
on replacing its 48-passenger FH-227s, Britt is more conservative in 
its expectations than Golden West. Midstate, too, although new in 
management and equipment, has been looking for new fuel-efficient air-
pl anes in the 50-passenger cl ass to enabl e it to meet its forecast 
growth rate. 
Each of the three carriers perceived" itself "to have the role of a 
short-haul carrier "providing frequent service to and from hub airports 
at tariff rates several times those of the ~ajor long-haul airlines. 
Generally speaking, all sought a more efficient 19-seat airplane than 
they now have. Additionally, none thought the current offerings in the 
30- to 50-passenger category met their needs as well as they would like. 
Finally, all believed that in the past manufacturers paid more attention 
to larger transports than to replacements for DC-3 and slightly larger 
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aircraft. All noted that foreign-'manufacturers seemed to be more respon-
sive to their needs than were American companies. 
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Chapter 8 
FUTURE JET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT NEEDS: 
AIRLINE MANAGEMENT VIEW 
Chapters 2 through 7 place primary focus on the future role each 
carrier sees for itself together with some reference to equipment impli-
cations. In this chapter the aircraft requirements themselves, as seen 
by the carriers, are the center of attention. Since introduction of the 
jumbo 8-747 in 1970, subsequent or derivative aircraft have been progres-
sively smaller as carriers and manufacturers recognized that the days 
of compound traffic growth at annual rates of 15 to 20 percent have 
passed. Capacities of new aircraft decreased from the 325- to 500-
passenger 8-747; to the 225- to 300-passenger DC-I0, L-I0ll, and A-300; 
to the 200-passenger B-767, to the 175-passenger.B-757. All of these 
aircraft benefitted by the use of high-bypass, quiet, fuel-efficient 
engines. 
8.1 The Next New-Technology Series of Jets 
As previously indicated, the economic obsolescence which first 
overtook the 8-707/720 and DC-8 series has, in general, overtaken the 
8-727-100 and early DC-9 series for all but package delivery service, 
and is expected to overtake later series of these aircraft. Until the 
last two years, the capacity of these planes has ranged from 85 to 135. 
"51 im-l ine" seats have now pushed the seating higher to 149 mixed 
class and as high as 177 all-coach, single-class for the 8-727-200 on 
at least one airline. For some time the development of replacement air-
craft has been inhibited by (1) the unavailability of a correctly sized 
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high-bypass engine, (2) the perceived loss of economies of scale in 
building smaller aircraft,· (3) the preoccupation of aircraft manufac-
turers with their larger aircraft, (4) the hope that a resurgence of 
traffic would cause the airlines to grow into larger planes, and (5) the 
lack of financial resources, both on the part of the manufacturers and 
the airlines, to handle such a large scale re-equipment program. 
However, relatively quickly after the first orders for the Boeing 
757 were announced, a flurry of activity in the direction of 150-
passenger capacity, new-technology aircraft. began. Prior to this time, 
USAir had issued specifications for replacement of the 110- to 135-
passenger DC-9, B-737, and B-727 by tWin-engine, two-pilot aircraft 
equipped with high-bypass ratio engines. 12 While these specifications 
did not generate a new~technology aircraft, they were instrumental in 
shaping the derivative DC-9-80 and the B-737-300 which some airlines see 
as adequate for their purposes almost to the year 2000. 
8.2 Management's Perceptions of the 150-passenger Jet 
Since Delta with its B-767 and B-757 orders had already committed 
for about $2.0 billion of new aircraft, its announcement in the sprtng 
of 1981 of an intention to place orders for an additional 100 new-
technology 150-seat short- to medium-haul aircraft came as a surprise. 
Perhaps a greater surprise was the nature of the specifications which 
focused on optimizing cost on a 400-mile segment, and the clear impli-
cation that Delta was deadly serious in its desire to initiate this por-
tion of its massive fleet replacement program by 1986. In other words, 
12 The specifications are detailed in Appendix 2, Speakers' Papers for 
International Civil Aviation Conference No.2, April 29-30, 1980, 
published by Lloyd's of London Press, New York, New York. 
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despite the poor economic outlook for the industry near term, and the 
heavy commitments already made, Delta's announcement was not a trial 
balloon to flush out comments by other airlines and aircraft manufac-
turers. 
Shortly after Delta announced its specifications for 100 new-
technology aircraft, estimated to cost $5.0 billion, United announced 
that it was asking manufacturers to design a twin-engine 150-passenger 
airplane and had forwarded specifications or ouidelines for the design 
to manufacturers. Unlike Delta's, the guidelines were ~uite general and 
focused on longer stage lengths. Reactions to these.proposals were 
varied among the airlines. Some carrier engineers criticized the Delta 
proposal as being unrealistic, "pie in the sky," a proposal which must 
have been devised by people without engineering knowledge. It was al-
leged by others that the proposal was a plot by Delta to confuse Boeing. 
Still others, while thinking the specifications to be unusually exacting, 
looked with favor at their emphasis on short-haul economics. 
On the other hand, some faulted the United proposal on the grounds 
that it was a mass of hastily drawn general ities -- a "knee-jerk" reac-
tion to Delta and was an attempt to obtain publicity at a time when 
United's executives were having to explain large losses at the company's 
annual meeting. United's contention was that it was not in the business 
of aircraft design and did not wish to constrain those who were with the 
type of detail in the Delt~ specifications. 
No other airlines, largely because of their financial condition 
have submitted specifications for a 150-passenger airplane. Therefore, 
manufacturers in the U.S. and abroad have been at work seeking to meld 
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the United and Delta proposals into one design, it being assumed that 
for economic reasons two separate aircraft could not be justified. 
T~ble 8-1 and 8-2 compare (1) several significant specifications, and 
(2) the stage lengths of the two carriers. The latter explains in part 
the reasons for variance in specifications. 
Tabl e 8-1 
Proposals for ISO-Seat Aircraft, Spring 1981 
Item 
No. of Seats (12/138 configuration) 
Stage length orientation 
Range with passengers & bags 
Seat miles per gallon: 
400 mi. trip 
Seat miles per gallon: 
1,000mi. trip 
Speed 
Direct operating cost: 
1,000mi. trip 
New tec hnol ogy 
Delta 
150 
400 
1,400 
77.6 . 
92 
M .83 
Not specified 
No limit 
Table 8-2 
Distribution of Stage Lengths 
Un ited 
150 
800 
1,850 
Not directly 
specified 
Not directly 
spec ifi ed 
M .80-.83 
10 percent per air-
p 1 an e mil e be low 
757 and 38 percent 
per seat mile below 
727-200 
No 1 imit 
Stage Lengths in Miles Percent of Flights 
Less than 400 
400-800 
800-1,200 
1,200-1,600 
1,600 and over 
Delta United 
66 
21 
10 
3 
14 
32 
24 
9 
20 
Delta, having already ordered the 8-767 and 8-757, saw itself as 
well situated for its medium- to long-haul flights, but short of modern 
equipment for its short-haul operations which constitute about two-thirds 
of the company's flight segments. Since short-haul flights require a 
high number of cycles (landings and takeoffs) in a given period, the 
102 
engines use high thrust for takeoff and climb a greater portion of the 
time than in cruise. Thus, Delta's specifications emphasized an engine 
optimized for the shorter segment. A look at United's stage length dis-
'tribution, plus its failure to order B-757s, explains United's desire 
for a longer range and therefore heavier aircraft. 
On the basis of the pUblished proposals (it must be remembered that 
individual airlines do not communicate with each other privately on 
these matters), a number of airlines were queried concerning their inter-
est in the proposed l50-passenger planes, assuming financing were avail-
able. On this- assumption, interest was shown by American, TWA, United, 
Northwest, Delta, Eastern, Continental, USAir, Frontier, Air Florida, 
Southwest, Midway, Piedmont, and PSA. In addition those airlines who 
feature single-class service Frontier, Air Florida, Midway, Piedmont, 
SWA, and PSA -- were interested in a single-class version. 
Northwest was in no hurry because it can add seats to its existing 
fleet and increase utilization at small cost. Southwest also was in no 
hurry since it has ordered the B-737-300 which will take care of its 
needs until the 1990s. American, TWA, Eastern, and several others 
stated that from a practical point of view their interest was academic. 
Their financial position was such that only the B-727RE (re-engine) was 
a possibility. Unless a quick, massive, unexpected turnaround in their 
fortunes takes place, failure of the re-engine program to proceed will 
mean the companies will have to shrink in size. 
Reconciliation of Delta and United Proposals 
Initial information released by Delta and United suggested that 
their proposals were incompatible. Billed as a "short-haul" feeder, 
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Delta's airplane was to have costs optimized over a 400-mile segment and 
a maximum range of 1,400 miles (Table 8-1). While previous airplanes 
wc~e designed with further growth in mind, the Delta proposal envisioned 
that "Stringent fuel efficiency requirements would preclude the inclu-
sion of design provisions for growth or derivative versions. 13 Further, 
to reach the objectives of maximum fuel efficiency and minimum direct 
operating expenses on the short-haul, a new high-bypass engine with 
efficiency focused on climb and descent, rather than cruise, would, 
according to Delta, be required. On the other hand, since the United 
proposal specified a much longer range plane, it would spend a great 
proportion of its time in cruise configuration. This design would in-
volve a heavier plane with a slightly different engine. 
A survey of·airlines desiring a future 150-passenger aircraft indi-
cated a marked preference for a longer range, more flexible plane than 
that indicated in the Delta proposal and more like that of United. Even 
the smaller local service lines which had more modest stage lengths than 
the trunks, wanted ranges long enough to exceed their current needs. 
They favored United's proposal. The manufacturers, therefore, seemed to 
face a dilemma. The airline with the money, Delta, preferred a plane 
which those currently constrained for funds did not. No aircraft or 
engine manufacturer could afford to build a new type aircraft or engine 
for the limited number of planes Delta would need. 
Oddly enough, the aircraft designers, after reexamining the speci-
fications more closely, have come to the conclusion that it is possible 
13 Presentation "Aircraft Evaluation and Selection at Delta" by C. Julian 
May, vice president-engineering, Delta Airlines, ATRIF, Atlantic City, 
May 27, 1981. 
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to design an aircraft which comes very close to meeting the requirements 
of United and Delta at the same time. How does this happen? It tUrns 
out that Delta" s specifications have always been extremely conservative 
which results in a heavier airplane. Delta's reserve fuels~ ·for eKample, 
are higher, its holding fuel is greater because it is calculated at a 
lower altitude. The company allows more weight for cargo. Finally 
Delta may demand that the aircraft takeoff from high altitude airports 
on a hotter day than does United. The sum total of all the differences, 
according to United, Delta, and the manufacturers,. means that the total 
weight of each aircraft is about the same. The longer range desired by 
United and others can be accomplished by the addition of belly tanks. 
With regard to the engines, some engineers now say that design require-
ments are not significantly different for the short-haul engine than 
for the longer-haul powerplant. 
This report, by its terms, was limited to perceptions by the air-
lines and thus powerplant designers such as General Electric, Pratt & 
Whitney, and Rolls Royce were not included in the interviews. Prelimin-
ary investigations indicate, however, that optimistic news of satisfac-
tory design accommodation between the United and Delta proposals come 
more from the airframe designers than from engine manufacturers. In any 
event, the original target date of 1986 for in-service operations of the 
new plane will slip by at least one or two years. Engine design lead 
time is greater than that for the airframe and the precise requirements 
have not yet been defined. Additionally, a new engine is a tremendous 
financial undertaking involving great risk, perhaps $1 billion. The 
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financial condition of the airlines and the manufacturers is not such as 
to lead them to rush into new engine development. 
Summary: A wide variety of airlines from trunks to regional air-
lines agree on the need for a 150-passenger new-technology airplane in 
order (1) to comply with noise regulations which are being progressively 
phased in, (2) to replace aircraft which have been made uneconomical 
because of increasing fuel prices and the development of more efficient 
techno1gy, (3) to provide aircraft properly sized to furnish the fre-
quency of service necessary to be competitive in a deregulated environ-
ment, and (4) in some cases, such as growing regionals, to provide the 
next step in equipment required by their increasing traffic. 
Unfortunately, although the airlines agree that in the 1985-2000 
period most of the B-727-100/200, B-737-200, and DC-9~30/50 series need 
replacing, only three major airlines -- Delta, United, and Northwest 
were optimistic about. financing purchases when such replacement air-
craft become available. Among the non-trunks, the profitability of 
Frontier, Piedmont, and SWA indicates that should they choose to re-
orient their equipment purchases to a new-technology, 150-passenger 
plane, they would be able to secure financing. 
Delta, pursuing its long established policy of continually modern-
izing its fleet sent specifications to manufacturers, for an economical 
new-technology aircraft tailored to its needs on its "bread and butter" 
short-haul routes. Such an aircraft would give Delta a competitive 
advantage over airlines forced to fly high-cost obsolescent equipment. 
United followed with specifications for a more flexible longer-haul 
aircraft -- specifications which other carriers seem to prefer. Engineers 
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now are at h~rk consolidating the two sets of specifications into one 
aircraft. When the airframe and engine designs meet the requirements 
of Delta and United, the problem for most managements will be financing 
purchases. 
8.3 Prospects for a l30-Passenger Jet 
Although it is almost certain that the next transport jet will be 
one of l50-passenger capacity, until recently there was reason to be-
lieve that a 130-passenger transport might be built in lieu of, or in 
addition to, the l50-passenger size. Some airline planners argued that 
strong growth of the regional airlines required something larger than 
the 8-737 and DC-9-l0/l5/30 series -- something about the size of the 
8-727-200 but with greater economy.and less noise. When placed in a 
single-class configuration, such an airplane would accommodate as many 
as 160. These planners also felt that the additional competition brought 
about by deregulation made it necessary to hold the size down in order 
to provide the frequency of service desired by the airline to attract 
customers. 
A point made by a senior official of a large trunk was that even if 
a l50-passenger plane were desired, airlines should ask for a 130-
passenger transport. History showed, he said, that every plane intro-
duced had grown substantially from its original design objective. There-
fore, to obtain an efficient l50-passenger plane, it was necessary to 
start at 130. The last time the executive heard an airframe designer 
begin a talk about a l50-passenger plane, within the hour the designer 
had begun to discuss how the plane could easily and better be built to 
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carry 170. Although the foregoing might sound "tongue-in~cheek," other 
airline executives somewhat ruefully agreed that there was a real danger 
th~t a design originally aimed at a 150-passenger aircraft might end up 
at a larger figure. 
Airbus Industrie, which already had c~rved a niche for itself --
particularly in Europe -- in the wide-body market with its A-300 series, 
decided to attempt a greater penetration of the U.S. market by announc-
ing in May 1981 an A-320-100 with 135 mixed class or 154 coach class 
passengers, and a longer A-320-200 with 156 mixed class and 172 pas-
sengers in an all-coach version. When Airbus discovered that the longer 
plane, which was aimed at the United and Delta specifications, did not 
come as close to the specifications as planes designed by competitors, 
it abandoned the two fuselage concept with the wider variation in seating 
capacities to hone directly in on a 150-passenger, mixed-class, with 12 
first class and 138 coach passengers. If configured for all coach the 
capacity became 162 (32" pitch). Two models, however, were still en-
visaged: one for Delta without a center section tank and another with 
a center-section tank for United. Since no one else is designing a new-
technology, 130-passenger plane the closest planes to that size will be 
the DC-9-80 and 8-737-300, both derivative aircraft. Should airline 
financial difficulties continue and should engine manufacturers not be 
able to commit, the estimated one to two billion dollars necessary to 
develop a high-bypass engine tailored to the 150-passenger plane, such 
a plane may not be built ·thus giving new life to derivative aircraft. 
As of December 1981 the prospects for a new 130-passenger transport have 
all but vanished. 
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B.4 Management and Re-engining the B-727 
If airlines cannot afford the high capital cost of purchasing a new-
technology plane to replace the aging, fuel-thirsty B-727 and DC-9 
series, or if aircraft manufacturers cannot finance building the replace-
ments, what then? Managements believe there are three alternatives: 
(I) re-engine the B-727 with two high-bypass engines which not only will 
meet Stage 3 noise requirements but will provide substantial fuel econ-
omy, (2) phase out the airplanes and operate with a reduced fleet, or 
(3) continue to operate aircraft hoping that moderating fuel price es-
calation and higher fares will permit profitable operation. Option 
three also involves obtaining some relaxation of noise regulations. 
Of the alternatives, managements considered number three the least 
likely. Given the pressure for low fares under deregulation, given 
managements l perceptions that fuel prices are likely to continue to 
rise, and given public resistance to lifting noise regulations, the con-
tinued operation of these planes was considered unlikely. American 
Airlines has a large fleet of B-7275 which are becoming uneconomic and 
in need of replacement. Since the company cannot afford replacement 
with new aircraft, it has taken the lead in advocating re-engining those 
B-727s with the structure capable of modification. American has inves-
tigated with Boeing the practicality of the conversion and believes that 
about BOO airline B-727s are candidates for re-engining which would 
result in a 26 percent saving in fuel burn per seat mile, and perhaps 
an extension of the plane1s useful life by 15 years. For reasons of 
economy, American1s motto has been to keep the modification as simple as 
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possible, which means keeping the same capacity and a minimum of cock-
pit and system changes. 
The likelihood at pres~nt that the plane will be re-engined is, in 
the eyes of most airline managements, small. Among other problems, the 
plan advocated by American requires adding several thousand pounds of 
ballast in the nose of the airplane to counterbalance the heavy weight 
in the tail caused by the sUbstitution of two new, larger engines. A 
number of managements rebel at the thought of carrying this unproductive 
weight around when a "plug" could be added in the fuselage which would 
eliminate the need for the weight and at the same time increase the 
seating capacity. The expense, however, would be considerable. More-
over, the increased seating would place the plane in competition with 
Boeing's 757 -- a factor not pleasing to Boeing, particularly when it 
~tands to gain little financially in the re-engining in comparison with 
an engine manufacturer. 
Interviews revealed little support for American's re-engining plan. 
Delta and United, occupied with their new-technology specifications have 
no interest. Northwest indicated that it could afford to sit back for 
several years before deciding which option is best for it. TWA doubted 
the desirability of the modification and said it could not afford a modi-
fication even if it were practical. Eastern expressed an interest pro-
viding the total investment would involve two B-727s for the price of 
one new-technology plane. Continental, busy with takeover and financial 
problems, clearly was in no position to show interest. Piedmont con-
sidered itself to be an interim B-727 operator and hence re-engining was 
110 
not being considered. Finally, USAir was not following the re-engine 
project cl osel y. 
Perceptions of commuter managements about their aircraft needs are 
more appropriately discussed in Chapter 9 which deal s with turboprops 
and prop-fans. 
Summary: Twin- and three-engine narrow-body aircraft for short- to 
medium-haul service were introduced into u.S. service in the early 1960s. 
Some DC-9s, B-727s and B-737s are still being manufactured. Although 
over the years these aircraft have been stretched and improved, increas-
ing fuel prices, advancing technology, noise regulations, and inflation 
indicate their growing obsolescence. 
Beginning in 1970 application of high-bypass engines to large-
capacity wide-body aircraft resulted in both fuel-efficiency and lower 
noise levels for aircraft so equipped~ Overly optimistic predictions of 
traffic growth resulted in a slow pr.ogressive reduction in aircraft size 
for application of high-bypass technology. An increase of fuel price 
from ten cents a gallon to over a dollar caused the percentage of fuel 
cost to direct operating cost to ris~ to· 50 percent, driving the early 
pure jet DC-Bs and even fan jet B-707 from regular service. The same 
increase in fuel price is rendering all but the most recent model DC-9s 
and high-density configured B-727s uneconomic at present fare levels. 
Moreover, these aircraft do not have the most modern instrumentation and 
avionics. 
For the last two years there has been controversy over the size and 
characteristics new-technology replacement aircraft should have. Finan-
cial success of the regiorial airlines following deregulation suggested 
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replacements might well include aircraft in tHe 120- to 130-passenger 
category. Orders for derivative aircraft, i.e., the 8-737-300 and the 
DC-9-80, and the recent decision of Airbus to drop its 130-passenger 
project, seems to have brought an end to the development of this size 
transport .. 
In the spring of 1981, Delta and United circulated specifications 
for a 150-passenger (mixed-class) plane. The specifications emphasized 
economy of operation over short to medium ranges. Foreign and domestic 
manufacturers are now striving to meet these specifications. Because of 
financial constraints only two or three airlines could finance new air-
craft. Similarly, because a new engine will cost approximately one to 
two billion dollars to develop, engine manufacturers are not yet ready 
to move. Given present economic conditions, the 1986 target date listed 
for service by Delta and United is unrealistic. 
An alternative to the high capital cost of a new-technology air-
craft has been suggested by American Airlines in the form of re-engining 
the B-727-200. While investigation has determined that the re-engining 
is technically feasible, other carriers do not share American's enthu-
siasm for the modification. A n.ew-technology aircraft is preferred by 
all. 
Since many of the current trarisport aircraft do not meet the new 
Stage 3 .noise rules, although they met governmen.t noise rules when intro-
duced, it may be in the public interest to assist engine manufacturers 
with research funding to accelerate a new engine timetable so that a 
forced reduction in U.S. air transport service does not take place with 
the mandatory p~asing out of noisy aircraft. 
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Chapter 9 
FUTURE FOR TURBOPROPS AND PROP-FAN TRANSPORTS: 
AIRLINE MANAGEMENT VIEW 
9.1 Early U.S. Turboprop Experience -- Large Airl ines 
Turbopropeller (turboprop) transport aircraft were introduced into 
U.S. scheduled airline service by Capital Airlines in 1955 with the 48-
passenger English-made Viscount. Featuring greater speed (about 300 
mph), less vibration, and lower noise levels than competing aircraft, it 
initially met with success in attracting passengers. Early in 1958 
Continental began flying a later model Viscount carrying 15 additional 
passengers. Finally, for about three years Northeast Airl ines in the 
. early 1960s operated Viscounts. Despite their smoothness, speed and 
reliability, such factors as reluctance to buy abroad, some accidents, 
and the unexpected success of turbojets, resulted in short life for this 
aircraft, and by 1970 they had been phased out. 
In the initial stages of design it was anticipated that turbojets 
would be economical only on long, nonstop routes. Moreover, runway 
requirements for the early jets exceeded the lengths available at many 
high-density airports such as La Guardia and Chicago (Midway). American 
. Airlines, followed by Eastern, sought a short- to medium-haul turboprop 
for markets which the jets could not serve. The result was the Lock-
heed L-188, Electra, a 400 mph, 66- to 86-passenger turboprop with good 
economics and excellent performance. 
At the peak of L-188 popularity in 1962, there were 122 L-188s in 
service on six domestic carriers. The Electra's four:-bladed "paddle 
props" geared to a constant speed turbine engine permitted takeoffs from 
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runways covered with snow to a depth whjch grounded pure jets. Similarly, 
reversing the propellers on landing provided for much shorter stopping 
distances than did the thrust reversers on pure jets. With a signifi-
cantly lower fuel consumption than jets, fueling of the L-188 could be 
more infrequent and holding in ATC stacks rarely included a time con-
straint. On short hauls it was believed that the time differential 
between turboprops and turbojets would be insignificant. 
Nevertheless, there were undesirable technical problems. Among 
them: gearbox difficulties, the complexity of the pitch changing mecha-
nism as well as problems associated with maintaining the integrity of the 
reversing and full feathering systems. Additionally, there were the 
difficulties and expense of keeping the propellers in "phase-sync" so 
that the passengers wou1 d not be annoyed by prope11 er II beat; II The down 
time when propellers had to be changed and the expense of propeller and 
gearbox maintenance ,were considered unsatisfactory. Several accidents 
resulting from a design defect cause some loss of confidence in the 
aircraft. Finally, those passengers seated in the plane of propellers 
were subject to unsatisfactory noise and vibration. 
The turboprop era, which was to resurface in modest proportions in 
the case of local service ai~lines and more robustly in the case of com-
muter airlines, never reached full flower on the trunk lines. It was not 
so much the problems 1 isted above that brought about a cessation of 
orders, but the wide acceptance of jet travel and rapid development of 
short- to medium-haul jet transports -- such as the DC-9 and B-727 
which combined greater speed and significant improvements in cabin noise 
and vibration with the magic attached to the name IjeL" With jet fuel 
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at only ten cen~s a gallon, the lower maintenance costs experienced with 
jet engines and the deletion of gearbox and the propeller costs more 
than overcame the expense of the greater fuel consumption of the turbo-
jets. Although a few L-188s survived in specialized services -- such as 
the Eastern shuttle and some cargo operations -- and notwithstanding 
their appealing fuel economy in short- to medium-haul operations, re-
cently there has been a noticeable lack of demand on the part of trunks 
or local service carriers for a replacement turboprop. 
9.2 Local Service Airlines Turboprop Experience 
The performance and cost advantages of the turboprop led to its 
greater acceptance by local service airlines. In 1958 and 1959 the 290 
mph, 40-passenger Fokker F-27, and the 52-passenger Convair CV-540 were 
introduced on West Coast Airlines and Allegheny Ai~lines respecti~ely. 
In the decade of the 60s the following aircraft made their appearance. 14 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1969 
Tabl e 9-1 
Turboprops of the 60s 
Aircraft Seating* 
Conva ir 580 52 
Nord 262 27 
Conva ir 600 40 
Conva ir 640 56 
Fa irchil d FH-227 52 
Ni hon YS-11 52 
DHC-6 Twin Otter 20 
Airline 
'Frontier 
Lake Central 
Central 
Caribbean Atlantic 
Mohawk 
Hawaiian 
Los Angel es 
* Seating subject to considerable variance depending on class 
of service, perceived availability of traffic, etc. 
Source: CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics, 1973 edition. 
The Convairs were conversions from earlier piston CV-240/340/440 lines. 
14 Samuel E. Eastman, IIEconomic Regulation of Air Services to Small 
Communities: Origins to the Airl i ne Deregulation Act of 1978, II TRB 
Meeting, January, 1981, p. 14. 
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Economic regulation under the Civil Aeronautics Act had a major 
influence in aircraft acquisitions of local service lines. It was not 
until 1959 that the Board decided it would subsidize a carrier with 
aircraft larger and more modern than a 21-seat OC-3. The federal govern-
ment's loan program by 1966 had guaranteed loans for 48 aircraft worth 
$38 million -- all aircraft over 36 seats. 15 By 1~70 there were on the 
aircraft roster of the local service lines 30 piston aircraft, 228 turbo-
props (of which 107 were CV-580, and 75 were F-27s and F-227s) and 157 
turbojets. 16 Ultimately by 1977 loan guarantees covering equipment 
" 
costing $355 million were made, but they were primarily for jets. How-
ever, opportunities for expansion became limited when the Board placed 
a moratorium on route awards and when the Board's Bureau of Operating 
Rights indicated, "In general, operation of the standard 40- to 60-seat 
aircraft employed by local service carriers is economically justified 
only at points originating 40 or more passengers a day.lI17 
Local service airlines, as soon as the moratorium was lifted, showed 
a strong desire to expand to longer haul routes and use jet aircraft. 
Since the public more readily accepted jets where jets and turboprops 
operated side by side, and since the objectives of management were to 
acquire longer haul routes which were more suitable for jets, the use of 
10 George C. Eads, The Local Service Airline Experiment, Brookings 
Institution, 1972, p. 152. 
16 Michael O. Rice, "Government Guarantees for Airline Financing," 
Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No.2, 1981, p. 333. 
17 CAB, "Service to Small Communities, Part I, Local Service Carrier 
Costs and Subsidy Need Requirements to Serve Marginal Points," 
March 1972, p. V. . 
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turboprops tapered off. When deregulation moved from proposal to de 
facto status and on to be the law of the land, expansion plans of the 
lecal service lines did not involve the acquisition and promotion of 
turboprop service. By 1981 only a few scattered turboprops were in use 
on local service (national) carriers, and they were in the process of 
being phased out. Interest in current type turboprop aircraft has, 
since deregulation~ centered on 19-, 30-, 40-, and 50-passenger planes 
for the expanding commuter market. 18 
9.3 The Prop-Fan 
Because of turboprop fuel economies, a resurgence of airline inter-
est in this type of aircraft might be anticipated, particularly if the 
latest engineering improvements were incorporated to further reduce 
fuel consumption and minimize the disadvantages previously enumerated. 
Accordingly, one task of this study was to ask each airline surveyed 
concerning its interest in operating turboprop aircraft in the 1985-
2000 period. The questioning was also to include the type of interest, 
if any, the carrier had in a new advanced technology turboprop which 
has been differentiated in terminology with the name "prop-fan." 
One significant difference between existing turboprops and jets is 
the the former, operating around. 6 or .7 Mach, is several hundred miles 
per hour slower than the latter. As stage lengths become longer, the 
time differential increases -- a characteristic which, American Airlines 
18 In a step which will for a long time perpetuate the confusion caused 
by the CAB's changing airline classification from trunks, local ser-
vice, and commuters to majors, nationals, large regionals, and small 
regionals the Commuter Airline Association of America in November 
1981 abol ished the name "commuter" and replaced it with the name 
"regional." -Thus former commuters are now referred to as regional s. 
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discovered to its regret, rendered the Electra at a competitive disad-
vantage as soon as jets capable of flying La ~uardia to Chicago (726 
m1les) were introduced. It has been reasoned that if a ~urboprop could 
be developed which matches the speed of a turbofan a·ircraft, i.e. Mach 
.78-.83 and still retain its fuel economy characteristics, not only 
would the industry be saved hundreds of millions of dollars on fuel 
costs with their inevitable impact on fares and ·traffic, but also the 
country would be benefitted by reduced usage of the scarce energy re-
source, oil. Proponents of the prop-fan quantify their views by fore-
casting, pres~ming introduction in 1990, a market for 4,000 planes and 
a saving of si~ billion gallons of fuel in ten years.19 
Essentially the prop-fan would replace the fan of a high-technology 
turbo-fan with a multibladed propeller (perhaps 8 or 10 blades) fea-
turing advanced swept-back blades having many times more thrust than 
older propellers of the same size. Preliminary research suggests that 
prop-fan speeds approaching Mach .80 are possible. Such speeds would 
narrow or eliminate the time differential between turboprops and jets 
and thus stretch the economic.usefulness from short-haul operation~ to 
much longer segments. For several years NASA has been working on 'ad-
vanced prop-fan technology but on a smaller scale than necessary for 
early adoption. An engine technology program as well as airframe pro-
gram and much acoustical work is needed if this type of efficie~t pro-
pulsion is to replace low-bypass, old-technology powerplants.'Present 
19 Testimony of R.L. Foss, chief engineer~ lockheed California Company, 
before House Committee on Science and Technology, Feb. 26. 1981. In 
the same hearing United Technologies estimated a 2,000 plane market 
in the 80- to lBO-passenger category. 
;' 
; 
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thinking is that the propfan would be 60 percent more fuel-efficient 
than present low-bypass engines and 15 to 20 percent more efficient than 
the most efficient high-bypass turbofan powerp1ant. 
The following section lists the current degree of management inter-
est in turboprops and prop-fans. 
9.4 Larger Carriers' Views on the Turboprop and Prop-Fan 
American. As previously indicated, American is fully occupied with 
significantly changing its route structure, in reorganizing to reduce 
costs -- including the elimination of B-707 service and a cutback in 
wide-body operations in order to afford the acquisition of new-
technology aircraft, or at least a re-engining of its B-727 fleet. Pre-
occupied as the company is with serious nearer term problems, it is not 
surprising that its turboprop and prop-fan interest is limited to watch-
ing developments from the side lines and "scoping" those focusing on 
short-haul aircraft which may be defined as aircraft optimized for 300 
to 500 mile segments. American also joins other carriers in urging Con-
gress to provide funds for further research including building an eight 
to ten foot propeller, which is considerable longer than the earlier two-
foot experimental model. 
It appears that until American's financial position is strengthened, 
and until research on the prop-fan has more definitive answers, the com-
pany does not really know what its future posture will be. This much, 
however, is reasonably clear. First, the company is only interested in 
the prop-fan version of the turboprop and that only if the speed is Mach 
.76 or higher. Secondly, the long range planners in the company are more 
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enthusiastic than are the operating departments. The latter recall only 
too well the propeller and gearbox technical and cost problems associated 
! 
with the Electra. Further, they are not sanguine that these difficulties 
can be solved in a matter satisfactory to them. Finally, since Pmer-ican 
has repeatedly emphasized speed -- witness the DC-7 and the Convair 990 
purchases -- 'it is not surprising that even if there were some 'cost ad-
vantage in a trade-off of speed for fue'- economy, the company feel s it 
must be competitive in flight times. Therefore, unless the bottom line 
is satisfactory at speeds of Mach. 76 to .80, a prop-fan would not be 
purchased. 
Some elements in American see a medium-capacity (no larger than 150 
passengers) short-haul prop-fan with low airplane-mil e costs as well as 
low seat mile costs as a way to compete with low-cost, new-entry opera-
tors on the presumption that the latte~ will be forced to use less effi-
cient equipment. 
TWA. This major company indicated that the prop-fan of the size it 
would be interested in, i.e. 150 passengers, is so far in the future 
that itis not worth considering in the present planning cycle. If 
cabin noise and vibration can be decreaSed to acceptable levels, and if 
lower fares can be justified, TWA felt public acceptance will be forth-
coming. Since the publ ic is. very sensitive to speed differences and since 
to the general publ ic turboprops waul d appear to be a step backward, for 
a major airline there could be no trade-offs of speed for fuel economy.1 
, I 
, Finally, TWA planners bel ieved that the first new prop-fan would be in 
the 75- to lOa-passenger category, a size too smail for the company. 
United. Whil~ in some companies operations, engineering, and plan-
ning departments spoke with somewhat different voices, this was not true 
at United where the chairman and CEO, the senior V.P. of corporate plan-
ning, ~hd the V.P. of engineering were in complete agr~ement. Simply 
stated, they were enthusiastic about the need and prospects for a Mach 
.80 prop-fan with 30 percent greater fuel efficiency than the best cur-
rent high-bypass turbofan. More than any other carrier, United empha-
sized that prop-fan speed must be competitive with that of turbofans. 
Not only wou,ld the company not trade speed for lower fuel consumption, 
but on the contrary would under certain circumstances consider a reverse 
trade-off of fuel economy for more speed. 
As to the size of the prop-fan aircraft, the consensus at United 
was that the first such transport aircraft would probably be smaller 
than the yet undefined size desired by United. However, United's engi-
neers did not see the same technical difficulties associated with the 
gearbox, propell ers, acoust ics, and vi brat ion as did representatives in 
other carriers. Modern engineering and new technology were capable of 
handling the problems. Having analyzed the results of a passenger sur-
vey taken two years ago, the company is satisfied that the public will 
accept reverting to turboprop operation "if the price is right. II There-
fore, United has been in the forefront of those urging NASA to build a 
larger size working model of a prop-fan than it has in the past. At the 
present time, many of the reservations about the turboprop and its deriv-
ative prop-fan which were expressed by other major airlines are heavily 
discounted by United. 
121 
Northwest. As pointed out in Chapter 2, Northwest, with a strong 
financial position and a relatively modern fleet, can increase capacity 
inexpensively by adding more seats to its "roomy" planes and by increas-
ing its low rate of aircraft utilization ano, therefore, is not in a 
hurry to re-equip. Nevertheless, it sees the need to replace its B-727 
fleet before a suitable prop-fan is available. While the company has no 
"mindset" against turboprops or prop-fans -- indeed, it recalls with nos-
talgia the performance of the Electra in rain, sleet, and snow -- NWA 
realistically believes that the B-727 will by 1987 be replaced by a 150-
passenger turbofan and then perhaps ten years later, with a similar or 
slightly larger capacity turboprop or prop-fan. 
Northwest usually begins to replace a given model aircraft while 
the plane still is in demand and while it still commands a good price. 
In the past Northwest' has been successful in so doing and then has used 
the proceeds for newer equipment. The company, however, recognizes that 
rapidly rising capital costs make it more difficult to payoff the new 
greater investment. Additional interest and depreciation charges may 
well offset savings in direct operating costs. Thus, the company points 
out, the pay-off of the very significant savings on fuel with a turboprop 
or prop-fan when fuel prices are assumed to be; say, five dollars a gal-
lon may be much 1 ess attractive shoul d such fuel prices fa il to 
materialize. 
Northwest has never led the way in the design phase of new equip-
ment. Thus it will not put its financi~l resources into pushing a new-
technology turboprop. However, depending on how it assesses "the bottom 
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line" when such an aircraft is available, it will not stand back be-
cause of previous turboprop experience. 
Delta. Although Delta is among the companies urging Congress to 
appropriate the necessary funds for NASA and others to complete research 
which would lead to a prop-fan aircraft, its long-range plans do not 
envisage use by Delta of that technology before the year 2000 if then. 
Presently the company's engineers believe that a ISO-passenger prop-fan 
would be the smallest size it would consider becasue by the time such a 
plane is available ISO-passenger capacity will be the smallest size prac-
tical for Delta's fleet. On the other hand, other voices suggested that 
because of the pressure from smaller carriers operating over less dense, 
short-haul routes the 75-passenger version would be the first produced 
and this would not be of interest. 
As noted earlier, Delta's policy is to keep a relatively young and 
fuel-efficient fleet by continuously phasing in the highest technology 
equipment available. Its 1979 and 1980 purchases of the B-767 and B-757 
extended high-bypass technology to aircraft in the 178- 220-passenger 
category. Delta's current attention is on obtaining a builder for its 
"Delta-3" ISO-passenger aircraft for which only turbofan engines will be 
available by the company's late 1986 or. early 1987 deadline date. Such. 
a 100-plane fleet is estimated to cost $50 bill ion by del ivery time. 
Since Delta's total assets were $2.8 billion and revenues $3.5 billion 
in fiscal 1981, the magnitude of future financing may present a problem. 
There are many outside of the Delta family who, because of the 
chaotic financial position of the carriers (Delta excepted) and the finan-
cial constraints faced by airframe and engine manufacturers, doubt that 
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a new 150-passenger turbofan meeting Delta' s and United' s specifications 
will be built. Should this be the case renewed attention will be given 
to a turboprop or prop-fan in this category. Delta's preoccupation with 
the turbofan version of its 150-passenger proposal and its consequent 
lack of detailed study of the prop-fan resulted in no answer to the ques-
·tion of trade-offs of speed for fuel economy. 
Eastern. Because of the company's pressing current equipment re-
placement problems -- mainly its large quantity of narrow-bodies and lack 
of financing ability -- Eastern is not actively interested in turboprops. 
However, it does ~ follow turboprop/prop-fan research and bel ieves that 
accelerated government funding by NASA and others can bring an economical 
plane into being. In this connection some in Eastern think that, given 
a little time, those pursuing the Delta specifications of optimization 
of costs at 400 miles will find a prop-fan solution more economical than 
a turbofan. However, if Mach .80 or higher and additional range is re-
quired, then only a turbofan will provide the answer. In any event, 
where competition is concerned, speed is considered so important that 
Eastern would not trade speed for additional fuel economy. 
Western. Because of more pressing equipment and restructuring mat-
ters, the turboprop/turbofan alternative to turbofans has not been 
thoroughly addressed by Western .. However, the foll owi ng comments were 
made in answer to questions. Increasing congestion at Los Angeles Air-
port has inhibited the company's ability to provide the desired fre-
quency of service to Las Vegas. Therefore, Western could be interested 
in a large capacity turboprop to provide low-cost service in an aircraft 
equipped with high-density seating. For this type of service, speed 
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woul d not be at a premium so a trade-off of speed for fuel economy 
would be acceptable. 
In general, the company thought improved turboprops would have a 
market among commuters rather than larger airlines, and since the company 
was not a commuter, it did not wish to suggest sizes appropriate for 
turboprop or propfan aircraft for this category of carrier. 
Continental. Public acceptance of turboprops, according to Conti-
nental, would not be a problem. Subject to financing abil ity, it would 
be interested in a turboprop provided speed was in the range of Mach .78 
to .82. Since competition- under deregulation rendered wide-bodies less 
desirable than narrow-bodies, the plane of interest to Continental would 
be in the 130- to 170-passenger range. As for trade-offs of speed for 
fuel efficiency, trades down to .78 Mach would be of interest if neces-
sary to reach a target rate of return on investment. However, being 
competitive with other carriers would still be the controlling factor. 
USAir. Previous experience with the complexity and high mainte-
nance costs of turboprop aircraft caused USAir to indicate no interest 
in acquiring turboprop or prop-fan aircraft. Its recent decision to pur-
chase B-737-200s and 300s in the 120- to 130-passenger capacity range 
has given breathing room before new equipment is necessary. Nevertheless, 
recognizing the need for something smaller to replace aircraft of the 
size of a DC-9, USAir felt that if a new-technology turboprop were built 
it should be in the a'rea of 100-passenger capacity. 
Republ ic. Like USAir, Republ ic had a strong aversion to turboprops. 
The company view was that "Things would have to get awfully desperate 
before we would consider going back to turboprops." Republic believed 
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that the public would not accept turboprops on anything but very short-
haul routes. Doubt was expressed that any major carrier would be inter-
ested in a propeller-driven airplane. If there were any market for 
turboprops among the regionals it would be, acCording to Republic, for 
a 75-passenger plane. 
Frontier. While not showing great excitement over a new turboprop 
or prop-fan, Frontier did exhibit some interest in a short-haul turbo-
prop with a capacity of 75 to 100·passengers .. Believing that turboprops 
were of maximum usefulness on trips of less than 500 miles and should 
be competitive with automobile travel, Frontier reaioned that low cost 
should receive the greatest attention and, therefore, felt that trade-
offs of speed for fuel economy would be warranted if the trade-off 
resulted in a measurable difference in fares. If the fare differential 
between the turboprop and turbofan were significant, a turboprop could 
be 10 to 15 minutes slower without suffering a diminution in passenger 
acceptance. 
Piedmont. As a result of its recent experience with the Nihon 
YS-ll, which has just been phased out, Piedmont has more definite ideas 
about the future use of turboprops and their derivatives than many of 
the preceding companies. Noting its passengers lack of enthusiasm for 
the YS-l1 by reason of its slow speed, cabin noise, and lack of comfort-
able ride because of altitude limitations, Piedmont would not purchase 
another turboprop unless these deficiencies are corrected. 
As to the size and speed, a 100- to 130-passenger plane capable of 
handling short-haul segments in hlock times within 10 minutes of existing 
jets, and at a much lower cost, would interest the company. Since the 
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VS-ll suffered from lack of speed" it is not surprising that the company 
viewed negatively a trade-off of speed for fuel- economy .. 
9.5 Turboprops and Prop-Fans as Viewed by Medium Size Carriers 
AirCal. This company, which began operations with turboprop Elec-
tras, progressed to jet aircraft and has increased its stage lengths. 
AirCal is glad to be out of turboprops and has no further interest in 
them. Because of this lack of interest, AirCal provided no response to 
the question of the future size for turboprops. 
Air Florida. In its meteoric growth Air Florida has left turbo-
props earlier it operated Lockheed L-188 Electras on short-haul intra-
state routes -- for the turbofan fleet mentioned in Chapter 4. Current-
ly a commuter airline affiliate operates 28~passenger CASA turboprops. 
As short-haul traffic grows, Air Florida sees the need for new 60-
passenger turboprop aircraft for the commuter industry and the same size 
airplane for cargo work to feed larger carriers. But for its own opera-
tions Air Florida does not see the use of turboprops or prop-fans. 
The opportunistic management of Air Florida has been mentioned in 
Chapter 4. Thus, although the company states it has no interest in 
turboprop technology, should a turboprop with favorable economics and 
passenger appeal become available at a price to give a satisfactory re-
turn investment, one can be sure that Air Florida would negotiate for 
such equipment. 
Air New England. During the drafting of this report Air New England, 
because of financial problems, ceased operations. Therefore, its views 
on turboprops are not relevant. 
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Southwest (SWA). Southwest, probably because it has been so suc-
cessful with a single plane fleet -- the 8-737 -- initially evinced 
little interest in a propeller aircraft. The company, however, did see 
a major niche for a 50-passenger pressurized turboprop in the commuter 
market. In fact, Southwest saw the poss i bil ity to "grow down II to ·the 
smaller cities with this type of aircraft. 
Southwest did not see publ ic acceptance of a turboprop as a probl em, 
particularly if lower fares were possible. For the 1990-2000 period, 
when it expected to be involved in a re-equipment program, a 160-
passenger pressurized prop-fan would be of interest. There was, however, 
one caveat: the plane must be able to fly from Dallas to Houston and not 
be more than 15 minutes slower than a competing turbofan aircraft. 
Pacific Southwest (PSA). At one time in the early 1960s PSA suc-
cessfully operated a turboprop fleet of L-188s until forced into jets 
when United and Western blanketed the Los Angeles-coastal cities routes 
with much faster 8-727 and 8-720 schedules. Additionally, because of 
the lack of efficient turboprop aircraft for its shorter-haul routes, 
PSA has been dropping these short segments and expanding to longer routes 
in the Pacific Northwest. Stating that liThe short range efficient com-
muter aircraft has not been invented yet, II and "Neither the. right air-
craft design or engine are here yet," the company suggested that it 
would take a new-technology turboprop or prop-fan to cause it to reassess 
its decision to leave the short-haul market. A hub-and spoke feed sys-
tem might then be practical. 
A turboprop or prop-fan of interest to PSA would be 100 to 125 in 
passenger capacity and have extremely low fuel consumption. As for 
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trading speed for fuel economy, the company felt this would be depen-
dent upon length of haul. Since short-haul service is less sensitive 
to speed differences, PSA would be willing to sacrifice speed for lower 
fuel burn on this type of operation. 
Actually, PSA has no real interest in turboprops. For one thing, 
it believes them to be "pretty far downstream.·· Secondly, the company·s 
interest for the 1985-2000 period is in maximizing its use of a large 
fleet of OC-9-80s with an eye to the acquisition of high-density B-757s. 
It places low priority on the type of routes it believes are appropriate 
for turboprops and has not really considered prop-fans. 
Midway Airlines (MOW). Less than two years old and fully occupied 
with organizational and growth problems, Midway is thus far committed 
to jets and is not positioned for turboprops or propfans. However, 
should such aircraft become available, Midway·s interest would be in 
the 100, 125, or 150 capacity size, with a preference for 125 if only 
one size were to be built. As was the case with other airlines inter~ 
viewed, Midway felt that a turboprop or prop-fan with significantly 
lower operating costs would be competitive providing its block times 
were within 10 to 15 minutes of those of conventional jets. 
Flying Tigers (FT) and Federal Express (FE). The companies, both 
cargo carriers, have similar views on the merits of propeller-driven 
aircraft for portions of their business and therefore, will be treated 
together. Both believe that current technology turboprops -- which 
operate at about .62 Mach -- are much too slow for their purposes. 
Accordingly, confirming his February 1981 congressional testimony, 
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Federal Express' s~nior vice president of operations planning said, 
"A prop-fan is exactly what this company needs." 
While both companies saw applications for aircraft of varying capa-
cities, each carrier focused on a 40 to 50 thousand pound payload air-
craft with primary cost efficiency in the 500 to 800 mile range. The 
maximum range desired was 1,500 to 2,000 miles. Because of Federal's 
need for replacing its small Falcons with a greater capacity plane, 
Federal would also look seriously at a prop-fan with a 10 to 15 thousand 
pound capacity. 
Curiously, although the main advantage stressed by passenger air-
lines for the prop-fans was its fuel economy, both cargo carriers down-
played this aspect when they discussed trading off speed for fuel .economy. 
The quote from Flying Tigers executive vice president, IIWe would not want 
to· invest capital for fuel savings, II represents- the view of both com-
panies. They explained that unless their low utilization was doubled it 
would not be economical to slow the aircraft to save fuel. To the con-
trary, both carriers agreed that they might trade some fuel efficiency 
for more speed under certain conditions. 
In brief, Flying Tigers and Federal Express indicated a strong 
desire for prop-fan aircraft primarily in the 40 to 50 thousand pound 
payload category. The prop-fan's short field performance in comparison 
with turbofans and its predicted economics were the main attractions. 
The lower flight altitude of operation was not a concern for cargo oper-
ation. Neither company thought that the problems of reliability and 
maintenance expense which plagued earlier large turboprops would be 
repeated with the prop-fan. 
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9.6 The Commuters View of Turboprops and Prop-Fans 
The limited number of commuters surveyed -- four including Air 
Wisconsin -- provides littl~ more than an inkling of the attitude of the 
approximately 250 commuters toward current and prospective turboprops. 
Supplementary information, however, was obtained from discussions at the 
fall membership meeting of the Commuter Airline Association of America 
in November 1981. 
As commuters grow there is continuing evidence of a desire on the 
part of some to turn to jets. AirCal, Air Florida, and PSA were once 
considered commuters but have moved on. Air Wisconsin's growing busi-
ness has provided the company with the incentive to purchase 100-
passenger BAe 146 jets and drop some of its short-haul cities. Altair 
and Empire have recently joined the list of commuters purchasing jets. 
And Golden West predicts the need for a twin-engine 100-passenger jet 
in four years. Nevertheless, the greatest number of commuter aircraft 
are turboprops. 
Despite the fact that there are many more makes of commuter air-
craft offered for sale than is the case for large transports, many man-
agements feel that aircraft offered to commuter airlines for near-term 
delivery do not provide the comfort or efficiency needed. The con-
straining effects of the early CAB size rules have not worn off. Those 
looking for efficient aircraft, particularly in the 30- to 40-passenger 
category say they do not have much from which to choose. 
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Golden West, Air Wisconsin, and Britt highlighted the need for a 
more efficient 30- to 40-passenger turboprop.20 All seem to feel that 
aircraft capable of flight times of one hour for flights of 200 to 250 
miles would be ideal. 
Air Wisconsin. Although the company has recently sold some of its 
Swearingen Metroliner turboprops and ordered for 1984 delivery the BAE-
146 jet, this does not presage a wholesale shift to jets. Actually the 
16-passenger Metrol iners became too small and without a suitabl e 30- to 
40-passenger turboprop replacement available the company is substituting 
additional 50-passenger DeHavilland Dash-7s. After having examined 30-
to 40-passenger turboprops which are likely to be available by 1985, Air 
Wisconsin believes that, in general, they lack either the economics or 
the baggage capacity the airline needs. Currently the company appears 
to favor the DeHavilland Dash-8 on which it has options. Its objective 
is a 350 mph 36-passenger plane for use on 150 to 200 mile route segments. 
Thus it would like more speed than the Dash-8 provides. Although the 
company believes that jet speed is not needed on short-haul routes, 
speed in current technology turboprops is sufficiently important that, 
economics permitting, Air Wisconsin would trade some fuel economy for 
additional speed. The company did not express an opinion on the desira-
bility of the prop-fan. 
Golden West. Although the company sees a bright future for the 48-
seat Dash-7, its plans also involve a 30- to 40-passenger plane for 
20 Air Wisconsin does have options on the DeHavilland Dash-8, 36-
passenger turboprop equipped with the new PW 120 engine. However, it 
is not clear that these options will be exercised if something more 
to its liking comes along. 
132 
200-mile segments as well as a 100-passenger jet or prop-fan for 400-
mile route segments. A turboprop plane with better economics would be 
desirable for frequent service if it were not more than 5 to 10 minutes 
slower than a jet. Finally, since the company considered fuel to be a 
driving force on costs, it would be willing to trade speed for fuel 
economy down to the 5 to 10 minute time differential. 
Britt. In large companies planners are not necessarily engineers 
or operations or finance people. Thus it sometimes is not clear who has 
the dominant voice and precisely what equipment is wanted. Such is not 
the case in a closely held small company like Britt Airways which has 
been guided from its inception by its current president, Will iam Britt, 
who was most candid in articulating Britt Airways' equipment. views. 
From the company's perspective all the turboprop aircraft recently 
offered for quick delivery represent old technology and thus less than 
desirable economics. Srime aircraft have large struts and other appen-
dages which accumulate ice as well as a physical appearance which makes 
one wonder if they could fly. Britt would like two classes of fuel 
efficient turboprops -- the company does not need jets for its short-
haul routes, many of which are 100 to 150 miles in length. These two 
types are a 19- and a 30- to 40-passenger plane respectively. Other 
specifications included 300 mph cruise speed, 100 knot approach speed, 
and the capability of operating from 5,000 foot runways. 
Fuel consumption is extremely important to Britt Airways and thus 
it desires fuel consumption of 100 to 120 gallons per hour for its 30-
to 40-passenger craft. This results in still air cruising seat miles 
per gallon of over 100. Britt's fuel consumption o·bjective for a 19-seat 
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aircraft is less than 90 gallons per hour. Of the new planes available 
for the 1985-2000 period, the Beach 1900 in the 19-passeng~r category, 
and the Fairchild SAAB 340 in the 30- to 40-passenger category, appear 
to be of the most interest to Britt. 
Britt Airways definitely has no interest in jet aircraft, believing 
them to be inappropriate for such short-haul operations. Looking to the 
future the company finds two deterrents to the acquisition of a prop-
fan. First, the additional speed is not thought necessary for short 
stage lengths. Second, the cost of developing and manufacturing this 
high-technology plane will be so great that neither Britt or other small 
carriers will be able to afford it. Britt points out that they can ac-
quire used 48-passenger FH-227s for about $1,000,000 or $21,000 per seat, 
compared with about $6,000,000 or about $120,000 per seat, for a ne\'1 
Fokker F-27. Britt does not see that the additional efficiency pays off 
the cost. He shudders at the thought of the price of a prop-fan. 
Midstate. Like Britt, Midstate plans to stay with turboprop air-
craft and avoid jets. This recently reorganized airline has not pro-
jected the need for aircraft other than the Metro III for several years 
to come, but perceives its next step will be a 30- to 40-passenger air-
craft. When the new management undertakes long range planning for more 
than five years in advance, it will then review the advantages and dis-
advantages of the propfan. 
9.7 Summary 
Among the large old-line carriers only Western; with an allusion to 
a possible ISO-passenger plane for short-haul Los Angeles-Las V~gas, and 
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Frontier, with a suggestion for a 70- to 100-passenger economical turbo-
prop for its short-haul operations, expressed any interest in conven-
t10nal turboprops. Of the eleven large carriers, only United Airlines 
viewed the development of a prop-fan with great enthusiasm. Management 
was concerned that when such a transport was built it would be smaller 
than the 150-passenger capacity United would wish. All carriers in 
this group, except Frontier,· agreed on two points. First, if an econom-
ical prop-fan were built, it should be 150 passengers in capacity. And 
secondly, if lower fares could be justified, the aircraft would not have 
to match jet speeds. Block times of 10 to 15 minutes longer than jets 
would still attract passengers. 
Views of the medium size carriers can be summarized as follows: 
Of the six -- AirCal, SWA, PSA, MOW, FT, and FE -- none opted for cur-
rent technology turboprops. Flying Tiger and Federal Express expressed 
strong interest for a 40 to 50 thousand pound payload prop-fan aircraft 
but made it clear that they would prefer to trade fuel economy for 
speed -~ just the reverse of most passenger carriers. All these com-
panies agreed that an economical prop-fan did not have to be as fast as . 
a jet. Surprisingly, each carrier, without prior knowledge of what 
others had said, vol unteered that passengers woul d not object to a 10 
to 15 minute schedule differential if the fare were significantly 
cheaper. 
Four commuter lines were in close agreement on the following three 
points. First, their type of very short-haul operations did not need 
a prop-fan. Second, a faster, pressurized, more economical 30- to 40-
passenger turboprop than those presently in service was needed. Several 
13~ 
aircraft not yet certificated were, however, being seriously considered. 
Finally significant improvements were desired for the 19-passenger 
offerings. 
All expressed concern that. the rapidly escalating cost per seat, 
when coupled with their current and projected financial condition, might 
preclude financing new-technology aircraft when they became available. 
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·Chapter 10 
FOREIGN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT: 
MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT AND INTEREST 
10.1 .Background 
Following World War II, the United States became the acknowledged 
world-wide leader in the production of transport aircraft -- a leader-
ship which continued during the first two decades of jet production. 
During the recession of the early and mid 70s thousands of U.S. air-
craft engineers and production workers became unemployed. The reces-
sion made it painfully clear that purchases of high-capacity, wide-body 
B-747s, DC-lOs, and L-lOlls had been made in advance of the traffic 
growth necessary to sustain them. Many were grounded. In Europe, par-
ticularly France, Germany, and England, a concerted effort was initiated 
to develop efficient transports slightly smaller than the large wide-
bodies. The first successful result was the Airbus 300 series with 
U.S. engines. 
In Europe and elsewhere Airbus began to carve. out a significant por-
tion of the wide-body market which in one year reached 38 percent. In 
the U.S; it was alleged that many of these foreign sales were made be-
cause of government subsidized financing and this was unfair competition. 
Early in 1978 when Eastern announced a $778 million order for the Airbus 
(albeit with American General Electric engines), and Pan American a 
$480 million order for Lockheed L-lOll-500 aircraft with Rolls Royce en-
gines, Congress was asked to look into the matter. American manufac-
turers and American labor unions objected that foreign subsidies to 
aircraft manufacturers, if allowed to continue, could deepen unemployment, 
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cause the loss of our technical skills, harm our national defense, and 
worsen our balance of payments problem. 
No conclusion came from Congress on the validity of the allegations, 
but subsidized transport aircraft financing by foreign banks through 
their governments as well as 'our response through the Eximbank has con-
tinued to be a concern not only to manufacturers but to foreign govern-
ments and the U.S. government as well. Governments of aircraft producing 
countries are becoming resistive over deploying resources from taxpayers 
to subsidize aircraft purchases. 
10.2 The Changing "Foreign Aircraft" Picture 
As traffic improved in 1978, domestic aircraft sales increased 
dramatically. Although Airbus and Rolls Royce received additional or-
ders outside the U.S., further U.S. orders did not materialize. This 
being the case, proposed legislation carrying "Buy American" provisions 
was not enacted. There are other reasons why the "Buy American" move-
ment subsided: (1) the fear of retaliation by other countries, and 
(2) the difficulty of deciding when a plane is foreign. The Airbus has 
been reported to be 30 to 45 percent American. Conversely, American 
planes now have many foreign components. The Department of Commerce 
estimates- that the Boeing 767 is 25 to 35 percent foreign. Further, the 
cost of developing and manufacturing commercial transport is so high 
that domestic and foreign manufacturers are busy looking for foreign 
partners or consortia to share the risk and burden. Air transport manu-
facturing has become so international in scope that the "Buy U.S." argu-
ment has lost its appeal. 
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This study reports on the extent to which U.S. carriers themselves 
have a "Buy U.S. II policy, the perceived quality of foreign offerings, 
and whether special financing inducements might sway their order to a 
foreign manufacturer. 
10.3 Major, National and Regional Airlines (Non-Commuters) 
Of 21 large and medium sized carriers interviewed, 17 stated that 
they had no' "Buy American" policy, their sole criteria being economics. 
One carrier, while stating it had no "Buy American" policy, admitted to 
an emotional bias toward an American plane where evaluations showed the 
foreign and American planes to be equal in all other respects. Two 
carriers stated that they did have a "Buy American" policy but this 
stemmed not from patriotism but from their location very close to a 
domestic manufacturer and from their satisfact"ion with the product sup-
port received. The remaining carrier related that it formerly had a 
"Buy U.S. II pol icy, primarily because of the fear over the qual ity of 
foreign product support. This preference no longer exists because of 
favorable reports from other carriers concerning plane quality and prod-
uct support from abroad. 
As to the quality of foreign offerings, all carriers judged it to 
be very high. In fact, the opinion was' expressed several times that 
. foreign electronic equipment was superior to that of the U.S. The rea-
son was that poorer weather in Europe in crowded airspace provided 
greater incentive to develop more precise and reliable advanced tech-
nologyequipment. The same degree of quality is being found in other 
components being made abroad for U.S. transports. On several occasions, 
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Boeing has commented on how perfectly the Japanese-made parts fit when 
mated to the main assembly. 
When the Japanese are asked how soon they will market Japanese 
transports to compete in the world market, they respond that the small 
size of their country, their small aircraft industry, and their lack of 
experience preclude this from happening for many years. However, after 
noting the Japanese success in autos, watches, electronics, and other 
products, many analysts in the U.S. think that this low-key approach 
may lead the rest of the world into a false sense of security. Recent 
courting of the Japanese by American manufacturers wishing to obtain a 
partner in the ISO-passenger transport competition. may result in 
giving the Japanese a greater sh~re of control than the manufa~turers 
originally had in mind, and may be a giant step toward a Japanese 
transport. 
Research into whether subsidies in financing, either directly by 
foreign governments, or through banks or other institutions controlled 
by foreign governments will lead U.S. carriers to purchase foreign air-
craft -- if indeed one can define what is foreign -- instead of domestic 
aircraft, leads to a negative response, except in one situation. If the 
U.S. Eximbank cannot (and of course by definition it cannot) finance a 
domestic aircraft at rates competitive with foreign subsidized rates~ 
U.S. international carriers face a dilemma. Assuming a foreign and 
domestic plane of equal quality, a U.S. airline planning to buy the 
American product may be faced with competition from a foreign carrier 
whose costs may be lower because of subsidized financing, or it may be 
forced to purchase the foreign plane to remain competitive. 
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Although it is true that financing was the key to the Eastern 
Airbus acquisition at a time when many felt that Eastern was headed 
toward bankruptcy, and althuugh financing was the key to Pan American's 
purchase of Rolls Royce engines, it appears from the interviews and from 
the subsequent lack of foreign orders in the u.s. that in the last three 
years subsidized loans have not caused U.S. airlines to purchase abroad. 
The likelihood of continued foreign low interest rate loans is 
diminishing. Governments around the world are increasingly pressed for 
revenues and are closely reviewing where to allocate subsidies which are 
paid for by the taxpayers. Transport aircraft are not on the priority 
list. To avert an export credit war among commercial aircraft exporting 
countries by insuring that no one offers terms more favorable than those 
agreed to, a proposed Standstill Agreement between U.S., Germany, 
England, and France would fix interest rates at 12 percent -- up from 
previous rates of around 9 percent under Standstill. If governments must 
pay 15 percent or more for money, the burden on the taxpayers of the dif-
ferential is substantial. Thus efforts are underway to eliminate the 
differential completely by transferring financing from the official ex-
port credit bank to the private sector and at that point having an asset 
in the private sector which could be repossessed if necessary.21 
In any event, focusing on interest rate differentials can be mis-
leading. Much greater financial inducements exist in the unpublished 
arrangements. For example, the price may include, in the case of en-
gines, upgrading another series of engines owned by the airline, and in 
21 For details see paper "Aircraft Financing: The International Equip-
ment Trust," presented at ATRIF, October 28, 1981, Northwestern 
University T~ansportation Center, Evanston, IL. 
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the case of an airframe, certain' modifications on existing planes to 
standardize the fleet. Offsets, such as building part of the plane in 
the purchasing country to relieve unemployment, or paying for part of 
the plane in golf carts or ham, may be implicit in the deal. Finally, 
in some cases purchases are announced and a year or so later it is re-
vealed that financing has yet to be arranged. In these cases, subsi-
dized financing is obviously not the cause of the aircraft's selection. 
A general summarization of managements' stated views on the effect 
of low cost financing in aircraft selection is that only in the case of 
a tie in the evaluations would a foreign manufacturer win with a below 
market rate subsidized loan. Several managements then added that they 
had never seen a tie. 
10.4 Commuter Airlines and Foreign Aircraft 
The common complaint of commuter airlines is the lack of attention 
paid by U.S. manufacturers to their needs. Commuters point out that in 
some cases there are no U.S. manufacturers of the aircraft category in 
which they are interested. Under this situation, none can have a "Buy 
American" policy if it wants to. Of course, part of the reason for lack 
of interest has been that for years commuters were 1 imited to 19-
passenger or smaller aircraft -- sizes ~onsidered uneconomic to operate 
without substantial subsidies. This constraint has now been lifted and 
the outlook for a broader coverage of seating capacities is'improved. 
Nevertheless, foreign manufacturers are still more active than domestic. 
Illustrating this point is a sample list, Table 10-1 of commuter air-
craft operating in 1981. 
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Table 10-1 
Commuter Aircraft of 15 Seats or More, 1981 
Aircraft Model I~anufacturer Seating Place of Manufacture 
C99 Beech 15 U.S. 
Jetstream Handl ey Page 18 U.K. 
CASA 212 ~ASA 28 Spain 
Twin Otter DeHavilland 19 Canada 
Dash 7 DeHavilland 50 Canada 
Bandeirante Embraer 18 Brazil 
F-27/FH-227 Fa irchi 1 d 46 U.S. 
F-27/F-28 Fokker 50/85 Netherl ands 
262/298 Nord 27 France 
330 Shorts 30 Ireland 
Metro Swearingen 19 U.S. 
While commuters have a broader list of sizes from which to choose 
in the future, a representative sample, Table 10-2, of new aircraft 
either in production or for which plans are in process, indicates that 
foreign producers still have by far the largest number of offerings. 
Table 10-2 
New Commuter Aircraft Offered For Sale November, 1981 
Aircraft Model Manufacturer Seating Countr~ of Manufacture 
ATR 42 Aerospatiale/ 42 France/Italy 
Aerital ia 
101-B ARAVA 18 Israel 
1900 Beech 19 U.S. 
748 British Aerospace 48 U.K. 
146 British Aerospace 100 U. K. 
CN-235 CASA 38 Spain/Indonesia 
Dash 8 DeHavilland 36 Canada 
228 Dorn i er 15 Germany 
Brasilia Embraer 30 Braz i1 
Gul fstream Gulfstream American 37 U.S. 
N24A Nomad 16 Austral ia 
340 Saab-Fairchild 34 Sweden/U. S. 
360 Shorts 36 Irel and 
404 Ahrens 30 Puerto Rico 
CAC-100 Commuter Aircraft 50 U.S. 
Metro III Swearingen 19 U.S. 
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However, when the ratio of U.S. manufactured or designed power-
plants to non-U.S. is calculated, the preponderance of U.S. equipment is 
clear. For example, the Pratt & Whitney Division of United Technologies 
furnishes PT6 turboporp engines for the following: Shorts 330 and 360, 
ARAVA, Beech C99 and 1900,. Twin Otter, Bandeirante, and Swearingen 
Metro IlIA. Its PW100 series is offered to power the ATR 42, the Dash 8, 
and the Brasilia. Other U.S. manufacturers such as General Electric, 
Garrett, Allison, Lycoming, and Continental have engines powering com-
muters. Pratt & Whitney estimates that 86 percent of commercial aircraft 
in the world are powered by U.S. engines. 
In the foreign commuter field, the largest engine supplier is Rolls 
Royce which powers the HS 748, the F27, the F28, and the Gulfstream series. 
Commuters purchasing foreign planes have had access to export credit 
bank facil ities abroad. A recent $70 mill ion purchase of the BAe-146 by 
Air Wisconsin will be financed by a $45 million credit at 8 3/4 percent for 
a ten-year term. At present, future rates cannot be less than 12 percent 
under the Standstill Agreement. Air Wisconsin insists that there were 
no U.S. manufactured planes suitable for its operations and that, there-
fore, the subsidized financing did not harm the U.S. aircraft manufac-
turing industry. 
Summary: The quality of workmanship in medium and large size 
foreign transports is deemed to be excellent by U.S. air carrier manage-
ments. Equally high ratings were given to the level of technology em-
ployed. In fact some perceived that in certain areas the European,s now 
have a slight edge. 
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Except for the two cases in 1978 -- Eastern and Pan Am -- no car-
rier would agree that financing with below market rate subsidized inter-
est rates would cause a company to purchase a foreign plane over a U.S. 
plane. That difference could not overcome the advantage of close com-
munication in a common ,language, commonality with their present fleet, 
and particularly the advantage of the enviable reputation for product 
support which has been carefully nurtured by U.S. companies. Finally, 
the internationalization of aircraft manufacturers is rapidly reaching 
the point where all transports have a significant proportion of parts 
manufactured outside the U.S. so that the distinction between American 
and foreign is becoming unclear. 
Air carrier assessment of U.S. versus foreign aircraft in the com-
muter area was somewhat different. As to the quality of foreign trans-
ports in the IS-passenger and over category,commuter managements were 
reasona bl y well sati sfi ed but did not rave about lI excell ence. II Although, 
the technology involved in aircraft flying in 1981 was believed to have 
lagged below that which could have been employed, there was some optimism 
about the upgrading being undertaken on new or derivative products 
scheduled for del ivery in the 1982-1985 period. Even here, however, 
there was criticism that some of the alleged II new ll aircraft were merely 
bigger but did not represent real solutions to the commuters needs. 
Two new aircraft were judged to be of particular interest. 
Commuter managements repeatedly expressed disappointment that they 
had to go outside the U.S. so often in search of a product to meet their 
needs. From their point of view, it was lIunfortunate ll that U.S. manu-
facturers did not have des i gns for 3D-passenger and 50-passenger pl anes 
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well underway in anticipation of the change in Federal Air Regulations 
authorizing larger aircraft. This delay, they maintained, has cost the 
commuters dearly and impeded adoption of U.S. aircraft. 
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Chapter 11 
MANAGEMENT PERCEPTIONS OF FUTURE GROWTH 
11.1 Background 
An air carrier's equipment needs in the 1985-2000 period depends not 
only on the role it sees for itself but also on its forecast growth rate. 
Also of interest for comparison purposes is the rate of growth it sees 
for the industry. 
11.2 Forecasts of Individual Carrier and Industry Growth 
Forecasts of growth by individual carriers are listed in Table 11-1. 
Basically the table shows agreement that the domestic airline industry 
will grow at the rate of 4.5 percent per year in the 1985-2000 period but 
that each carrier will grow at that rate or at a greater rate. The two 
rates are mathematically incompatible. Since some new entrants under de-
regulation are growing rapidly and since additional entrants will certain-
ly join the industry, some carriers will have to grow at less than indus-
try average. 
There are qualifications to be kept in mind when reading the tabula-
tion. First, concerning industry growth forecasts, a. number of those in-
terviewed commented that normally five years was their maximum forecast 
period and thus estimating for 1985-1990 was questionable, and 1990-2000 
forecasts could only be termed pure speculation. As indicated in the ta-
ble, several companies gave no estimate at all because the time frame was 
excessive. USAir indicated that forecasting was most difficult against a 
background of two years of declining traffic -- only once in history had 
this happened and then the decline was less than one percent. Finally, 
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Table 11-1 
ANNUAL GROWTH AS FORECAST BY CARRIER FOR 1985-2000 
Percent 
Air Carrier 
American 
TWA 
United 
NWA 
Delta 
Eastern 
Western 
Continental 
USAir 
Republic 
Company Industry 
Growth Growth 
4.4 4.4 
5 
Proprietary 
NA 
Proprietary 
4.5 
NA 
6-8 
5 
4.75 
5 
4-5 
NA 
4-5 
4.5 
NA 
6-8 
4.5 
4.5 
Frontier 10 5 
Piedmont 15/12/5 4.5 
AirCal NA NA 
Air Florida Proprietary 4.5 
SWA 6 4 
PSA 9 5 
4.5 5 
MOW 5-10 5-10 
Flying Tigers More than More than 
industry GNP 
Federal Express 15 No forecast 
Air Wisconsin 
Golden West 
Midstate 
Britt 
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More than No forecast 
industry 
More than 4-5 
industry 
No forecast No forecast 
No forecast No forecast 
Notation 
"possibly slightly .less than 
industry" 
No forecast beyond 1990 
No forecast that far in ad-
vance 
Exceeds forecast period 
"we should outpace the indus-
try slightly" 
Industry tapering to 4% 
15% to '88; 12% to '90; 5% 
thereafter 
Exceeds forecast period 
Exceeds forecast period 
SWA to double by 1988 and 
again by 2000 . 
To 1990 only, if can expand 
If route limited 
Much more 1981-1985 
Had no industry forecast 
Exceeds forecast period 
,. 
since the individual estimates for the industry are so close and since 
they correlate so well with the Air Transport Association's forecast, the 
independence of the forecasting process is brought into question. It is 
well known that before finalizing their predictions of industry growth, 
airline forecasters revise their figures after checking with their coun-
terparts in oth~r airlines. Since no forecaster wishes to be proved 
wrong, particularly if his predictions are at a variance with those of 
other forecasters, this checking process tends to yield strikingly simi-
lar individual forecasts. The Air Transport Association consolidates 
these slightly varying predictions into one growth rate which most air-
lines. then adopt as their "officia'" forecast. 
The company forecast of its own rate of growth also can lack objec-
tivity. A forecaster has a built in bias against showing that his com-
pany will not do as well as the average. Of those willing to answer ques-
tions on their future growth, only American mentioned that its growth 
rate might be below average. United and Delta considered that to protect 
themselves from competitors, their growth forecasts were proprietary in 
nature. Fast-growing Piedmont had an interesting and detailed forecast 
, 
of 15 percent per year to 1988, tapering to 12 percent for two years to 
1990, at which time its growth would fall to five percent, the same as 
the industry to 2000. 
Not surprisingly, the most optimistic about their own future were 
the currently successful older carriers -- Frontier and Piedmont -- and 
the rapidly growing newer successful carriers -- Federal Express, Midway, 
and PSA. Starting from a much lower traffic base makes the realization 
of their forecasts less difficult. Nevertheless, Federal Express' 15 per-
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cent per year compounded for 19 years would result in a 16-fold increase 
in its traffic. And if the business were all in its small package opera-
tions, its current run of 120,000 packages a day would rise to almost 
2,000,000. 
Summary: At the present time, traffic growth of 4.5 percent per 
year is the consensus for industry growth through the year 2000. With 
limited exceptions~ individual carriers see themselves as growing at the 
same rate. 
Since the forecast horizon of most airlines is five years or less 
~nd since their technique is not noted for its sophistication, the credi-
bility to be attached to their forecasts suffers. Many airlines disdain 
forecasting longer than a year or two. When a rapidly expanding carrier 
whic~ had purchased new aircraft for delivery some years hence was asked 
hoW tpe equipment acquisition was ju~tified on the' basis cif forecasts, 
t~e reply was that the carrier had made no such forecasts and that it had 
no idea on which routes the planes would be used. The company, recogniz- ~" 
ing that larger new-technology aircraft would be needed by.it or someone 
" . 
else, purchased the planes on speculati.on so that when delivery time came 
it could profitably employ them or dispose of them. On the other h~nd, 
there are companies which claim to "make very elaborate traffic stUdies 
and projections before purchasing aircraft. However, the unanticipated 
actions of new entrants and competitors under deregulation often invali-
date these forecasts. 
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Chapter 12 
INTERFACE AMONG TYPES OF CARRIERS 
Preceding chapters have outlined each management's view of its com-
pany's role in the new environment characterized by deregulation, infla-
tion, strict aircraft noise abatement regulations, aging aircraft, and 
unstable fuel supplies and price. These chapters also dealt with the 
types of aircraft needed to fulfill this role as well as the attitudes 
toward purchasing foreign aircraft. The final subje~t to be treated in 
this report is how managements see their future relations with other 
types of carriers. 
12.1 The Majors: AA, TW, UA, NW, DA, EA, WA, CO, USAir and Republic 
According to managements of major airlines, interfacing with foreign 
airlines will not be adversely affected by the new environment. In fact, 
several suggested there may be more cooperation than before. Some of it 
may be "forced cooperation" in that foreign relations may make it wiser 
to cooperate to be in a favorable position to ask for reciprocal treat-
ment. Only one major airline characterized its foreign interface arrange-
ments as being competitive. Another put it, "We generally cooperate be-
cause we feel we have to. When we think we don't have to, we don't." 
Another very large carrier said, "We are very dependent on foreign car-
riers for our feed and, therefore, try for maximum interfacing." 
Relationships between majors and commuters has undergone a consider-
able change in the last three years. There was a time when the commuters 
were considered little more than annoyances to the rest of the industry. 
Problems of joint fares, ticket counter space, OAG listings, baggage 
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transfer, and interline reservations were considered bothersome to the 
non-commuters. On the other hand, under deregulation large carriers have 
looked to commuters to pick up their unprofitable short-haul routes which 
they have dropped. Further, the passengers on these dropped routes were 
part of a longer haul -- sometimes a very long haul which the major car-
riers did not want to lose. Therefore, every carrier emphasized its deep 
interest in interfacing with such statements as "Cooperation with commut-
ers is the name of the game." 
In responding to questions about interfacing with charter airlines, 
managements, without exception, held that deregulation brought about such 
a reduction in fares on the major airlines that the charter carriers were 
no longer a competitive threat and, therefore, interfacing was not a prob-
lem~" One carrier indicated that it did some interfacing with charter 
carri ers by transporti ng baseba 11 teams and saw thi s as a means of ob-
taining more efficient use of its resources. 
To summarize the effect of the current environment on the interfacing 
of major carriers with other types of airlines, the conclusion is that 
interfacing with foreign carriers and with commuters has increased and 
will continue to hold at the present lev~l or increase because these re-
lations are mutually beneficial. Charter and cargo service represent 
such a small part of total operations that the majors did not have a po-
sition on interface. 
12.2 Nationals and Regionals: Frontier, Piedmont, AirCal, Air Florida, 
SWA, PSA, Midway, Flying Tigers, Federal Express 
Since the national and regional airlines, with the obvious "excep-
tion of Air Florida and Flying Tigers, do not engage in significant for-
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eign operations,22 i~ is not surprising that their interface is cooper-
ative in nature and designed to provide traffic feed. This feed, however, 
furnishes but a small amount of business and is thus not considered to be 
of great importance. On the other hand, Air Florida's aggressive expan-
sion internationally has been made possible in part by successful inter-
facing with foreign carriers. Notwithstanding, cooperative arrangements 
do not always run smoothly. Laker has been cooperative with Air Florida, 
taking the attitude "If you are better, you deserve the business." On 
the other hand, British Caledonian Airways (BCAl) discontinued its inter-
line agreement with Air Florida. Of course, there is no love lost be-
tween Air Florida and Eastern, so that the interface between these Miami 
base airlines is highly competitive. 
National and regional airlines have about the same cooperative in-
terface arrangements with commuters as do the majors. Stage lengths of 
the nationals and even the regionals are long enriugh to benefit from feed 
supplied by the commuters. One national airline, however, pointed out 
that while it desired to be cooperative, it had to guard against giving 
up too much of value in the way of ticket counters, gate space, etc. in 
the process. Another national carrier made the point that the degree of 
cooperative interfacing depended upon how much good the commuter could do 
for it. Blanket cooperation was not the policy. In the case of a large 
cargo carrier, like Flying Tigers, whose planes are often too large to 
serve small or medium size airports, it has cooperative arrangements with 
commuters to feed its large aircraft. 
22 For this purpose we disregard the limited "foreign operations ll of PSA 
and Frontier to Mexico and Canada. 
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There is little interface between nationals and regionals on the one 
hand and cargo carriers on the other. In fact, as the size of carriers 
decreases, so does the amount of interface. Generally speaking, nation-
als and regionals have little cargo business so that it is to their in-
terest to have cooperative interfacing to feed their belly compartments. 
However, such companies as Flying Tigers and Federal Express, who are al-
most exclusively cargo carriers, in their scramble for business have com-
petitive relationships with other cargo carriers. 
Regionals and nationals had little to say about interfacing with 
charter airlines, pointing out that freedom of entry and exit, as well 
as pricing freedom available under deregulation, has resulted in marginal 
pricing with which the charter carriers have been unable to compete. 
Therefore, charter companies have declined in importance. Only one car-
rier thought there was a likelihood of a charter resurgence. In the pre-
sent recessionary period, with cheap secondhand piston planes and cheap 
labor available, Flying Tigers has established contracts with small com-
panies to haul cargo in DC-6s and CV-440s to major hubs, in order to 
feed jumbo 8-747s which by themselves could not operate profitably in and 
out of minor markets. 
One final point: New carriers who focus on low-cost service be-
tween high-density markets do not attempt interface arrangements because 
of a desire to keep operations simple and maintain flexibility. South-
west and Midway stated that questions on interfacing with foreign, com-
muter, cargo, or charter carriers did not have relevance for them. 
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12.3 Commuters: Air Wisconsin, Air New England, Golden West, Midstate 
Since only a few commuters operate from international airports, the 
opportunities for commuters to interface with foreign airlines are limit-
ed. Generally interfacing is limited to conventional interline arrange-
ments and is cooperative in nature. 
As the preceding portion of this chapter has shown, commuters are 
presently being courted by larger carriers as a means of providing the 
latter with longer haul traffic. However, the interface of commuters 
with other commuters is, as would be expected, largely competitive. Air 
Wisconsin, whose route structure and operations seem to be moving it away 
from the commuter class, proved to be a'n exception indicating that most 
of its commuter interfacing was cooperative. 
Charter operations were considered to be a small part of commuter 
operations. Beyond interlining a commuter may be chartered to a company 
like Flying Tigers to feed traffic by air instead of by truck. Air Wis-
consin indicated its interfacing with cargo carriers was cooperative. 
Golden West and Midstate said their charter interface was small or nonex-
istent. 
Commuters indicated an ongoing interest in building their cargo bus-
iness and, to this end, were pursuing cooperative arrangements with other 
carriers at the interface. Air Wisconsin in particular felt its inter-
facing was more cooperative than competitive. Britt and Midstate had in-
terline arrangements which were deemed to supplement their own loads. 
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12.4 Summary 
National and international air carriers provide service from small 
cities to large hubs and to international destinations employing various 
types of carriers such as: long-haul, medium-haul, short-haul, commuter, 
cargo, and charter. Some compete not only for passengers and cargo but 
also for scarce resources such as gate space, reservation facilities, 
airport use, and air space. To provide service required by the public 
interest, as well as to maximize their earnings, the carriers interface 
at points where they operate from the same airport and this interface ex-
tends to beyond points. This chapter examined whether the managements 
view these relations as competitive or cooperative. The answer was 
clearly on the .cooperative side. To the extent that deregulation in the 
future will further fragment the system so that large carriers will con-
centrate on different types of operations from the medium sized and com-
muter carriers, the more extensive will make cooperative arrangements at 
the interface. 
The zeal with which commuters are being courted demonstrates that 
the larger carriers wish not only to retain feed from routes they have 
dropped but wish to acquire additional feed to increase load factors on 
their present and future aircraft equipment. 
156 
.. 
Chapter 13 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The decade of the 1970s and the first two years of the 80s have 
been a period of dramatic and, in some cases, traumatic change for air-
line managements. Prior to 1970 management worked in a reasonably com-
fortable economic and regulatory environment characterized by: (1) in-
creasing aircraft productivity and lower unit costs, (2) a stable price 
level, (3) a high degree of regulatory protection from new-entry compe-
tition and predatory pricing, (4) a population with an increasing 
disposable income and with an inclination to allocate some of it to air 
travel, and (5) a fairly clear division between unsubsidized long-haul 
carriers, then called "trunks," shorter-haul subsidized smaller carriers, 
called "local service ll airlines, and a group of very short-haul carriers 
called "commuters.1I The latter were severely limited in the size of 
aircraft they could use. 
A number of managements operated profitably in this environment but 
some regulatory and business policies fell into public disfavor. The 
CAB at one time frowned upon attempts to stimulate traffic by discount 
fares, placed a route moratorium in effect, approved a capacity control 
agreement, and proposed floors for charter fares. By 1975 the CAB and 
Congress began to show interest in permitting management to make entry, 
exit, and pricing decisions in a competitive framework. 
Initially the large carriers, who had much turf to protect, vigor-
ously opposed deregulation. However, United, who had good reason to 
complain that its management had not been able to manage effectively 
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because it had been uniformly denied route applications by reason of 
size, supported deregulation. Then one by one the major carriers, at 
least publicly, fell into line and followed United. Local service car-
riers, who had long coveted some major markets, gave their support early. 
In October 1978 the Air Deregulation Act became law. Basically it pro-
vided almost complete freedom of entry, somewhat less free exit, wide 
flexibility in setting fares, relative freedom to merge with or acquire 
another carrier, and a guarantee of service for a limited term to com-
munities 1 abel ed "essential." Managements were faced with a competitive 
environment in which some airlines were not fully prepared to cope. 
Cases of wild and conservative expansion or both occurred. 
In the hearings leading to the passage of the deregulation act, 
much emphasis was placed on the success of PSA and SWA, two carriers 
which had avoided the constraints of CAB regulations by confining them-
selves to intrastate operations and which had engaged in low-cost, high-
frequency service accompanied by very high load factors. Proponents 
argued that under deregulation this type of operation would find in-
creasing favor with the scheduled air carriers and would offer lower 
fares to the public and better profits for the airlines. Although the 
specter of cut-throat competition was raised, it was usually in terms of 
new "fly-by-night" operators who would buy cheap used aircraft, employ 
cheap labor, and skimp on maintenance. It was not in terms of major 
airlines consuming themselves with bel'ow cost pricing on major route 
segments. 
Managements agree that deregulation has a significant effect on 
their equipment needs for the 1985-2000 period. While officially 
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forecasting a 4.5 percent growth rate, "off the record" managements are 
more pessimistic. Given the belief that "frequency is the name of the 
game," and that the competitive environment leads to more carriers per 
route, they conclude that large wide-bodies, such as the DC-10, L-1011, 
and A-300, have limited usefulness. The sizes managements now foresee 
as needed in the future are smaller than they had previously thought. 
Two other factors having major impacts on management's assessment 
of aircraft needs arose in the 1970s, namely fuel price escalation and 
aircraft noise emission regulations. Noise regulations, when fully im-
plemented in the middle 80s will require the removal from service of a 
significant number of jet transports and the replacement or significant 
and expensive modification of others. Low-noise emission aircraft may 
become a marketing tool. 
Escalation of fuel price per gallon from 10 cents in the early 1970s 
to the current level of $1.05 has raised the fuel portion of direct costs 
from 10 percent to 30 percent, and the portion of cash operating costs 
for some fuel-inefficient aircraft to over 50 percent so that a portion 
of variable cost can now exceed total fixed costs. This dramatic in-
fluence on costs has wrought revolutionary changes in the operating, 
engineering, maintenance, and route planning departments. Many manage-
ments have made significant alterations in the type of r'outes flown so 
as to adjust them to the economics of their fleets. By the same token, 
in their future acquisitions, seat miles per gallon has emerged as a 
major factor. Future acquisitions, when they can be financed, will no 
longer turn on attractiv~ and comfortable passenger amenities, but on 
low airplane mile costs and low seat mile costs. Ownership costs, 
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particularly with high interest costs, will be scrutinized to see that 
they do not offset the cash operating expense economies provided by the 
new technology incorporated in the aircraft. 
As an airline management looks to the 1985-2000 period it sees that 
the comfortable environment of the 1960s has been replaced by one of 
uncertainty and instability involving: (1) its future role, (2) the 
type of aircraft needed, (3) whether to pUrchase foreigh transports, 
(4) how much, if any, growth to plan for, and(S) the extent of inter-
facing with other airlines. 
13.1 Future Role (Chapters 2-7) 
Management's views of the future role of its company appear to be 
largely a function of the airline's financial status. Thus, companies 
like Delta, United, and Northwest feel not only that they will be sur-
vivors under deregulation and inflation but will emerge stronger and be 
capable of excelling in short-haul, long-haul, and very long-haul inter-
national operations at the same time. Delta and United have submitted 
specifications for new-technology highly efficient planes calculated to 
give them a competitive advantage over those not able to finance pUr-
chases. On the other hand, other large carriers, like American, feel 
that they will not be in a position to purchase a new 150-pas~enger air-
craft when it is offered for sale, and thus believe they will have to 
shrink the size of their companies. American has admittedly changed its 
network to fit the economics of its fleet where it carthot meet the lower 
costs of new "upstart a irl i nes" in point-to ... poi nt compet 1t ion. 
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'All carriers using wide-bodies in domestic service were concerned 
that if used in the frequent service needed to attract passengers, the 
wide-bodies would not attract break even loads except in holiday seasons, 
periods of fuel shortage when less efficient planes would be,grounded, 
or when a{r traffic control constraints were present. 
Although many major carriers view the future with some degree of 
concern, such was not the case with the nationals (former local service) 
and regionals, all of whom were greatly pleased with the opportunities 
afforded under deregulation. Their deregulation experience is charac-
terized by a lengthening of stage lengths and a movement to extended 
operations once considered the province of the trunks. Accordingly, 
they tend to look for 1985-2000 fleet additions which would involve some 
larger aircraft than they now have. 
As was the case with the local service carriers, the success of 
Southwest Airlines, Pacific Southwest and Midway breeds in each of them 
the desire for further expansion. This was not true of Southwest when 
the interview with their President Howard Putnam was conducted. However, 
shortly thereafter Mr. Putnam moved to become president of Braniff and 
Southwest's new chief executive, Herbert Kelleher, announced a signifi-
cant interstate expansion program for'~is company. 
The cargo carriers, Flying Tigers and Federal Express, both propo-
nents of deregulation, envisaged an expanded role for themselves with a 
much greater rate of growth seen by Federal Express. Also relatively 
optimistic were the commuter carriers, each of whom planned interstate 
expansion with longer haul segments. 
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13.2 Type of Aircraft Needed 1985-2000 (Chapters 8 and 9) 
The major airlines are in agreement that their most pressing need 
is replacement for the DC-9, B-727, B-737, B-707, and BAC 1-11 fleets. 
Many of these are noisy, fuel-inefficient, reaching 20 years of age and 
contain less than state of the art technology. Since the passenger capa-
cities of such ajrcraft run from the high 80s for some DC-9s to approxi-
mately 149 (mixed class) or 177 (coach class) for the B-727-200, one 
size plane will not suffice. 
150-passenger plane: Sixteen carriers are in general agreement that 
a twin-engine, l50-passenger (mixed class) two-pilot, very fuel-
efficient aircraft meeting Stage 3 noise rules is badly needed. More 
specifically, this design should be optimized around stage lengths 
ranging for 600 to 900 miles, but be relatively efficient over a much 
wider range. Only Delta and United believe they can finance such a 
plane and say they are prepared to order them. Northwest and SWA do not 
yet have the need for this type aircraft and thus prefer to sit on the 
sidel ines. All the other air1 ines see financing as an impossi b1 e 
stumbling block until there are several years of robust earnings, which 
they define as at least five percent on revenues. 
The difficulty in climbing the financial hurdle involved in pur-
chasing a new-technology l50-passenger aircraft led American Airlines 
'to propose re-engining the B-727-200 series with two fuel-efficient, 
quiet new-technology engines. Estimated to cost $12 million each in 
1981 dollars, the plane would be designated the B-727RE. Thus for a 
price of a new-technology plane the company could extend the life of its 
current B-727-200s perhaps 15 years and have an aircr-aft almost as 
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efficient as the "c1ean sheet" new aircraft. Carriers operating 8-727s, 
except for United and Delta, show interest in the 8-727RE provided a 
Ip1ug" added to the fuselage would increase capacity and e1 iminate the 
need for carrying a heavy weight of lead in the front to counterbalance 
the weight of the rear engines. On the other hand, American, hewing to 
its "keep it simple and keep the cost down" approach asserts it is only 
interested in the 1 ess expensive "no p1 ug" modi ficat ion. 
130-passenger plane: A new-technology plane in the l30-passenger 
size had support in some quarters of Eastern for·two reasons: first, 
unless very rose-colored glasses were· worn, this size would be ideal 
for many of Eastern's present and future markets, and second, the air-
craft might easily, through growth during design,deve10p into the ideal 
l50-seat plane. The smaller of the major airlines, as well as former 
local service airlines, indicated a desire for a l30-place plane. How-
ever, following Airbus ' dropping of the l30-seat version of its A-320 
design, and after reviewing the tasks ahead for the aircraft manufac-
turers, the carriers reluctantly concluded that no "c1ean sheet" air-
plane would be built. Rather, derivatives from the B-737, B-727, and 
DC-9 would be the alternatives. USAir's conclusion that the 8-727-300 
was close enough to its specifications for a new aircraft, and SWA's 
view that the 8-737-300 would take the company almost to the year 2000, 
tend to confirm the conclusion. 
100-passenger plane: Eastern and some of the former local service 
lines, discounting the view that the halcyon growth days of 1945-1970 
will ever return, believe a new 100-passenger (mixed class) plane is 
needed to replace their obsolescent equipment. However, they see little 
163 
prospect of such an aircraft being developed by Boeing, Oouglas,or 
Lockheed -- their regular American suppliers. Several regional carriers 
perceive an 85- to 100-passenger jet as meeting their .future needs. Thus 
far Air Wisconsin has been the first to order a new lOO-passenger jet, 
the British-made BAe 146. Altair and Empire, commuters, have also 
adopted jet equipment, the 85-passenger Fokker F-28 Mk4000. 
Turboprops and prop-fans: The prop-fan, which is advanced, jet 
speed development of turboprop technology, was highly desired by United 
and Federal Express. Both saw no problem with public acceptance or with 
the successful application of the technology required. Other large 
carriers, however, particularly those with previous turboprop experience 
(AA, OA, EA, USAir, PI, and Republic) had serious reservations about the 
likelihood of solving the noise, vibration, and maintenance and gearbox 
problems. Every carrier urged that research on prop-fans be accelerated 
to hasten the day they will be operational. 
Given the present emphasis on fuel economy, a primary benefit of 
a prop-fan, it was surprising that the cargo carriers considered speed 
so important as to be willing to trade-off some fuel economy for speed. 
Without exception, all airlines thought an economical propfan did not 
have to match exactly the speed of a turbofan. In return for lower 
fares, passengers would accept a differential block time of 10 to 15 
minutes. Accordingly, some airlines would accept a lower speed down to 
this bench mark in return for additional fuel economy. 
In aircraft below IOO-passenger capacity and involving short-haul 
operations, the overwhelming desire was for "clean sheet" new-technology 
turboprops. The greatest interest' was .in the 30- to 40-passenger size 
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to fill the void developed under earl ier CAB c.onstraints. Commuters 
regretted that foreign manufacturers were more attentive to their needs 
than were U.S. companies. After the interest in the 30- to 40-passenger 
size came a desire for a significant improvement in present 15- to 19-
passenger commuter turboprops so that management could effectively use 
the aircraft's full seating and some cargo capacity.on longer stage 
lengths. Carriers were not convinced that new technology had trickled 
down to their aircraft in a timely fashion. 
Finally, despite the performance advantages of turboprops in short-
haul operations, commuter and other managements expressed a desire to 
turn to jets where possible. Some have begun to do so and are finding 
it necessary to drop certain former turboprop route segments in the 
process. 
13.3 The Purchase of Foreign Transport Aircraft 
Purchases of the wide-body A-300 by Eastern and Rolls-Royce engines 
by Pan American fuel ed a "Buy American" movement in the 1 ate 1970s when 
there was hi gh unemployment in the aerospace industry. Thi s movement 
subsided as air transport production became more international in charac-
ter. A growing number of American components find their way into 
foreign aircraft and an increasing number of American components are con-
tracted to be made in foreign countries. What is Amerlcan and what is 
foreign has become unclear. 
All the large carriers and all but two of the small carriers denied 
any bias against purchasing a foreign aircraft and stated that only in 
the case of a tie in the competition would they favor the American 
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supplier. These same carriers reported that the quality of foreign 
aircraft and engines was excellent and in some cases, particularly 
avionics, was better than U.S. The two carriers having a definite pref-
erence for U.S. built planes attributed their preference to their loca-
tion near the aircraft manufacturer's plant and to excellent support 
experience, and not to any patriotism or questions of foreign quality. 
The lack of U.S. offered commuter planes in some categories has 
made it impossibl e for commuters to have a "Buy American" pol icy. How-
ever, while they consider foreign quality reasonably good, they would, 
if given the proper product buy in the U.S. The cbmmuters general com-
plaint is that American manufacturers have lagged behind their foreign 
counterparts ih being responsive to commuter needs. 
13.4 Managements Growth Forecasts (Chapter 11) 
Periods of overcapacity in the past have resulted from aircraft 
purchases based on forecasts of growth which did not materialize. There-
fore, it is not surprising that some carriers consider forecasts for 
their company's growth a proprietary matter, and that others frankly say 
they don't forecast more than two years ahead. In any event, all con-
sider forecasts beyond_ 1985 as questionable and those beyond 1990 to be 
little more than scattergun shots in the dark. 
Having supplied these caveati, management, in respon~e to the ques-
tion of forecasting industry and their company's rate of growth, uni-
formly predicted an industry growth rate of 4.5 percent per year. Their 
growth rates, they forecast, would be equal to or greater than the 
industry rate -- indicating that some individual forecasts are in error. 
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Finally, since it is rare for airlines to agree with each other, 
the fact that each airline forecast the same industry growth suggests a 
lack of independent forecasting. As a matter of fact, the airl ine fore-
casters consult each other through the Air Transport Association and 
agree on a figure which all then use. In this way no one's incorrect" 
forecast stands out above the others. 
The individual forecasts are even more suspect. First, no one is 
below the industry average -- a contradiction in terms. Secondly, a 
forecaster is not likely to hold his job if he keeps telling his manage-
ment that it is doing less well than the competitors. Several said, off 
the record, they did not believe their own forecasts. Thus the reports 
in this forecast chapter should not be given much credence. 
13.5 Interfacing with Other Carriers (Chapter 12) 
The purpose of Chapter 12 was to ascertain the type (cooperative or 
competitive) and extent of interfacing the carriers anticipated in the 
future as a result of the new economic, regulatory, and technological 
environment. In an era characterized by competition there will be by 
definition more carriers and areas of special ization both in passenger 
and cargo carriage. Each carrier has a strong interest in receiving feed 
from others at the point of interface .. Therefore it is anticipated that 
the present extensive interface arrangements now existing between domes-
tic and foreign carriers not only will continue but will increase in 
scope. Of course, at the regional and commuter level there are fewer 
points of international interface. These arrangements are cooperative 
in nature. 
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Since de~egulation, the larger carriers have dropped some of their 
short-haul segments as they concentrated on what they perceived to be more 
profitable long-haul operations. Not wishing to lose the feed from 
these routes and hoping to receive feed from other routes, the major, 
the medium size, and the regional airlines have been establishing in-
creasingly cooperative arrangements at the interface. All the carriers 
interviewed anticipated that these types of arrangements would continue 
to develop in number and importance in the 1985-2000 period. However, 
some concern was shown that the long-haul carriers might give away more 
value than they received in their efforts to woo the commuters. 
The ability of charter carriers to compete successfully on price 
with scheduled carriers has diminished in the last few years as the 
scheduled carriers gained more pricing freedom. As a result, they are 
no longer considered. a competitive threat by most carriers. There is 
almost no interfacing and this condition is expected to continue in the 
1985-2000 period. 
Generally speaking, domestic carriers of all types, including com-
muters, have excess capacity in their belly or other cargo compartments. 
Accordingly, their interest in utilizing this space has spawned coopera-
tive arrangements at the interface. It was the consensus of opinion 
that the 1985-2000 period would see no change .. 
13.6 Conclusions 
With the caveat that 'generalizations imply variations and excep-
tions, the following represents a distillation of the perceptions of 
airline managements as to the 1985-2000 period: 
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1. For the large major airlines, deregulation and inflation will cause 
some shift in their roles in the industry. Some will shrink in 
size as they specialize in limited types of operation rather 
than being all things to all people. It was predicted that some 
would fall by the wayside; but it was always "some of the others." 
2. Medium size, small size and commuter airlines expect to expand and 
be profitable as they select longer stage length routes of the 
larger carriers and as they acquire more efficient aircraft. 
3. Except for United and Delta, both of whom are seeking "cl ean sheet" 
aircraft tailored to their needs, airlines expect continuously to 
"fine tune" their routes in accordance with the economics of their 
fleets. 
4. Although fuel efficiency has been highly touted as the controlling 
factor for planes to be used from 1985-2000, most carriers say this 
is an oversimplification. It is only the "bottom line" after taking 
account of higher depreciation caused by inflation and the cost of 
new technology, and the new higher order of financing rates, which 
controls. In two cases carriers were willing under some situations 
to trade fuel efficiency for more speed. 
5. Notwithstanding number 4 above, fuel costs, noise regulations, and 
increasing maintenance costs will force the replacement in 1985-2000 
of most B-707s, B-727s, B-737s, DC-9s and BAC I-lIs operating in 
1981. 
6. Although the majors and some regionals are in agreement on the need 
for a 150-seat, and possibly a 130-seat (both in mixed class) re-
placement, the chaotic financial state of the industry leads the 
majority to believe that financial constraints will prevent the air-
craft from being undertaken for a number of years, if ever. 
7. One large carrier short of financing ability, American Airlines, is 
leading a movement to modify the three-engine B-727 into a twin-
engine pl ane of the same capac ity but with more powerful, qu i et, 
fuel-efficient, high-bypass engines. If this can be done at half 
the cost of a new technology plane, the company believes the project 
to be a fforda bl e and a way to prevent serious shrinkage of the com-
pany's operations. The other operators who cannot afford a new-
technology plane favor the re-engining idea, but only if a costly 
plug containing additional seats is inserted into the fuselage. 
8. The speed of new-technology airl iners will not be reduced below cur-
rent operating practices to take advantage of fuel economy. Speci-
fications for new jets call for current Mach numbers. In fact, two 
major cargo carriers indicated that they might be willing to sacri-
fice fuel economy for speed in the case of acquisition of turboprops 
or prop-fans. 
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9. A1tho~gh all carriers earnestly desired accelerated research to 
bring turboprop speeds close to those of jets via a high-technology 
prop-fan, a few, primarily those with previous turboprop experi-
ence, had reservations about the solution of vibration, noise, and 
maintenance problems. On the other hand, two large carriers, 
United and Federal Express, thought modern technology would solve 
the problems and, therefore, these airplanes representing signifi-
cant economies in fuel usage were eagerly awaited. 
10. With some well defined exceptions, carriers saw turboprops in the 
1985-2000 period as becoming more efficient but their use confined 
to aircraft carrying 100 passengers or less and on routes on which 
the block time differential between them and turbojets did not 
exceed 10 to 15 minutes. 
11. All but two carriers denied any bias against foreign planes. Even 
though they may have purchased American transports in competition 
with foreign planes, managements gave high praise for the ~uality 
of foreign wide-bodies -- even indicating that in some areas the 
quality and technology exceeded that of the U.S. built aircraft. 
Growing internationalization of aircraft under which there is an 
increasing mix of construction locations and origin of component 
parts has blurred the distinction between U.S. and foreign to the 
point where the IIBuy American ll argument has lost its logic. Fail-
ure of American companies to purchase foreign transports was based 
upon the aircraft not being right for the mission or. would dupli-
cate aircraft in the company's existing fleet. . 
12. In the smaller plane area, commuter airlines felt that American 
manufacturers, conce~trating on larger aircraft, had not paid suf-
ficient attention to the needs of commuters who were thus forced to 
make most of their purchases abroad. The central needs of the com-
muters for the 1985-2000 period are: (1) a more efficient 15- to 
19-passenger plane (turboprop), and (2) a 30- to 40-passenger turbo-
prop to fill a void created by CAB regulations which have now been 
lifted. While not enthusiastic about the technology in foreign-
built commuters, the carriers considered the workmanship to be 
good. 
13. Considerable concern was expressed as to the futUre of the three-
engine, three-pilot wide-bodies. Competition resulting from deregu-
lation, air fares rising more rapidly than the consumer price index, 
and,a general downturn in economic conditions make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to fill these wide-bodies and provide the frequency 
of service needed to attract passengers. Secondly, the efficiencies 
and route capabilities of the forthcoming twin-engine, two-pilot 
8-767 and B-757 cast further gloom on these wide-bodies .. 
8y 1992 some three-engine wide-bodies will be 20 years old. Since 
the aircraft are currently quiet, fuel-efficient, and since they 
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provide low seat mile costs, little has been done to plan for their 
future. Studies are now underway investigating re-engining pro-
grams. Unless there is return to a growth pattern greater than 
currently forecast, the capacity of the wide-bodies in the changed 
environment may lead to their transfer from the American scene. 
14. No concern was felt for the long run future of the Boeing 747. 
Evolutionary changes constantly improve this aircraft and no other 
manufacturer can at current prices affotd to build a· competitive 
model. All concerned felt that when needed a new more efficient 
engine would be developed to extend the aircraft's useful 1 ife. 
15. When asked for industry traffic forecast to the year 2000, manage-
ments, while responding with a 4.5 percent figure, disclaimed any 
accuracy for it. Figures two years out were treacherous, they said, 
and anything beyond 1985 was guesswork. Individual forecasts for 
company traffic growth, which ranged from 4.4 percent to 15-20 per-
cent annually to the year 2000, were even more questionable. Ad-
mittedly a manager has a strong bias against forecasting that his 
company will do less well than his competitors. 
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Appendix A 
Sample questions addressed to airline managements in NASA study of 
future aircraft needs, 1985-2000, under the changed economic, regulatory 
and technological environment. 
1. Given the changes of the 1970s and 1980, how does the airline see 
its future role in the air transport system? 
a. What is the size and type of aircraft this role requires? 
b. What stage lengths will be involved? 
c. Will it be necessary to readjust the airline's route network 
to fit the economics of the current fleet? . 
d. Or is it planned to obtain a completely new plane optimal for 
the airline's new strategic plan? 
2. If new aircraft are in the picture, what percent fuel savings over 
existing equipment is necessary to interest management? 50%? if 
not that, what percent? 
3. What is the appropriate stage length(s) and Mach number(s) around 
which a future plane(s) should be designed? 
4. What passenger capacity would be desired for a new turboprop, prop'-
fan, or fan jet for the airline? 
a. 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, or 150 passengers? 
b. given the existing capital constraints, how many sizes could 
the carrier handle? 
5. Addressing the turboprop and propfan, are there possi bl e trade-offs 
between speed and fuel efficiency? For example, is fuel efficiency 
the driving force in all cases? 
6. How does the carrier see itself ~nd the industry interfacing with 
foreign carriers in the future? With commuters?' With cargo car-
riers? With charter? Will it be competitive or cooperative? 
7. How does the carrier view the trends in foreign offerings in com-
parison with U.S. manufactured planes? Do you have an expr,essed 
or latent bias against foreign aircraft? 
8. Do you see replacement or reengining of the B-747, DC-10, L-1011, 
A-300? 
9. What type of traffic growth is expected by 1990 and 2000? 
a. air transport generally 
b. your company 
173 
Appendix B 
Individuals Interviewed in Preparation of NASA Study 
1981 
DATE 
May 15 
May 18 
May 19 
June 9 
June 15 
June 18 
June 24 
COMPANY 
( PLACE) 
American 
(DFW) 
Air Florida 
(Miami) 
Eastern 
(Miami) 
USAir 
(Washington) 
Delta 
(Atl anta) 
USAir 
(Pittsburgh) 
Republ ic 
(Minneapolis) 
NAME 
Donald Lloyd-Jones 
Richard Linn 
Earl Ditmars 
Don Garvett 
Wayne A. Yeoman 
Al fred Brescia 
D. S. Kl ein 
Gary Purvis 
Ro bertCozz i 
Paul Johnstone 
Garner W. Willer, Jr. 
Edwin I. Colodny 
Randa 11 Mali n 
A. C. Ford 
C. Julian May 
Wa lter Overend 
Capt. Robert A. Byrd 
Garner W. Miller, Jr. 
J.F. Nixon 
Northwest Donald Nyprop 
(Minneapolis) 
June 25 United 
(Chi cago ) 
June 30 SWA 
(Da 11 as) 
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Richard Ferris 
Edward Beami sh 
Sven Madsen 
Howard Putnam 
Harold F. Reilly 
TITLE 
Sr. VP Operations 
Dr. Technical Development 
VP Forecasts, Research 
& Traffic 
VP Planning 
(also other staff) 
Sr. VP Finance 
VP Economic Planning 
Dir. Special Planning 
Studies 
Mgr. Fleet Planning, 
Mgr. Passenger Forecast-
ing & Planning 
Sr. VP Operations Svc. 
Sr. VP Maintenance & 
Engineering 
Chairman & President 
Sr. VP Marketing 
Asst. VP Long Range 
Planning 
VP Engineering 
Gen. Mgr., Programs & 
Performance Engineering 
Mgr. Flight Operations-
Techni ca 1 
Sr. VP Maintenance & 
Engineering 
Sr. Vice Corporate 
Planning 
Consultant and Former 
Chairman & President 
Cha irman & CEO 
Sr. VP Corporate Planning 
Fl eet Pl ann i ng 
President & CEO 
VP, Schedule Planning 
(", 
.. 
'II 
:l 
... 
1981 
DATE COMPANY 
June 30 American 
(DFW) 
NAME 
Earl Ditmars 
Peter A. Pappas 
William H. Troxel 
July 1 AirCal Harry G. Lehr 
(Newport Bch) Barbara Mowry 
Flying Tigers John E. Flynn 
(Los Angeles) Richard Brannon 
Continental Dan Love 
(Los Angeles) Richard Adams 
July 2 Western James L. Mitchell 
(Los Angeles) Robert Ross 
July 8 TWA 
(NY) 
July 10 Piedmont 
(Winston-
Sa 1 em) 
July 14 Frontier 
(Denver) 
Neil Effman 
Russell Garl in 
R.L. James 
D.W. Witte 
Dan A. Hersh 
PSA· Byron H. Miller 
July 28 
July 29 
Aug. 7 
(San Diego) 
Golden West 
(Boston) 
Air New 
Engl and 
(Boston) 
Midway 
(Chicago) 
Aug. 11 Federal 
Express 
(Memphi s) 
Richard Russell 
Stephen Gill 
Gordon L inkon 
Arlene Dunn 
Theodore L. Weise 
Ronald Ponder 
Aug. 12 Midstate Bryce Appleton 
(Stevens Pt., 
WI) 
TITLE 
VP Forecasts, Research 
& Traffic 
Asst. VP Economic Planning 
Sr. Director - Forecasts 
VP Planning 
Dr. of Planning and 
Analysis 
Executive VP 
Dir. of Pricing & Tariffs 
Sr. VP- Futures Planning 
Executive VP Operations 
& Technical Services 
Sr. VP Corporate Planning 
Dir. of Flight Schedules 
Sr. VP-Airline Planning 
Mgr. of Fleet Planning 
Dir. of Route Development 
Mgr. Marketing Research 
Planning 
VP-Future Planning 
VP-Fleet .Planning 
Dir. of Planning 
Sr. Dir. Marketing 
Planning 
President 
Dir. of Economic Planning 
Sr. VP Operations Planning 
VP Advanced Projects & 
Research 
President 
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1981 
DATE COMPANY NAME TITLE 
Aug. 12 Britt William C. Britt President (questionnaire 
Airways response from Mr. Britt) 
Aug. 18 United Robert C. Collins VP-Engineering 
(San Dick Coykendall Mgr. Aircraft Development 
Francisco) Engineering 
Aug. 25 Air William H. Geenan VP & Treasurer 
Wisconsin 
(Appl eton WI) 
Dec. 3 Fed era 1 Peter S. Wilmott President 
Express 
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